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THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH PEASANT PARTY, 1895-1907

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THE majority of the mass peasant parties which played such an important role in the politics of central and south-east Europe during the inter-war years were derived from groups which date back to the last decade of the nineteenth or the first decade of the twentieth century. The Czech Agrarian Party was founded in 1896; the Bulgarian Agrarian Union in 1899; the Croatian Peasant Party in 1904. But the earliest in date, and later one of the most powerful in numbers and influence, was the Polish Peasant Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*), which was formally set up on 28 July, 1895, at a congress held at Rzeszów in the Austrian province of Galicia, the only part of Poland where conditions at that time were at all favorable to the development of a political peasant movement.

The party had come into existence for a specific purpose: to replace the ineffective Catholic Populist Club formed in 1889 by a wider organization more capable of fighting elections successfully. The new party remained, however, without any clear ideological basis, since the 21 points issued on 4 August, a few days after the Rzeszów Congress, dealt almost exclusively with minor problems; and it represented in fact a fusion of the two wings of the peasant movement, led respectively by Bolesław Wysłouch and Father Stanisław Stojałowski.¹

Wysłouch, to whose initiative the formation of the party was mainly due, had imbibed during his student years at St. Petersburg the agrarian socialist theories of the Russian *narodniki*. In the mid 1880's, shortly after settling in Lwów, he had started a short-lived monthly, *The Social Review* (*Przegląd Społeczny*), in whose pages he expounded the new creed, applying it particularly to the question of nationality. The contents of this review were of a purely theoretical nature, likely to appeal only to a narrow circle of middle-class intellectuals. But now for the last six years, aided by

¹Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Czasopiśmiennictwo Ludowe w Galicji* (Wrocław, 1952), pp. 132-36.

his gifted wife Maria Wyslouchowa, he had been working hard to awaken the peasants to a sense of their political rights and national heritage through the medium of his paper *The People's Friend* (*Przyjaciół Ludu*), the first appearance of which in 1889 had coincided with the humble beginnings under Stojałowski's guidance of independent political action on the part of the peasants themselves.

While Wyslouch advocated the formation of a secular peasant party free from any religious affiliations, his rival Stojałowski, whose attempts to organize the peasantry date back to the 1870's, based his action on Catholic social principles such as inspired the parties which arose among the Roman Catholic workers in Central Europe as well as among the Slovak and Slovene peasants. These ideas he aired in his bi-monthly papers bearing the curious names of *The Garland* (*Wieniec*) and *The Bee* (*Pszczółka*). But, despite his loyalty to his faith, Stojałowski was long to endure opposition from his ecclesiastical superiors, who regarded his political activities as subversive of the social order, an opposition as fierce as that which also greeted the efforts of Wyslouch and his followers.²

By the end of 1895, however, Stojałowski had met with defeat in his attempt to harness the new movement to Catholic social principles. With the rejection of his proposal to tack the epithet "christian" to the party's official title, Stojałowski withdrew with his followers.³ Henceforward he was to work independently of, and usually in opposition to, the Peasant Party. Wyslouch in his resistance to Stojałowski's designs had been supported by several prominent middle-class democrats, including Dr. Karol Lewakowski and Henryk Rewakowicz, successive presidents of the new party, who had come over to the Populists at the foundation of the Peasant Party.

In September 1895 elections took place to the provincial diet and, as a result, 9 (7 peasants and 2 middle-class men) from the Peasant Party's 26 candidates were returned from the village *curia*, where alone the new party had any chance of success. In addition, 2 more candidates won partly through the party's support, a townsman and a Ruthenian peasant, and 3 peasants were elected as members of the Peasant Union (*Związek Chłopski*), which was now however in alliance with the Conservatives. At last Wyslouch's *People's Friend* could afford to be optimistic: on the whole, it wrote, "the peasantry has carried out its civil responsibilities well."⁴

In 1896 came a limited measure of electoral reform in the shape of an additional electoral *curia* for the *Reichsrath*, the so-called fifth or universal *curia* in which every adult male had the ballot; and in March, 1897, the first elections were held under this new electoral law. Stojałowski fought in

²For Wyslouch, see my article in *The Slavonic and East European Review* (London), Dec. 1951. For Stojałowski see Fr. Kački, Ks. Stanisław Stojałowski i jego działalności społeczno-polityczne (Lwów, 1937). But only the first volume which breaks off in 1890 has so far been published of this work.

³*Przyjaciół Ludu* (Lwów), (cited below as *P.L.*), no. 24, 15 XII, 1895; no. 21, 22 V. 1910; no. 7, 11 II, 1912; *Wieniec Polski* (Lwów), no. 1, 1896; Stanisław Szczepański, *Z dziejów ruchu ludowego w Polsce* (Cracow, 1924), p. 18.

⁴*P.L.*, no. 18, 15 IX, 1895; no. 19, I X, 1895. Cf. Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-39.

loose alliance with the Social Democrats, whom he had so long attacked. The Peasant Party standing in opposition to both Stojałowski and the Social Democrats as well as to its old adversaries, the Conservatives, with their Peasant Union in Nowy Sącz, put forward 9 candidates in the village *curia* and 6 in the universal *curia*. The number of those returned, however, was disappointing in view of the hopes raised by the party's modest successes two years earlier. Only 3 candidates were in fact elected: Jakub Bojko, later famous as a peasant writer and politician, another peasant Francisek Krempa and a young lawyer, Dr. Winkowski, while Stojałowski's supporters obtained 6 seats, though their leader was himself defeated, and the Social Democrats 2.

The election results had shown that the Peasant Party was still weak organizationally. There had been no sustained effort to gain control over bodies such as the village and district councils until 1896, when some success was achieved.⁵ Control over these lower administrative organs could mean a lot when the time for elections to provincial diet and *Reichsrath* came along. The party had been slow in taking steps to alter the situation, so that the initiative was often left to individual members with enterprise. A month after the March elections, for instance, we find Dr. Bardel, an active Cracow party member, writing to Wysłouch that "it would be difficult to continue with the old organization; indeed several committees consist only of followers of Stojałowski and there is no new organization." He therefore intended to go ahead with organizing new committees on the basis of the party program, "not waiting until the happy moment when our consultations produce some positive result."⁶

At a general meeting on 11 January, 1898, a resolution was adopted defining exactly conditions of membership. Directions were sent out as to the composition and functions of party organs from the General Meetings and National Council down to the village and district committees. The local organizations, too, were drawn into closer contact with the headquarters in Lwów. This work was largely due to the efforts of Jan Stapiński, Wysłouch's brilliant young assistant, who—both as secretary of the Party and its chief agitator—was in close touch with the party membership at all levels.⁷

As a result of the general election of 1897, as has been seen, two peasants and an inexperienced young lawyer were the first to represent the new Party in the *Reichsrath* at Vienna. Krempa, though extremely honest and devoted to the cause of his peasant brothers, was rather slow and not at all fitted to support unaided an unpopular cause in a hostile and strange environment like the Vienna *Reichsrath*. Szczepański remarks rather acidly of him that "he achieved a record for the frequency with which he put forward stupid interpellations."⁸ Bojko, though with undoubted gifts as

⁵Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-42.

⁶Wysłouch Papers, Ossolineum Library (Wrocław), Department of Manuscripts, 7175/II, vol. I, p. 153. Letter dated 2 V, 1897.

⁷Ossol. 7231/II, vol. LVII, pp. 57-69.

⁸Szczepański, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

speaker and writer and a short experience as deputy in the provincial diet, was also a stranger in the atmosphere of Vienna. Winkowski, too, was new to parliamentary life and perhaps not altogether at ease with his two colleagues from the country. It was, therefore, natural that the three new deputies were at first able to make little impression in the Vienna parliament and also that they should turn to Wysłouch, the brains of the movement, for advice and guidance in these difficult new conditions.⁹

The next year, 1898, saw the election to Vienna of Stojałowski in February and Stapiński in June, both able exponents of the two opposing trends in the peasant movement. Stapiński's electoral campaign in the Sanok area was marked by the violence of the campaign conducted against him by Stojałowski, which led to serious riotings and anti-semitic outbreaks in Jasło and the declaration of martial law by the government in thirty-three districts.¹⁰

During these early days in Vienna Stapiński, although able to give a firm lead to the tiny group of Peasant Party deputies, continued in close contact with his friend and mentor in Lwów and relied much on Wysłouch for information and advice, much the same as his other colleagues did. "I would like you to forward me some other interpellations as well [he writes from Vienna three months after his election]. I am ready to accept with gratitude your criticisms and suggestions if I am mistaken."¹¹ At the beginning of the next year he is writing again: "According to the agreement, I have been waiting for your orders and that is why I have not written to you."¹²

The letters which Stapiński wrote to Wysłouch from Vienna during the next few years tell a story of difficult material conditions—there are indeed occasional requests for loans of money—and of a lack of spare time left over from their official duties. The life of these early peasant deputies was a simple one, as these letters show, and marked by diligence and hard work on behalf of the cause of those who had elected them. They show, too, the considerable influence which Wysłouch continued to exert on the little parliamentary group, even though Stapiński was beginning to stand on his own feet.¹³

Though opposition to the new party still remained strong and menacing, by the end of the century there were Polish peasants sitting in both the provincial diet and the central parliament; and, most important, the peasants themselves were awakening to a consciousness of their potential strength and were beginning to make their demands felt. The countryside

⁹See Ossol. 7175/II, vol I, p. 435; 7179/II, vol. V, p. 99; 7193/II, vol. XIX, p. 1.

¹⁰An account of these elections is given by Stapiński in his unpublished Memoirs, "Pamiętniki", p. 25. See also Dunin-Wasowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹¹Ossol. 7183/II, vol. IX, p. 191. Letter dated 18 X 1898.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 207. Letter dated 30 I, 1899.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 120-240. 47 letters from Stapiński to Wysłouch have been preserved, of which the majority date from the last four years of the century. Thereafter Stapiński and Wysłouch were slowly to drift apart.

was alive with political activity where ten years before everything had been dead; and the future promised further triumphs and a development of strength and influence. Not every development naturally was for the good. The organizational side had evolved at the expense of the ideological and the cultural; but even organizationally the new movement was not strong. New elements had entered the Movement, which were not always to bring it either honor or profit; careerism began to show itself among leading members of the party.¹⁴ But, even so, the reckoning-up of gains and losses which the end of the century brought might well induce optimism.

"To-day the Peasant Party is a force which all must reckon with [wrote the *People's Friend* at the beginning of 1899] a young peasant army, which will not rest until it has won for the people their rights. . . . We have our members in every corner of the country . . . Our brothers from the other provinces of our partitioned fatherland know about us and are turning their eyes in our direction. Our family is a large one, numbering within its ranks many enlightened and devoted members."¹⁵

The Peasant Party, however, in spite of the progress during the five short years of its existence was at the beginning of the new century, reckoning by its parliamentary strength, still a very small group in comparison with its main opponents, the Conservatives. Some ten deputies in the provincial diet, and less than half that number in the *Reichsrath*, meant that the Party could exert little practical influence on parliamentary proceedings. The first two years of the century were to see fresh elections to both provincial diet and *Reichsrath*. The problem, therefore, at once arose of whether it would not be possible to combine forces with other opposition groups with similar aims in order to break the Conservative majority, at least in the village and universal *curiae*. A coalition of progressive, democratic, and populist parties might have some chance of achieving this; each individual party fighting separately and against the other would have in the foreseeable future none.

Apart from the Peasant Party the opposition camp included three other Polish parties: the liberal Democrats, the Christian-Populist followers of Stojałowski and the Social Democrats. Each of these was at the moment in bitter opposition to the other two. The Social Democrats had, indeed, entered into a brief and uneasy alliance with Stojałowski for the 1897 elections, while the liberal Democrats during the nineties had been very junior partners in the Central Electoral Committee, the Conservatives' electoral machine. Since all these parties were small, for all, therefore, some form of coalition had its attractions.

The most obvious ally for the Peasant Party lay in the Social Democrats, the only other party consistently in opposition, independent of all outside control and based on real mass support. An alliance of the peasant masses with the urban proletariat would have seemed in the logic of history. This,

¹⁴See *P.L.*, no. 8, 11 III 1897.

¹⁵*P.L.*, 1899, no. 1.

however, was not to occur, partly owing to personal differences of temperament and outlook between the leaders of the two parties, more to the parties' fundamental differences of approach. In the early days, before the parties themselves had been formed in the 1890's, no understanding had been reached between the leaders of the two movements in spite of the fact that, for instance, Wysłouch still considered himself a socialist. Populists at that time did not regard the industrial workers as being of great importance: all efforts in their opinion should be directed towards organizing the peasant masses. "In conversations with me [writes the famous Social Democrat leader Daszyński] they pointed to the insignificance of the working classes and laughed at my work among them."¹⁶

With the introduction of the universal *curia* in 1896 the Social Democrats, who had previously confined their agitation to the city workers, began to spread their activity to the villages too, where they expected to find support among the small peasants and landless laborers now possessing the vote for the first time; and this further worsened relations between the peasant and socialist parties.

Various factors contributed to the success or failure of the Social Democrats' efforts in the countryside during these years. The degree of prosperity among the peasants, the power exerted by local clergy and gentry, the previous influence enjoyed by the Populists all played their part. Villages in the proximity of industry and the larger towns were more amenable to socialist propaganda than those more remotely situated; and in fact it was only around Cracow that the Social Democrats succeeded in winning a majority among the peasants. A desire to obtain high prices for their products placed at least the more well-to-do peasantry in opposition to the workers in the towns with their demand for cheap foodstuffs. But in many areas the Social Democrats enjoyed considerable support among the landless laborers and the semi-rural proletariat.¹⁷

A paper specially designed for circulation in the countryside, *The Right of the People* (*Prawo Ludu*), had been started up in 1896 by the Social Democrats. The latter thereby came directly into collision with the Peasant Party, which under the inspiration of Stapiński, "Wysłouch's farm-hand" as the Social Democrats disparagingly called him, had begun a campaign of mass agitation in the villages. The *People's Friend* soon began to complain of attempts on the part of the Socialists "to break up meetings and frustrate the activities of the Peasant Party." It went on to accuse the Socialists of hiding their true aims and intentions in their propaganda designed for the peasantry, rather as Wysłouch's opponents had done when seven years before he had started his work for the peasant cause.¹⁸

¹⁶Ignacy Daszyński, *Pamiętniki* (Cracow, 1925), vol. I, p. 68.

¹⁷Cf. Maciej Czuła, "Robotnicy i Chłopi: Wspomnienia", *Wies* (Łódź), 1948, no. 49/50.

¹⁸*P.L.*, no. 30, 20 X, 1896; no. 34, 1 XII, 1896.

"The peasant, who possesses a piece of ground and a cottage of his own [it wrote] is [in the eyes of the Socialists] 'a usurer' and 'an exploiter' . . . Peasants with a dozen or so morgs are all exploiters, equally with the gentry and the tavern-keepers . . . That the Socialists say . . . that the Peasant Party consists only of the richer peasants does not make us at all angry. We want . . . all members of the Peasant Party to be rich . . . Let the Socialists remember that members of the Peasant Party . . . are all persons toiling on their minute strips of land to keep body and soul together."¹⁹

At the very beginning the peasant movement had in fact represented all sections of the village community. But during the second half of the 1890's a gradual process was initiated whereby the interests of the medium and larger peasants began to take precedence over those of the dwarf-holders and landless laborers. This was noticed by an acute contemporary observer, who wrote that about 1897 "the class character of the Party became crystallized, its national and reform policies suffering as a result . . . Its members still carried on fervent agitation, they aroused a red-hot spirit of opposition, but they were unable to put forward any positive aims."²⁰

While the Peasant Party, therefore, was repelled by the ideological tenets of Marxian socialism, the Social Democrats on the other hand came to regard the Peasant Party as the organ of the richer peasantry. Nevertheless voices were to be heard even in the ranks of the Peasant Party in favor of at least some kind of working agreement between the two parties. Once more it was Cracow, which was most conscious of the Social Democrats' actual and potential strength and the harm which conflict between the two parties could cause both sides. In October 1900, shortly before the elections to the *Reichsrath*, Wysłouch received a letter from an active Cracow party member, Walery Elias Radzikowski,²¹ well known in his day as writer and artist, a man too who had endured personal hardship for his activities on behalf of the Peasant Party. "I implore the party leaders [he writes] not to favor an electoral fight with the Socialists. It would be good to reach a compromise with them, so that the socialist candidate in the fifth *curia*, where they have the most chance, should not be jeopardised, while we on the other hand would obtain concessions from the socialist leaders [in the fourth *curia* where] the Peasant Party candidate has the better chance. Such agreements should be verbal, so that our enemies would have no opportunities of making capital out of any correspondence."²²

This letter evidently found agreement among the leaders of the party. Neither Daszyński in Cracow nor Hudec, the Social Democrats' candidate in Lwów, were opposed; they enjoyed, indeed, the Peasant Party's quali-

¹⁹*P.L.*, 1897, no. 27.

²⁰Wilhelm Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicji* (Cracow, 1907), vol. II, p. 71. Cf. *Naprzód* (Cracow), no. 49, 3 XII 1896.

²¹See article by Jan Reychman, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Cracow, 1948), vol. VI, p. 231.

²²Ossol. 7176/II, vol. II, p. 418.

fied support. Daszyński was now described by the *People's Friend* as "a man of outstanding ability, manfully defending the rights of the working people."²³ Unfortunately this change of tactics was to have no lasting consequences on the policy of the Peasant Party.

Meanwhile a crisis had occurred within the Democratic Party. Part of its followers withdrew from participation on the Central Electoral Committee, those who remained soon losing their separate identity in the Conservative majority. The independent Democrats were at this time a motley collection, kept together mainly by a mild opposition to the ruling party. They had little influence outside the few big towns and had never in fact shown any inclination to compete for the support of the peasantry. The main plank in their platform was the defense of constitutional liberties and a gradual extension of the suffrage, as well as the preservation of the Polish national tradition, which usually confined itself to the repetition of empty phrases on ceremonial occasions. The party had its supporters chiefly among middle-class intellectuals—officials, lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers—as well as among the small craftsmen and lesser merchants; and Lwów had long been the centre of its activities.²⁴

Pursuant to a recommendation from its National Council in May, 1900, the Peasant Party concluded an agreement with the independent wing of the Democrats.²⁵ The main aim in view was to establish co-operation during the forthcoming elections. It was in effect an alliance for mutual support at elections and to avoid any sort of political conflict in-between. An inter-party commission was set up to settle any disputes which might arise and generally to keep the two parties in contact with each other. "The Peasant Party [*The People's Friend* explained] while not renouncing independent activity or binding itself to make any changes in its previous policy, has at the same time gained the help of another party, which recognizes equally the need for the kind of opposition to the Conservatives that we have been putting up." As a result of this alliance it optimistically foresaw a speedy end to the rule of the Conservatives and an increasing solidarity between peasant and townsfolk.²⁶

The alliance, however, did not bring the expected results and soon ceased to function. The Peasant Party put forward at the *Reichsrath* elections in December, 1900, five candidates in the fifth *curia*, all of whom lost, as well as eleven candidates in the fourth *curia* where only three were returned. A total of three victories out of sixteen contests could not be regarded as in any way a success, even taking into account the usual electioneering malpractices which militated against the left-wing parties. The Democrats had, indeed, ceased to be a vital force in the country, those with

²³P.L., no. 50, 9 XII 1900. For the relations between Populists and Socialists, see Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 151, 263 and also his paper in *Pierwsza konferencja metodologiczna historyków polskich, 1952* (Warsaw, 1953), vol. II, pp. 510-15.

²⁴Cf. W.Z.L., *Stronnictwa polityczne w Galicji w przededniu wyborów* (Cracow, 1900), p. 14.

²⁵P.L., 1900, no. 35.

²⁶P.L., no. 36, 2 IX 1900.

genuine sympathy for the peasant's cause having already joined forces in 1895 with the Populists to create the new Peasant Party. The middle classes were to turn away to other parties, to the Conservatives even and to the future National Democrats (then usually known as *Wszechpolacy* after the name of their leading journal), who seemed more likely to put up a firmer defense of their interests.²⁷

Alliance with the Democrats had led to disappointment. The difficulties in the way of an understanding with the Socialists seemed insuperable. There still remained Stojałowski with his Christian Populist Party. The two peasant groups, indeed, had much in common. Both deputies and rank and file were recruited from the same social class, the peasantry. Each claimed to be defending its interests. Personal ties too joined their members, even at the top. Stojałowski's person and ideology were, however, the biggest stumbling block to any understanding. The leaders of the Peasant Party, since their break with him at the end of 1895, had repeatedly claimed that Stojałowski's activities put him outside the pale. Stojałowski equally vehemently asserted that no good Catholic could be associated with Wysłouch and his gang of "atheists" and "masons." The last few years of the century had seen no abatement from either side of this mutual vituperation. With the libel action, brought by Stojałowski against Wysłouch in March, 1899, any understanding—at least for some years—would have seemed to have been ruled out.²⁸ Even in May, 1900, one finds Stojałowski writing of "those common frauds, the godless Wysłouch and the perjurer Stapiński," and three months later of "the nihilist" Wysłouch.²⁹

At the end of the year, however, in December, 1900, the two peasant parties concluded an agreement similar to the one made a little earlier with the Democrats, covering the co-ordination of their policy and alliance at elections.

The reasons for this surprising change of front by both sides, which illustrates the low level of Galician politics and the political immaturity of the community, were two-fold. For some time a desire to put an end to the fratricidal political fight between the two parties, to unite their forces against the Conservatives, had been making itself felt among the rank and file. At the beginning of 1899, for instance, the peasants from the Wieliczka and Jarosław areas had issued an Address in favor of the unification of the two peasant parties and suggesting a meeting of representatives from each side to take a decision in this direction. At least one of the Peasant Party's

²⁷Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

²⁸The action resulted from the publication by Wysłouch in the *People's Friend* of a letter showing that Stojałowski was in contact with the Tsarist authorities in Warsaw. Two other editors were also sued by Stojałowski, who lost his case. The acquittal of his opponents led to Stojałowski's reputation becoming seriously compromised in the eyes of public opinion. Though the latter was not motivated by any hope of material gain, as his opponents alleged, his increasing sympathies with Pan-Slavism and his obvious desire now to come to terms with the ruling classes made him suspect in the eyes of democrats and radicals. *P.L.*, 1898, no. 18; *Kurier Lwowski*, 5/7 III 1899; Ossol. 7180/II, vol. VI, p. 147.

²⁹*Wieniec-Pszczółka*, 1900, nos. 17, 29. See also *P.L.*, no. 45, 4 XI 1900.

deputies, Antoni Styła, came out openly in favor of such an agreement. However, at a meeting on 26 March, the Party's National Council, after considering the demands contained in the address, later supported by a resolution from Party sympathizers at Tarnobrzeg, decided that there could be no talking with a man so politically dishonest as Stojałowski. It was resolved that, however desirable in theory, the uniting of the two wings of the Peasant Movement was not at the moment possible. Those in favor of unity seem, however, to have persisted in their opinions. At any rate the failure of the Peasant Party at the recent elections to the *Reichsrath*, even in alliance with the Democrats, must have convinced the leaders of the party that some sort of working arrangement with Stojałowski was then a necessity, in view of the forthcoming elections to the provincial diet in September, 1901.³⁰ Similar reasons probably impelled Stojałowski to conclude such an alliance from his side; and anyhow rapid changes of front never presented great difficulties for him.

The conditions of the agreement to form a Union of Populist Parties (*Zjednoczenie stronnictw ludowych*) were published in the form of a joint Address from the two parties on 28 December, 1900. The two parties were to keep their separate programs and organizations, while working out together a common plan of action and settling any disputes which might arise through a common executive organ. Clauses in the agreement defining the attitude of the Union to the questions of national independence and religion were designed to set at rest the reservations which each might entertain with regard to the other's aims in these matters. The agreement was, therefore, a compromise between the views of the two parties. Doubtless it was Wysłouch who insisted, in face of Stojałowski's pro-tsarist sympathies, on an unequivocal pronouncement on the national issue, while Stojałowski's hand is clearly seen in the underlining of the religious principles according to which the Union was to function. It was expected, too, that other peasant groups, such as the Peasant Union, still in alliance with the Conservatives, and the Ruthenians, would soon join forces with the Union, now that the two main peasant parties had finally come together.³¹

At a meeting of the Union's joint Committee in Lwów on 27 January, 1901, a resolution was passed to form at Vienna a combined Club of their eight deputies. It was decided, too, not to join the Polish Circle, then under Conservative domination, until it had forced those members elected by obvious fraud and violence to resign, used its influence with the Home Administration (*Wydział Krajowy*) to prevent continual violations of the people's rights, and changed its statutes so as to allow its constituent parties greater freedom to defend these rights. It was further agreed to remain in continuous and friendly contact with the Ruthenian deputies and give each other mutual support in defending the two peoples' interests against the Conservatives.³² The agreement, therefore, appeared at first to be working

³⁰P.L., 1899, nos. 3, 5, 10, 15.

³¹P.L., 1901, nos. 1, 2; Ossol. 7183/II, vol. IX, p. 332.

³²P.L., no. 6, 3 II 1901.

smoothly and to contain the possibility of broadening out into a general coalition of the left-wing parties in Galicia, strong enough to challenge effectively the Conservative monopoly of power.

"The chief aim of our Union [writes Stojałowski to Wysłouch at the beginning of February] has been a [united] electoral campaign; and we have, indeed, carried our agreement as far as a fraternal division of the constituencies between our two parties. As for parliamentary action we take counsel together on the affairs of the country, sign interpellations and resolutions together; indeed, it is now unlikely that cases of mutual vituperation in parliament will be repeated. That is certainly sufficient to embody the Union's ideal."³³

Nevertheless, expressions of surprise and apprehension from Peasant Party members and sympathizers, especially among the intellectuals, were soon to be heard at this unlooked-for alliance. Voices of warning were raised as to the unreliable character of Stojałowski and the undesirable consequences which alliance with him would bring on the movement, the inevitability of a break after a short time and the immorality of allying for the sake of immediate advantage with a man with such a shady political reputation.³⁴

A breach was in fact to arise between the two partners in this uneasy alliance, only a few months after its conclusion, over Stojałowski's intention to take his deputies into the Circle despite the agreement undertaken by both parties not to do so unless certain conditions were observed. On 27 May the Peasant Party's executive committee met in Cracow to consider Stojałowski's proposal and agreed that there was no need to call the National Council together, as Stojałowski had requested, since there could be no possibility of the Party joining the Circle in the existing circumstances. On 31 May we find Bojko reporting to Wysłouch from Vienna that "during our discussions with Stojałowski to-day it came out that he does not recognise the validity of our resolution and his people will be joining the Circle—perhaps to-morrow. We have been shamefully let down and are now deprived of their help."³⁵

Stojałowski's entry into the Circle contrary to the wishes of his partners naturally broke up the Union after barely five months' existence and caused relations between the two parties to revert once more to their old state of mutual hostility.³⁶ Indeed the polemics which at once arose were more bitter, more personal in tone even than before. From his side Stojałowski accused Wysłouch and Stapiński of trying to impose their dictatorship on

³³Ossol. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

³⁴See Ossol. 7183/II, vol. IX, p. 493; 7188/II, vol. XIV, p. 522; *Przegląd Wszechpolski* (Lwów), 1901, nos. 1, 3, 6; *P.L.*, no. 10, 3 III 1901.

³⁵Ossol. 7175/II, vol. I, p. 451.

³⁶Stojałowski's claim that the Peasant Party deputies with one exception (Olszewski) were in substantial agreement with his attitude to the Circle is not borne out by the available evidence (See Ossol. 7195/II, vol. XXI, p. 419; *Kurier Lwowski*, 6 VI 1901). On the other hand, one of Stojałowski's supporters, Kubik, disagreeing with his leader's action now went over to the Peasant Party.—Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

the Union. "None of the peasants in the [Peasant] Party had a voice in the Union's committee [he wrote]; the orders came from Lwów."³⁷

The Peasant Party fought the elections to the provincial diet, which took place at the beginning of September, 1901, in continued alliance with the Democrats. This did not prevent it from suffering a severe set-back, which was shared by its recent ally, Stojałowski. Polling only 7.3% of the total number of votes in the Galician village *curia*³⁸ the Peasant Party was now reduced to three deputies: Stapiński, Krempa and Bojko, out of a total number of twenty eight candidates. Such leading figures in the Party as Dr. Bernadzikowski and Franciszek Wójcik were defeated. Stojałowski also won only three seats; while, on the other hand, the Peasant Union, dominated by the Conservatives, returned four deputies. It was, indeed, a triumph for the latter. The only bright spot was provided by Bojko's return for the municipal *curia* in Lwów, where the students had combined with workers, craftsmen and other sections of the town community to secure his victory.³⁹

The internal life of the Peasant Party during the early years of the new century was marked by three events: the shifting of the party leadership from Wysłouch to the younger Stapiński; the campaign to promote the policy of the "separation (*wyodrębnienie*)" of Galicia, that is, the promotion of the province to a status within the Empire equal to that enjoyed by Hungary, as one of the main planks in the party's program; and thirdly, the attempt to win support for the party's policy, especially on national issues, from the Galician middle class.

In January, 1902, Wysłouch had handed over the editorship of the *People's Friend* to Stapiński. The role of the party organ as a factor in the political, social and cultural awakening of the Galician peasantry was immense, much greater than its comparatively small circulation would indicate; and for over twelve years it had been acting as a rallying-point for the politically conscious peasantry.

By the end of the century, however, with some years of experience as a political agitator and as a tribune of the people in the Vienna *Reichsrath*, endowed with great gifts as organizer and speaker and with plenty of ambition, Stapiński was anxious to get control of the *People's Friend*, to run it in such a way as would more nearly answer the new tasks facing the party as he conceived them. Disputes as to the manner in which the paper should have been run often took place between him and Wysłouch. The latter, claims Stapiński, "in his capacity of editor used to make me insert such laughable passages and even whole articles that the paper did not exercise its proper influence." When Stapiński asked him to say frankly what he thought wrong with his way of writing or acting Wysłouch vigorously

³⁷ *Wieniec-Pszczółka*, no. 32, 11 VIII 1901. See also *P.L.*, no. 36, 3 VIII 1901.

³⁸ Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

³⁹ *P.L.*, 1901, nos. 37, 38. The party's success in Lwów was due largely to the influence which the liberal populist daily *Kurier Lwowski* exercised, under Wysłouch's editorship, upon the more progressive sections of the Polish middle-class in Galicia.

denied having any reservations, telling him that he intended soon to hand over the ownership of the paper to him. Evidently Wysłouch long hesitated to do so, doubtless not yet convinced that Stapiński was sufficiently experienced, fearful perhaps that he might not be ready to keep the movement on the road which Wysłouch had marked out for it. Anyhow matters came to a climax in December, 1901. Stapiński was then able to point to the recent electoral defeats and the low number of the paper's subscribers as justifying the need for a change. He was also able to remind Wysłouch of his previous promises to him. Wysłouch agreed; and, as Stapiński puts it, "knowing his hesitant nature I gave him at once the proper forms to sign. I had struck a good moment: he signed."⁴⁰

From the middle of June, 1903, the *People's Friend* was published in Cracow instead of in Lwów as hitherto. The reasons for Stapiński's transferring the paper were complex. Firstly, Cracow was nearer the centre of the Movement's activities, while Lwów was in the middle of the Ruthenian part of Galicia. Contact with its readers and the rank and file of the party would obviously be easier from Cracow. This appears, too, to have been the opinion of the other party leaders.⁴¹ Indeed, soon after, the paper began greatly to increase its circulation and to pay its own way, which was also due doubtless to the more lively manner in which it was now edited and the steps taken by Stapiński to see that subscriptions were paid regularly. There was also a further, though secondary, reason for his decision: the desire to free himself completely from Wysłouch's influence.⁴²

Both Wysłouch and Stapiński, however, were in agreement over the policy of the "separation" of Galicia, which was included in the party platform from 1901 onwards,⁴³ and the need to enlist the support of the townspeople for the party. But "separation," though in principle much might be said in its favor, was too theoretical an issue to excite much enthusiasm among the peasantry. It did, indeed, figure prominently in the new party program adopted at the congress held at Rzeszów on 27 February, 1903; but it soon ceased to be a live issue in Galician politics.⁴⁴

The need for a more satisfactory statement of aims than the twenty-one points of 1895 had long been felt. The main item in the new program now drawn up by Wysłouch was the demand for full political equality to be gained by constitutional reform with the ultimate aim of a free and united Poland. Defense of the economic rights of the small-holder, increased industrialization and social security for the workers were also advocated,

⁴⁰Stapiński, "Pamiętniki", pp. 10-15. Cf. *P.L.*, 1902, no. 1.

⁴¹*P.L.*, no. 24, 14 VI 1903.

⁴²Stapiński, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Władysław Studnicki, *Z przeżyć i walk* (Warsaw, 1928), p. 60. Stapiński says that he delayed taking the decision for half a year and only finally decided on it after a careful balance of the pros and cons. Szczepański, *op. cit.*, p. 21, also mentions "certain family misfortunes" which forced Stapiński to leave Lwów.

⁴³See Wysłouch's speech at the party congress at Tarnów on 30 June 1901, reprinted as *Prawno-państwowe stanowisko Galicji*.

⁴⁴The adoption of "separation" was largely due to the efforts of Władysław Studnicki. For Studnicki's activities as a member of the Peasant Party, see my article in *Wiadomości* (London), 1954, no. 21 (425).

as was collaboration between the three nationalities inhabiting Galicia: Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish.⁴⁵ Clerical interference in politics was condemned though the place of religion in national life was to be respected. Co-operation with persons of different political outlook was recommended in matters of general public concern. "The ideas of the Peasant Movement [said Wyslouch in his speech at the Rzeszów congress] are becoming popular and will in the course of time be incorporated into the program of parties with quite different views." Though inadequate in many respects this program was in its Galician context an advanced one.⁴⁶

The National Assembly (*Wiec Narodowy*) which took place in Lwów in the same year during the Whitsun holidays was an attempt to realize that co-operation between different elements of the community for national ends, which had figured in the Rzeszów program. The Peasant Movement was not to be concerned exclusively with the sectional interests of its members, but to take its share in the initiation and realization of those common aims, which were not the monopoly of any one party or any one class. Indeed, in Wyslouch's opinion, the peasantry which comprised the bulk of the nation had a special duty, an undoubted right, to take the initiative in the matter.

Wyslouch had begun his plans for the assembly at least a year before it actually took place. He sought support for his project primarily among the members of his own party as well as from among the independent Democrats and the National Democratic group centered around the *All-Polish Review* (*Przegląd Wszechpolski*). These three elements were well represented in the committees set up to prepare for the meeting. But all those active in the national cause were to be welcome. The Assembly had three aims in view: a broadening of national consciousness among the masses of the population, the defense of the Polish element wherever threatened with denationalization and the strengthening of the ties between the three partitioned provinces of Poland. It was, therefore, to be almost exclusively occupied with the national problem.⁴⁷

The preparations appear to have run smoothly until shortly before the

⁴⁵The program was not so clearly in favor of Ukrainian claims to East Galicia as Wyslouch's previous statements in the *Social Review* had been. The socialist *Naprzód*, no. 62, 4 III 1903, pointed out the significant omission of any reference, either in the program itself or the discussion on it, to the agricultural strikes which had broken out in East Galicia in the previous year, chiefly among the Ukrainian population. For these strikes, see Józef Gójski, *Strajki i bunt chłopskie w Polsce* (2nd edition, Warsaw, 1949), pp. 32-48.

Regarding the Jews the program makes a distinction between those who had assimilated Polish nationality and culture and "those Jews who regard themselves as foreign to the [Polish] community, tending usually towards German culture." Emigration to Palestine was advocated as the most desirable solution for the latter category.

⁴⁶The program was first published as a special supplement to *P.L.*, no. 12, 22 III 1903, and later as a separate pamphlet. See also *P.L.*, no. 10, 8 III 1903; Feldman, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 75-78; Dunin-Wasowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-66.

⁴⁷*Ossol.* 7176/II, vol. II, p. 82; 7185/II, vol. XI, p. 375; 7230/II, vol. LVI, pp. 459-62; *Przegląd Wszechpolski*, 1902, no. 9; 1903, no. 6; *Czas* (Cracow), no. 125, 4 VI 1903; *P.L.*, no. 23, 7 VI 1903.

date of opening. Towards the end of May, however, the Ukrainians came out strongly in opposition to the assembly and at the same time their deadly opponents, the Polish National Democrats, threatened their withdrawal. Thus the idea of a National Assembly, as it was originally conceived by Wysłouch and his associates, came in for a fire of criticism from these two mutually hostile camps. The Ukrainians considered that the assembly was directed towards the attainment of Polish supremacy in East Galicia; while the National Democrats, on the other hand, objected to invitations being issued to two prominent pro-Polish Ruthenians.⁴⁸ In spite of some hesitation and wavering, however, the National Democrats finally decided to participate.

The assembly itself lasted two days. About a thousand persons attended; though members of the intelligentsia predominated, a number of peasants came even from distant parts of the country. The organizing committee, however, purposely refrained from making it a mass meeting and limited the number of those invited.⁴⁹ Neither the Cracow Conservatives, the most influential party in the land,⁵⁰ nor the Social Democrats⁵¹ participated; and even the National Democrats, whose policies were tending in an opposite direction to that of the Populists, were only lukewarm in their support.⁵² With only the Peasant Party genuinely in favor of the idea it is not, therefore, surprising that the assembly was still-born. Little in fact resulted from its proceedings; and a Committee of National Action (*Komitet Pracy Narodowej*) which was set up to carry out its resolutions appears to have petered out soon afterwards.

Despite the Peasant Party's emphasis on the need to bring the peasant masses into the orbit of the national tradition and its readiness to collaborate with other sections of the community in such ventures as the National Assembly as well as a gradual watering down of its earlier radicalism, it still had to face fierce opposition from certain members of the hierarchy and lower clergy. As late as November, 1903, Bishop Wałęga of Tarnów, an old opponent of the peasant and socialist movements, issued a fiery pastoral letter against the Populists. The *People's Friend* in particular was singled out by the bishop for condemnation. "There can be no absolution [he wrote] for anyone who does not cease to read the *People's Friend*. Permis-

⁴⁸Ossol. 7182/II, vol. VIII, p. 279; *Naprzód*, no. 155, 7 VIII 1903; *Nowa Reforma* (Cracow), 31 V 1903.

⁴⁹*Kurier Lwowski*, 1903, nos. 151, 153, 154; *Nowa Reforma*, 1903, no. 124; *Przegląd Wszehpolski*, 1903, no. 6.

⁵⁰*Czas*, no. 122, 30 V 1903. The Podolian Conservatives representing the big landowners of East Galicia did, however, take part in the Assembly (See *Nowa Reforma*, no. 126, 5 VI 1903). Threatened by the upsurge of national sentiment among the Ruthenians, these landowners had now begun to take some interest in the welfare of the Polish minority among the peasants. A desire to use the latter against the Ruthenian majority accounted for their participation, as it was to account for their future alliance with the National Democrats.

⁵¹*Naprzód*, 1903, nos. 151, 152. The only prominent socialist participating was Kazimierz Mokłowski, a personal friend of the Wysłouchs.

⁵²*Czas*, no. 124, 3 VI 1903, quoting from *Słowo Polskie*, recently become the Lwów organ of the National Democrats.

sion to read it will only rarely be granted, since one does not give people poison even though they may ask for it."⁵³ The bishop's attack, however, though it caused the Peasant Party a temporary set-back, not only failed to injure the movement permanently; it even brought it increased support from the younger generation in the villages.⁵⁴

A little over a year later, in 1905, revolution was to break out among the Poles in the neighboring Congress Kingdom (*Królestwo Polskie*) as part of the widespread disturbances throughout the whole Russian Empire. The National Council of the Peasant Party in February issued an Address which, while disavowing support for any insurrectionary action, came out in favor of the constitutional and cultural demands which were being put forward across the frontier.⁵⁵ Contact certainly existed between the Peasant Party in Galicia and the Polish Peasant Union (*Polski Związek Ludowy*), a radical populist organization which was started in the Congress Kingdom in 1905 and continued to exist until the middle of 1907. Bojko visited Warsaw during this period and held conferences with its leaders there. The *People's Friend* frequently inserted favorable comment on the activities of the Congress Kingdom Populists. But nothing much was to come of these contacts since the Galician peasant leaders, accustomed to constitutional procedures, felt out of place in an atmosphere of conspiracy and police oppression and alien to the spirit of radicalism, which prevailed among the Congress Kingdom Populists.⁵⁶

The outbreak of revolution in Russia had made, indeed, a deep impression on all the left-wing parties throughout the Habsburg Monarchy. If Wysłouch had still been mainly responsible for the Rzeszów program and the National Assembly of 1903, it was Stapiński who was now the driving force behind the Peasant Party's agitation in favor of universal suffrage. The party's activities formed but a part of a united campaign of all the left-wing parties in Austria to force the Vienna government to introduce a wide measure of electoral reform for the *Reichsrath*. From November, 1905, onwards mass meetings were held up and down the country; petitions were organized; and the left-wing press was active in backing the demands for reform. Success came in December, 1906, when a law was passed introducing a more democratic electoral system for the central parliament.

The first general election held under this new law in May, 1907, brought a triumph for the Peasant Party, when seventeen of their candidates were elected out of a total of seventy-seven Polish deputies.⁵⁷ As a result of these constitutional changes, as well as of an electoral truce concluded in January,

⁵³Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 152, 166, 167, 183, 184. Cf. *P.L.*, 1904, nos. 3, 4,

⁵⁴Szczepański, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁵⁵*P.L.*, no. 9, 26 II 1905.

⁵⁶Henryk Syska, *Przez walkę do zwycięstwa* (Warsaw, 1949), pp. 59-61; Tadeusz Rek, *Ruch Ludowy w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1947), vol. I, p. 107; Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 182.

⁵⁷Dunin-Wąsowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-71, 182. For the reform campaign in its Austrian setting, see Hugo Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Österreichs* (Graz-Vienna, n.d.), vol. II, pp. 480-88.

1908, with the Polish Conservatives, the Peasant Party was to become by 1911 the largest single Polish group at Vienna; and, if the outbreak of war in 1914 had not caused schemes for reform to be put on one side, the party would most probably have become the largest in the Lwów diet as well.

These later successes were based on the effort and exacting struggles of the previous years. During this early period the organization of the party was built up almost from nothing. A group of devoted party workers had been created, who labored without any hope of personal gain and in the face of the combined opposition of church and state. A body of supporters was formed out of the politically quite inexperienced peasantry, often illiterate and lacking any feeling of oneness with the rest of the nation. A widespread campaign, too, had been started to educate the peasantry in their political and cultural heritage.

With the broadening of the movement and increased success in the political field something, indeed, of the early idealism vanished. But the positive achievement remained. The Polish peasants in Galicia who at the time when the peasant movement first emerged at the end of the 1880's were an amorphous mass, often inimical to the political and cultural traditions of their national past, were soon to become a vital force in the political, and an increasingly important factor in the social and cultural life of the Polish nation.

OXFORD, ENGLAND

WAS THOMAS MASARYK'S "AUSTRIA DELENDA EST!"
A MISTAKE?*

by William J. Rose

IT WAS a century ago that Tsar Nicholas I, bitterly disappointed at the stand taken by Austria during the Crimean War, made his celebrated remark: "Je suis le deuxième imbécile qui a sauvé Vienne!"

The reference is, of course, to his action five years earlier, in sending a Russian army over the Carpathians to put down the revolution of 1848; "second fool" because another Slav ruler, John Sobieski, had hurried to the rescue of the Habsburg realm in the late summer days of 1683. He too wondered later whether he had acted wisely or not.

The consideration of such undertakings in human history is perplexing. Must all political enterprises, at least in the field of international relations, be rooted in expediency? Can they be founded on moral principles? If so, when? This reflection must be in our minds as we look at a particular decision, made by a responsible leader, which amounted to a reversal of his own line of action during many years. And it would be a tantalizing question to ask whether things might have turned out differently had he made no such decision, or had he made the opposite one.

When Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, having risen from the humblest station to become little less than the conscience of the *Reichsrath* in Vienna; having long since become "a terror to evil-doers and the praise of them that do well" both among his own people and elsewhere—when this man, as yet scarcely known in the outside world, dared to make his memorable stand in the autumn of 1914 and to go on to tell the nations that the Habsburg Monarchy had outlived its usefulness and was no longer viable, it is my view that he did it *both* on moral grounds *and* on those of political expediency. For me the events of the last decade have provoked much soul-searching on this point, and even inspired a resurgence of the claim that when the Allies made the dissolution of the age-old Monarchy part of the settlement of 1919, they "set the clock back," and prepared the way for the dominance of Central Europe by Russia.

He who ventures into so controversial a field should belong either to the class of professional historians or to that of recognized political leaders. I cannot aspire to either of these, and any justification for my daring in attempting this discussion must be sought elsewhere, chiefly in the fact that I had the good fortune (and I must be one of the few surviving Anglo-Saxons who did) to see with my own eyes the workings of the Dual Monarchy before the upheaval of 1914; that I lived through the war years as a civilian prisoner in the care of "the imperial and royal" police; that I shared

*The substance of a public lecture given at Cornell University on the Jacob Schiff Foundation, April 29, 1954.

on the spot the experiences of those who watched the break-up of the "Monarchy" or "Empire" into its constituent parts; that I was to observe with interest and concern the efforts of the nation states to justify their liberation; and that, again at close hand, I have looked on since 1939 while in the welter of another war and out of the tissue of conflicting forces, there emerged a new situation—quite unforeseen by most—which is as distasteful to the smaller nations involved as it is to the whole western world.

Speaking then as an amateur, but I hope a not unintelligent observer of what has happened during forty years, I venture to doubt whether the preservation of the Habsburg Monarchy *in any form possible at the time* could have given the least guarantee of security against resurgent Russian power. The collapse of the Austria-Hungary we knew in 1914 was not the work either of Masaryk, or—as we used to be told—of Wickham Steed and the recently deceased Scottish historian, R. W. Seton-Watson. It took place because the *raison d'être* of that ramshackle structure had ceased to exist; because its leaders had not adjusted their thinking and policies to modern requirements; because, as history has shown so often, ideas and institutions that have outlived their usefulness get swept away in favor of new ones more likely to serve.

I am well aware that the exact reverse of this view was held by people of standing and intelligence, both men of learning and men of action, during the critical years, and for a variety of reasons. I shall quote only one example here, that of a member of a well-known Polish family, who was a great friend of nineteenth century France and an enemy of Tsardom. Hearing the following words from a fellow-countryman in the autumn of 1914

"Austria has fulfilled a far-reaching historical mission: she gathered together the smaller nations which had nowhere to go and did not know what to do with themselves; she gave them a roof over their heads and the possibility of development. That is a great thing!"

he replied thus: "But Austria has no future!", only to be told: "That may be: so let her at the least have a present."

Whatever that cryptic remark might have meant, it was the view taken by not a few, both at that time and later. Now this view is held for sentimental reasons, now on grounds of expediency, or even on principle. And that it is still held was brought home to me a year ago when I received a letter from a London colleague, telling me of his impressions gained during a study-vacation spent in Vienna. The atmosphere he found there was at bottom one of *nostalgie* for the imperial days; not, perhaps, a surprising thing in view of the ordeal of recent years. Here is one sentence:

"There was a lotus-land atmosphere about the place. The Austrians dare not think about the future, and are therefore more and more living in an idealized past, in which the Good Emperor is the beneficent Deity and Thomas Masaryk the destructive Lucifer."

Thus do men idealize the days of their fathers, forgetting conveniently in this particular case the rather grim lines of Franz Grillparzer:

"That is the curse of our noble House:
To strive on half-way paths to half-way deeds,
Tarrying by half-way means."¹

I

When the Habsburg family, whose ancestral home had been near the sources of the Danube and the Rhine, moved eastward with high ambitions in the second half of the thirteenth century, their leader, Count Rudolf, found an expanding Czech power across his path. Having reached Vienna in 1276, he then met the armies of King Ottokar in a decisive battle at Duernkrut (the Marchfeld) two years later. The death of the King left him master of the middle Danube. During the next century and a half other Houses, notably that of the Luxemburgers, were to be rivals for the election as Emperors—or Kings of the Romans—but from 1438, when the Hussite threat had been dismissed, only two Emperors in the great succession that ended in 1806 were not Habsburgs. Vienna became their favorite residence city, with Prague serving at times as an alternative. On them, as a consequence, fell the grim task of defending Europe against the mounting threat of Islam, and memories of this struggle were to remain and be significant long after the threat had disappeared.

Of this sacred mission, dealt a grave blow as early as 1526 on the field of Mohács, a dim view was taken by neighboring powers from the day a branch of the Habsburg line came to reign in Madrid. From then onward there was conflict, chiefly on the high seas with England, and still more with France. With the former the issue was decided by the defeat of the Armada in 1588. With the latter the struggle continued, and a century later we have the undignified spectacle of the Bourbon *rex christianissimus*—Louis XIV, in league with the Sultan against a Christian European front—thus bringing about the costly battles of the War of the Spanish Succession. The "Good Prince Eugene," known on the Danube as *der edle Ritter*, became the revered champion of the West, got the Turks out of Hungary, and established the *cordon sanitaire* across the Balkan peninsula that lasted into our own times.

But the proud Magyars, whose country had been partitioned since Mohács, now found themselves forced to accept the Habsburgs as kings, in place of the ancient line of St. Stephen. They developed an almost pathological condition which led on the one hand to their revolt under Louis Kossuth in 1848, on the other to a policy of intolerance toward all non-Magyar elements living inside the circle of the Carpathians. From this policy, though warned—as we shall see—they refused to budge right down to 1918.

¹Quoted in Kann, *The Multinational Empire* (New York, 1950), II, p. 234.

The "spring of the nations" (1848) brought two blessings: the flight of Metternich, and the emancipation of the serfs. Sober onlookers like František Palacký, already famous for his *History* and brought into the limelight by his chairmanship of the Slav Congress, found themselves hoping for a partnership of peoples, a federation of neighbor nations under the sceptre of the young Franz Josef, proving their allegiance by their firm support of Austria through the ordeal of 1866. As all know they were doomed to disappointment.

The *Ausgleich* of the following year, forced on the House of Habsburg by the defeat of Sadova, satisfied no one, except perhaps the Magyars.² From this time onward their intransigence, and the mounting resolve of Prussia to assume the guidance of the whole German world, became with every decade a more serious menace to the unity and viability of the Monarchy. When in 1908 the aging Franz Josef celebrated his diamond jubilee, not even the response of millions to his famous address "An meine Völker," could hide the concern of serious observers, or the evidences of dangerous cracks in the ship of state.

Unable to make use of a nationalism of its own, Austria had to take refuge in the "state-idea," a somewhat bloodless material out of which to build a society. With the mellow traditions and charm of Vienna neither Munich nor Dresden, least of all Berlin, could compete. But more than charm is needed where the loyalty and well-being of diverse peoples are at stake, and the closing years of the reign were a time of troubles. Among these not the least was the unexpected defeat of Turkey at the hands of the Balkan Christians in 1912, since a cardinal principle of Austrian policy during the century had been the preservation of the Islamic dominion in Europe.

Such then was the state of affairs when the hour of reckoning struck in the late summer of 1914. This was the scene (a moving one in both senses of the word) on which Masaryk had looked as student and lecturer in Vienna, as professor from 1882 in the newly restored Czech university in Prague, as founder of the Realist Party, and as a member of the *Reichsrath* from 1907. What were the positive elements in the picture? Where could one look for those features which might still justify the position taken by Palacký in his famous Letter to the Germans in 1848: "If Austria did not exist, we should have to create her!"? Were there grounds on which one could argue that the Monarchy had a survival value, that it was by no means just a product of chance, or the achievement of brute force? Beyond a doubt there were, and we might consider them for a moment.

First, its geographical position and structure: the fact of the Danube waterway, the longest in Europe, comprising with its tributaries a sizeable interdependent territorial unit. "There was something," wrote Fisher, "in

²Under the Dual System now introduced the nearly 30 million people in Austria (as of 1914) were in effect governed by the Germans—one-third of the whole; while the 20 millions of Hungary were held at the mercy of the Magyars, who were only half of the whole.

the racial and geographical conditions of the Danube valley which seemed to demand a dynasty—firm, steady, unintellectual.” Everything necessary for the maintenance of a normal civilization (except for products of the tropics) were to be found within its limits. Not until the coming of the machine age with its demand for coal and steel did shortages become imminent, and even then these were not tragic. Only the overweening ambition of the Dynasty, expressed in the celebrated “AEIOU” lines,

“Alles Erdreich Ist Österreich Untertan!”, or the Latin
 “Austriæ Est Imperare Orbi Universol”.³

rendered futile every effort, or “half-effort” in Grillparzer’s term, toward progress, and in time the whole régime became the object of ridicule.

Secondly, with the expulsion of the Turks from half of their holdings in Europe early in the eighteenth century, it might seem as though the high calling of Austria-Hungary to be a bastion against the infidel was a thing of the past. Such a conclusion, however, goes too far. The relatively small, culturally sundered, and sadly arrested peoples of the Balkans were no adequate buffer, and the hopes of some to make imperial Russia the “defender of the faith” were welcomed only by adherents of the Orthodox Church. Clearly something like the Danube Monarchy has been needed even in our own day; and when added to the advantages that accrued to all from the Customs Union which ensured the free exchange of goods to millions of buyers, this solution looked like something to clinch the whole.

This, it may be pointed out, was precisely what was dreamed of and talked about in 1848. It was with this in view that Palacký surprised the Germans of Frankfort when, as the spokesman of his nation, he declined their invitation to attend their Congress. He gave three reasons: (1) that Slavs would not feel at home there; (2) that as Austrian citizens they could not take part in a demonstration and an enterprise which in the nature of things would destroy the multi-national Austrian state; and (3) that the thing the liberal Germans were trying to do was impossible without a surgical operation for which they were not prepared.

The second of these contentions went to the root of the matter. No plan with solely national aims could fail to topple a structure founded on universalism. It spelled disaster for the non-German peoples of the Monarchy. Foreseeing the dangers of what is known today as the *Anschluss*, Palacký stood for an “Austro-Slav program.” He acted as spokesman for the rights of smaller nations to be themselves, and equally opposed any dominance from the side of the German world, and—as he made clear—any subjection to the might of Tsarist Russia.

It is worth noting in this connection that a contemporary Polish historian, Walerjan Krasiński (author of a *History of the Reformation in Poland*), published at that time an essay on “Panslavism and Germanism,”

³First used by Frederick III after getting his son Maximilian married to Mary of Burgundy in 1477.

in which he set the whole issue against the background of Europe in general. His suggestion was a western-Slav Federation to balance the Russian colossus. These are his words:

"The only effective means which Europe possesses to counteract the establishment of a Russo-pan Slavonic empire is . . . the transformation of Austria into a Slavonic state which would comprise Poland, Bohemia and all the Austrian provinces where the Slavonic element prevails . . . This would mean a confederate state not unlike the U.S.A., except that the constitutive authority would be vested in a hereditary sovereign."⁴

Krasiński, however, does not help us to see how little acceptable this Grand Design would have been to the Magyars, or what could have been done about an almost solidly German Vienna.

When the high hopes of the spring of 1848 were dashed and, with the help of Russia, the insurgents had been reduced to impotence, two decades of jockeying followed in the Habsburg realm, ending in the "Compromise" of 1867. Those who looked for a democratic monarchy got a rude shock. The architects of the future acted as though they had never heard of Havlíček's warning: "Austria will be what we wish her to be, or she will cease to be!"; just as they paid no attention to what the now older Palacký was saying: "Before Austria was, we were; and when Austria no longer exists, we shall still be here." Nevertheless it would be unjust to the Germans of the Danube lands to think of them all as sympathizing with pan-Germanism (*Grossdeutschtum*). When Georg von Schoenerer's *Los von Rom* movement emerged in the eighties, it was firmly met by the Christian Socialist Party, led by the redoubtable mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger, and supported by historians such as Richard von Kralik. Out of this camp later were to come statesmen like Lammasch and Seipel.

Their concept of a Greater Austria had indeed been defined as early as 1869 by the not too clear-thinking but keen Jewish publicist, Adolf von Fischhof, in his book *Österreich und die Burgenschaften seines Bestandes*. Social Democrats, like Redlich and Renner, were to follow in his footsteps a generation later. But the most ambitious project for a partnership of peoples on the Danube was framed by Popovici in 1906 in *A United States of Greater Austria*, at a time when it was scarcely likely to get a hearing at all.⁵

What in effect all these seekers after a means for saving the Danube Monarchy were trying to get at has been put rather well by Christopher Dawson in a recent book, *Understanding Europe*.

"The Austro-German and Bohemian-German opposition to the supernational tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy originated during the later XIXth century the pan-German ideology with its anti-Semitism, its anti-Catholicism and its cult of the pure Nordic race.

⁴Kann, II, pp. 18-19.

⁵May, pp. 479ff.

"The acceptance of these anti-Christian, anti-humanist and anti-European ideas was in any case a retrograde step. But for Austria it was an act of spiritual suicide, since it meant the denial of all the spiritual values on which Austrian culture had been built. The Habsburg Monarchy had risen to greatness as the champion of a universal religious ideal and as the patron of an international Catholic culture. It had made use of men of most diverse national origins—Italians and Frenchmen, Magyars and Czechs, Spaniards and even Irish, in the service of the common cause. The later Austria, built on this Catholic foundation, had developed its own type of humanist culture—that of musicians like Haydn and Mozart, and of men of letters like Grillparzer and Adalbert Stifter—a humanism that was less self-conscious and less philosophical than that of west Germany but was all the more deeply rooted in the social life of the Austrian people. Now all this was to be cast aside, and the common heritage of baroque Austria and classical Vienna was to be torn in pieces between the rival fanaticisms of the pan-Germans and the pan-Slavs. Grillparzer, who remained to the last loyal to the old Austrian tradition, summed up the situation in 1848 in a prophetic utterance: 'The path of modern culture leads from humanity through nationality (i.e. nationalism) to bestiality.'"

That may be an exaggeration, but the main point stands. Dawson puts the burden of mischief less on the principle of the Monarchy and more on the advantage taken by others of its weaknesses. In this he reveals his Catholic convictions, but Masaryk probably would have agreed with him. He would, however, have added that any dynastic imperialism which could not hold the minds and bind the loyalties of its people could not survive.

This matter of dynasties, their logic and their destiny, should be examined a little more closely. One of the clearest statements of the two extremes involved here can be found in Namier's Raleigh Lecture, "The Revolution of the Intellectuals" (page 25).

"The basic conflict of 1848 was between two principles—that of dynastic property in countries, and that of national sovereignty: the one feudal in origin, historic in its growth and survival, deeply rooted but difficult to defend in argument; the other grounded in reason and ideas, simple and convincing, but as unsuited to living organisms as chemically pure water. To the men of 1848 the dynastic principle stood for arbitrary rule and autocracy, that of popular sovereignty for human rights and national self-government. By a crude over-simplification the conflict presented itself to them as a fight between reason and unreason, freedom and unfreedom. The British system of representative and responsible government. . . seemed to them to secure in practice the basic maxims of the French Revolution: they did not realize how deeply ingrained the proprietary principle is in the public life of this country. The proprietary claim of dynasties centers in the land and works

through it: popular sovereignty is primarily the claim of men apart from the land.⁶

"The title "roi de France" stressed the territorial principle; "roi des Français" transferred the emphasis to the human element, and paid tribute to the sovereignty of the people. The growth of urban agglomerations stimulates the rise of a non-territorial ideology but unless there be a complete return to the conditions of the horde, the basic element of territory cannot be eliminated. There is no escape from the inter-play between groups of men and tracts of land which forms the essence of history."

Namier then goes on to illustrate this position, and in so doing explains why Central Europe was not yet ready for the break with the past that was to come only seventy years later. But he does not allude to the fact that neither in the older Bohemian kingdom nor in the joint kingdom of Poland and Lithuania had any such dynastic status, linking the crown with the land, taken root. (Whether there was in Hungary I am not competent to say.) The whole conflict appears to stem from the dogmas of the Holy Roman Empire by which the land belonged to God alone, while its *usus* was enjoyed by the princes— on the one hand of the Church, on the other of the secular world.

If now we take the liberty of standing this all on its head, we can see how the Central Europe of our day, into which had come a measure of urbanization and still more of the solvent of secularism, needed only the shock of war and defeat to bring it down in ruins. Neither the magic of the state-idea nor the charm exerted by the Court and the Church could avail to save an outmoded pattern of civilization and government. All who knew it were endeared to the humane, easy-going and outwardly friendly set-up of pre-1914 Austria (the atmosphere in Hungary was something quite different), which betrayed a striking contrast to Prussian efficiency and tidiness. But something sterner than this was required to perform the miracle of adjustment demanded for the salvation of the system and the state. Too many obstacles had accumulated during the years, and to the major of these we must now turn.

II

We have already concerned ourselves with one of the obstacles in Namier's discussion of the problems arising out of the hopes and disappointments of the "spring of the nations". With the liberation of the serfs, with the slow but steady extension of popular education that followed this, with the expanding practice of reading the weekly, or even daily press, and, last but not least, with the granting of manhood suffrage in 1906 which

⁶It is worth noting that just ten years later, in 1858, Franz Josef was to remark: "I have lost a battle; I shall pay for this with a province." The reference was of course to the defeat of Solferino.

put the Germans of Austria in a marked minority at election time, the hopes of saving the old order melted away.⁷

But there were other lions in the way. Perhaps the most formidable fact to be reckoned with was one which not even the most ardent patriot or the most adroit politician could dismiss, viz. the fact that whole (and in some cases larger) parts of the nations comprising the Monarchy lay beyond its borders. Such loyalties, other than regional, as these peoples nurtured, were directed not toward Vienna but to the outside world. Of this kind of thing the Poles provided the most obvious example. The ideal of "the emperor's man" which Wincenty Witos had known as a boy in school would not function any more. The sense of being Polish could not be thrust into the background.

At the other end of the Monarchy a scarcely less insoluble problem was provided by the Croats. They had, it is true, been separated from their Serb brothers since the Middle Ages, and they had been nurtured in Latin Christianity; but much of the strength of these affinities had been cancelled out by their unhappy relations with Hungary. Little less than an open feud emerged in the forties when the Croat leaders decided to follow the example of the Magyars and replace their mother tongue for Latin as the medium of debate in their Diet (Sabor). The Magyars wanted them to employ Hungarian and made strong objections, but the only result was that Ban Jellačić joined the Imperial forces in the march on Budapest, in order to suppress the revolution. As he put it, "The Serbs are our brothers in race and blood." The equestrian statue of the Ban, standing in the town square, shows him with his sabre extended in the direction of the Hungarian capital.

Within a generation this trend had become a dogma. It would have been hard to find in the early seventies a more loyal servant of the dynasty than the ex-Court Preacher, Bishop Josef Strossmayer. He was a great churchman, but he did his own thinking, and he was at heart a patriot for his own people. He was guided by under-lying realities, not by outward appearances. When in 1878 there came the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, he realized what was in the wind, and uttered this notable warning:

"If Vienna, or rather Budapest, means to govern the new provinces with Hungarians or Germans, and for their profit, the Austrians will end up by being more hated than the Turks."

This prophecy was to be fulfilled just thirty years later.

Finally we have the Romanians of Transylvania, whose age-old experience of Magyar domination helped to condition, if not to determine their centrifugal allegiances. From the time when their mother people won back their independence from the Turks it was simply out of the question that they should submit even to an accommodation of themselves to alien rule. How this ended is common knowledge, though not everyone knows

⁷There can be little doubt that one reason for the Suffrage Reform at this time was to be found in the events in Russia.

how signal a contribution the Romanians from this region made to their proper homeland after 1919. It was unfortunate, undeniably, that the island of a million Szeklers found itself involved in this momentous change.

Two other obstacles to the achievement of a Habsburg patriotism, via the state-idea, deserve attention. They were respectively the stand taken during the nineteenth century by the Magyar ruling classes toward their non-Magyar neighbors, and the rise in the eighties of aggressive pan-Germanism on the Danube.

To the former we have already alluded. The situation had become so grave by 1843 that the Bohemian nobleman, Count Leo Thun—later to become a Cabinet Minister in Vienna—was moved to write his notable warning *Die Stellung der Slowaken in Ungarn*. Two short excerpts from this little known work will reveal his state of mind:

"In the national diversity of peoples lies the peculiar nature of the truly great monarchy to which we belong. The principle of national tolerance assures the monarchy of a permanent bond and a most powerful lever of spiritual power; conversely, the principle of intolerance would be for it the most frightful curse, a source of irreconcilable discord, and the sign of inevitable collapse. . . ."

Addressing his fellow gentry of the Magyar race, he went on:

"What you bear to your motherland is not love but a passionate vanity of race to which you have fallen victims—of the race to which you belong—or to which you reckon yourselves. This vanity makes you inaccessible to anything else, and blind to the true good of your country and the world. . . . Your very utterances are nonsense when you defend your position with words that make everyone who hears them blush."

Unfortunately even the otherwise praiseworthy Kossuth was to remain unmoved by this appeal. Only years later, in exile, did he realize and admit the fateful mistakes being made, and the blundering obstinacy of those who followed him. To these latter he himself still contributed in his old age, writing from his home near Turin anti-Habsburg articles. Magyar leaders resisted right to the end of the century every effort of Vienna to get an increase in the contribution made by Hungary to the imperial and royal exchequer; and they were equally hostile to plans for raising the Hungarian contingent, in line with growing population, in the joint army. Not even the one campaign speech ever made by Franz Josef (in 1903) could move them.

These same people sent the government of Stephen Tisza down to defeat in 1905, since Tisza was known to be a supporter of the Dual System. Outside events may have contributed to this action—Russia's defeat in the Far East, and the winning by Norway of her independence from Sweden. But the tide of separatist feeling continued to rise, and nothing seemed likely to check it save the threat of an imperial decree authorizing

the introduction of manhood suffrage. This, as all would agree, would have ended in one blow the supremacy of one class or nation. When it came the reactionaries sought and obtained a compromise, but at the price of economic concessions which fortified the position of their country as the granary of the empire, and—it must be added—made possible ten years later in wartime as effective a blockade of hungry Vienna as was that of all Central Europe by the Allies.

III

And now we must look at *das Alldeutschtum*, the pan-German upsurge on the Danube, of which the recognized apostle was Georg von Schoenerer.⁶ Drafted in 1882, the "Linz Program," to quote Taylor, "sought to return to the heroic age of German supremacy." He goes on to add that the guarantor of this was to be not Schmerling (the "liberal" statesman of twenty years earlier with his "empire of seventy millions"), but Bismarck. The Reich was to be trusted to ensure German preponderance on the middle Danube for all time.

Everyone with insight knew well that this amounted to treason toward the Monarchy. It is not surprising that it found favor for the most part among Lutherans; that, as already noted, *Los von Rom* meant *Los von Österreich*. Small wonder then that the Young Czechs met this fanatical move by an all-out nationalist reply; or that the moderates of both peoples, alarmed at the turn things were taking, got together to work out a compromise. But it was too late. No *modus vivendi* could be found, and a decade of strife followed. Not even the "dropping of the pilot" in Berlin could daunt men of Schoenerer's ilk. Their sense of "manifest destiny" outran all discretion. They could recall how even Franz Josef, who stood for the multi-national solution, had balked at the notion of being crowned King of Croatia, exclaiming ". . . but I am a German Prince!"

So far did things go that, again to quote Taylor, "the appointment of every school-teacher, of every railway porter, of every hospital doctor, of every tax-collector, was a signal for national struggle." Surely a *reductio ad absurdum*! A way had to be found; a strong man unearthed to work out a formula, and see it translated into action. As historians know, the task was entrusted to the able Governor of Galicia, Count Badeni, whose famous Decree of April 5, 1897, put the German and Czech languages on an equal footing in "the inner services" throughout Bohemia. The effects were devastating.

"Schoenerer," says Taylor, "had his opportunity at last." An appeal went out for support, not the least to the Germans in the Reich. The

⁶Professor May has reminded us in his recent study of *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914*, that roots of this movement lie in the rejoicing of many Germans in Austria at the triumph of Prussia over France in 1870. One member of the *Reichsrath* declared in June, 1871: "Our fathers were Germans and, if fate should destroy Austria, we should again be Germans." A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, (London, 1948), p. 162.

avowed purpose now was to wreck the Monarchy and to incorporate its lands in Hohenzollern Germany. Overwhelmed by the fury of this assault the Emperor surrendered and released Badeni. The Language Decree became a scrap of paper. Meanwhile, however, a Deputy from Eger had raised his glass to the toast "One God, one Emperor, one Empire!"; while another, Karl Hermann Wolf, made the celebrated public reference to *die minderwertigen Nationen*.⁹ The heat of party political argument can be used to explain many undignified outbursts, but this kind of thing was neither helpful nor loyal to the Habsburg cause.

To fill up the cup the voice of a venerated historian from outside Austria was raised on the side of the traitors. On October 31, 1897, Theodor Mommsen published a letter in the *Neue Freie Presse*, from which one or two sentences have often been quoted, but of which more deserves to be known. Here are parts of it, rather mutilated by the Censor:

"Only believe me that, just as Austrians are looking across at us Germans, so we Germans are looking at Austria; and our hearts too are bleeding at these unheard-of. . . (excision by Censor). That the Alps of Salzburg and the Tirol are in the future to belong to the whole nation, that the Danube is to remain as German as the Rhine, that the graves of Mozart and of Grillparzer are as German as those of Schiller and Goethe—of all this no one among us Germans of the north has any doubt, even amid the hottest of conflicts between us.

"And now the apostles of barbarism are at work, burying the German labor of half a millenium in the pit of their *Unkultur*. It is for us Germans an unspeakable grief to have to look on at the. . . (again the Censor) of the Monarchy, at the. . . (once more an excision) this side of the Leitha, at the stupidity of the so-called Liberals beyond it. . .

"We cannot *act* with you, we can only *suffer* with you. We hope for firm and united endurance on the part of all to whom violence is done. . . . How can German Catholics concede the good sense of those who declare that Catholicism and patriotism do not march together; who deny their nation as Peter denied his Lord? How can it happen that the ancient imperial city, Vienna, so slack, so *volklos*, so empty of honor, does nothing in these days of struggle?

"Be as one! (*Seid einig!*)—that is my first word. Be tough! (*Seid hart!*)—that is my second word. Reason gets no recognition from a Czech skull, but blows can reach it. By untimely concessions much mischief has been committed in Austria. Everything is at stake; to submit spells destruction. The German Austrians cannot leave the Marchlands which they have made to blossom both in visible and in invisible things, in the way Jews can leave Russia. He who yields must know that his grandchildren, if not his children, are to be made into Czechs. Be tough!"

There is more in the same strain about "this life and death struggle,"

⁹It is hardly likely that Wolf knew of the remark made just thirty years before this by the architect of the *Ausgleich*, Count Beust, to his Magyar colleague, Andrassy: "You look after your barbarians, and we shall look after ours."

all with the inference that, since nothing else avails, brute force must be employed.

This *cri du coeur*, for such it was, of an aging patriot, who of course should have known better and kept quiet, was not allowed to pass unchallenged. A telling reply was made by the eminent Polish historian, Oswald Balzer, of Lwów University in an *Offenes Schreiben*, of which I have the good fortune to possess a copy. It was one thing, said Balzer, for tub-thumping politicians to talk about "the inferior peoples of Central Europe"; it was quite another for "a man of science, who had won fame in Europe for his work" to join in the chorus.

"Your judgments are stern and hard, sterner than those of the politicians. You are not content with 'inferior nations' but speak of 'apostles of barbarism, who are trying to bury German civilization'. No historian has appeared heretofore who has dared to utter such a statement. . . We are looking for evidence in support of what you have said. To provide this is an obligation laid on you by your place in the world of learning, and by the grey hairs you have acquired in the pursuit of truth."

Needless to say, no such evidence was ever forthcoming. No more unfortunate intervention has ever, to my knowledge, been made in the course of national conflicts in Europe. To substantiate it was impossible; to defend it would have brought only confusion on those who tried. What matters for us was the lapse of such people as Mommsen into the realm of blind and uncontrolled emotions, at a time when Czech scholarship had given the world a Purkyně, Czech music a Smetana and a Dvořák, and the tradition of Hus, Comenius and Palacký could not be a sealed book, at least not to students of history. No reference is needed to corresponding figures from Polish or Russian records. Balzer could have given these, but all he did was to assure Mommsen that the Slavs had not thought of desecrating the resting-places of Mozart or Grillparzer, and then add these significant words—from which Hitler might have learned something later on, had he been teachable:

"German culture is neither the first nor the last, and it is in no way the only one that leads toward perfection. As equal partners the Slavs desire to work together with the German people on the mighty structure of human civilization."

Partnership—that has been the goal sought for long by the lesser nations of Europe, as Masaryk himself was to say so well in 1915 in his Inaugural Lecture in the University of London.

"Culture is not the product of any one nation, big or small. . . . It is a very great disability not to accept the various forms and degrees of culture as represented by many nations and parts of nations; and not to understand that each nation must work out its culture alone and independently, not simply taking over that of another even if it be called 'higher'. . .

"History refutes the pan-German argument. It shows that national states have developed in Europe; and history is in favor not only of big but also of medium-sized and smaller national states."

IV

Such was the considered judgment of one who had grown up in the heart of the Danube Monarchy, who sought for decades to assess fairly and to esteem the good in it, but at the same time refused to close his eyes to its defects, and whose final verdict was "weighed in the balances and found wanting!" An even sterner view had been taken earlier by another Liberal, who watched the scene from farther away. In 1880, indiscreetly—as he later admitted—Gladstone had uttered a judgment in these terms:

"Austria has been the unflinching foe of freedom in every country of Europe. . . There is not a spot on the map where you can lay your finger and say 'Here Austria did good!' "¹⁰

Oddly enough, in his heart, Bismarck seems to have thought much the same as Gladstone. During all those years he never trusted Vienna to do the right thing. What is more he depended for the stability of the régime he distrusted on the very thing which was doing most to disrupt it. He had no liking for pan-Germanism, but he admired the Magyars and their policy. Pointing to the map on 1884 he remarked:

"There, between the Danube and the Carpathians, live the Hungarians. For us it is—as though Germans were there, since their destiny is tied to ours."

How true that was to prove; and how increasingly clear it became that the Slavs were to foot the bill! Did Bismarck realize this, or did he care?¹¹

The issue lay, more than anywhere else, between Germans and Czechs, and for two reasons. Firstly, because since 1848 the latter had been thorough-going champions of the Austrian tradition; and secondly because—whether from the standpoint of geography or that of economics—the loyal cooperation of Bohemia and Moravia remained a condition of Habsburg survival. No other non-German land approached being as essential to the Monarchy as did theirs; nevertheless the makers of high policy seemed to be blind to this fact.

Not that they were never reminded of it. In the great debate on the military estimates of 1888 Palacký's son-in-law, Dr. Rieger, declared: "We must remain Austrian; we have no future outside this empire." Nevertheless, this position was becoming increasingly harder every year to maintain. The realism of 1848 was slowly but surely replacing idealism. After years of

¹⁰An admitted exception to this indictment was Bosnia, in which just at that time the Habsburg administration was beginning a period of really constructive work.

¹¹Professor May reports Bismarck's pessimistic reflections, revealed after his death in 1898. In his view disintegration was imminent, and Germany should realize that: "It is in vain to ally oneself to a corpse."

boycott the Czechs were again taking part in state affairs, and with fateful consequences.

The new century had hardly begun when two events shook the whole fabric of the Monarchy, each in a different way. The granting of manhood suffrage in Austria put the Germans in a hopeless minority; while the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, coupled with the scandal of the Zagreb treason trials and their sequel, virtually ended the trust of men like Masaryk in the good faith of Vienna. It had become clear (as British observers divined from the outset) that the system was unworkable, and that the leaders who sought ways and means of sustaining it were both cowardly and incompetent. It needed only the outcome of the Balkan wars—the reverse of what Austria had predicted—to complete the ruin. Unless he refused to read the handwriting on the wall, Masaryk could not have acted in the autumn of 1914 other than he did.

Let no one think, however, that his decision was easy. It took sober and deep searching of heart. He was to spell out later the considerations that determined his action, in the opening chapter of *The Making of a State*. His choice was based on as near a total weighing of both principles and possibilities as man has ever achieved, as well on the conditions inside the Monarchy as on those in the world at large; as well the near as the more remote goals; as well the dictates of the heart as those of the head; as well the darker as the lighter features of the picture—nothing was omitted. Rarely has any man suffered more agony of mind and spirit before “crossing the Rubicon”, and all this at the age of sixty-five, when professors are supposed to “retire,” and cultivate their gardens. For him, for his family, for all his friends, such a decision meant trouble and turmoil—an earthquake which might engulf everything. Who was to say that he would succeed? Who could know that he would not become an Ishmaelite in the earth, another pilgrim like Comenius, and lay down his bones far from home—an inglorious exile?

As those know who have read his book with care, Masaryk was less concerned about what would happen inside the Danube lands—of that he had little doubt. The real difficulty lay elsewhere, in Paris and London. In respect to the prospects at home, it seems as though the scales were tipped for him by his two-hour interview with the former Prime Minister, Eric von Koerber, which he describes early in *The Making of a State*. To his question as to the probabilities of reforms in the event of victory, Koerber replied:

“No! Victory would strengthen the old system, and a new system under the young heir-apparent would be no better than the old. The soldiers would have the upper hand after a victorious war, and they would centralize and Germanize.”

Nothing could have been more unequivocal. It was quite clear that the hopes of those who had worked for a solution of the Dual Monarchy's

problem by which Austria would provide a home rather than a prison for the non-German peoples were doomed to failure.

Turning now to the outside world, we have to realize that as yet there existed only one book in English, that of Wickham Steed, from which any real conception of the truth about the Danube lands could be gleaned. France had a better record. Louis Léger and Ernest Denis had done much—the former with his *La Renaissance Tchèque*, the latter with *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche*. Two earlier pioneers, Leroy-Beaulieu and André Chéradame, had published notable books at the turn of the century, but both had come down roundly for preserving the status quo. They saw in the monarchy a barrier to German expansion, and thus a cornerstone of the balance of power in Europe. True, the latter demanded the transformation of the Dual System into a federation of peoples, in which he was to be supported by René Henry's *Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie* in 1903. The next year saw the statesmanlike survey of the whole matter by the able Louis Eisenmann.

Useful as all this was, it did little to prepare the way for any measure of formed, and informed, public opinion in the west. What is more, neither the French nor the British regarded themselves as at war with Austria-Hungary. The one great need was to end German, i.e. Prussian, militarism, and other issues were likely to get scant attention.

At least, then, this aging professor saw a new and vast educational task before him; could he undertake it? Would enough time be given to achieve anything before it was too late? Would Allied statesmen even give him a hearing? There was every chance that he might be set down as another crank, or even crack-pot—a counsellor of perfection, whose head was in the clouds but whose feet were not on mother earth. The very fact of his academic career was against him; when had a professor, outside of Plato's *Republic*, ever proved to be a practical politician?

That these misgivings were not just a fiction of his mind was to be shown by the events which followed just two years later. I refer to the secret negotiations by which the young Emperor Karl sought to secure a separate peace for the Monarchy, using his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, as mediator. Had this move succeeded Masaryk would have had to regard his whole enterprise as defeated. The first meeting, with the Austrian Foreign Minister Czernin in attendance, took place in Vienna in March, 1917. It was then that the soon to be famous "Sixtus Letter," addressed in effect to President Poincaré, was handed to the Prince, without the knowledge of Czernin. Only in December, however, did things become acute, when Smuts, acting for Lloyd George, met Count Mensdorff at Geneva. Publicity was given to the issue by the British Prime Minister's speech of January 5, on which he was complimented by Clemenceau. The anxiety of those who saw the possibility of salvaging the Monarchy was now grave indeed.

Czernin himself relieved all worries when he told the town council of Vienna that the initiative had been taken by France, implying thereby an

admission of weakness. Clemenceau had no choice but to publish the facts, including the text of the Letter. The damage done to the Habsburg cause was colossal, the relief of Masaryk and his supporters complete. As Beneš wrote later: "We could breathe again!"

To every student of those times the dimensions of Masaryk's dilemma must seem enormous. His motto had always been: *Magna est veritas et praevalerebit!* He disliked any appeal to force, but the issue for him was now no longer political—it was moral. He had then no choice but to do his duty, even though the people whom he wanted to reach looked on him as

An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry!

You will have wondered that nothing has been said thus far about the great ally of the east, imperial Russia, regarded for generations by many Slavs of Central Europe as "the big brother" destined to liberate his lesser kinsmen. The reason is simple. Masaryk had no illusions about Tsardom. He knew it well. His two volumes, published in German in 1913, and in English six years later as "The Spirit of Russia" are still in my view the best work of its kind in our language. Following Palacký and Havlíček he could see nothing good accruing from Russian intervention in the Danube lands; just as from the start of the war he shared none of the wild hopes about the efficiency of the "Russian steam-roller."¹²

V

When I arrived in Prague on New Year's Day, 1914, speaking not a word of any Slav tongue, as complete "an innocent abroad" as ever travelled, few of us had any premonition of what was ahead. Only after the struggle had got under way did I get hold of two books which were being passed around under cover, Scotus Viator's *The Slav Question* and Steed's *The Habsburg Monarchy*. The former meant little to me at that stage, but from the latter I learned a great deal. Meanwhile I was serving as a special worker for the World's Student Christian Federation, reporting directly to Dr. John R. Mott; cooperating with a Swiss colleague in Vienna, who was joined in the spring by a Harvard man. Politics was not our business, but I was soon to be brought up short by responsible men, older and younger, with whom I discussed in all its phases the cause of the kingdom of God. They said to me in plain fashion: "That is all very well, but it must wait till we have settled the political issue; we must first get our freedom." I told them that in my view this amounted to putting the cart before the horse, and was met by the rejoinder "You do not know our conditions."

In retrospect I have come to realize that those men were more nearly right than I would admit at the time. It took me years to learn that, while

¹²It is significant that when Sir Bernard Pares published his (Penguin) *Russia* in 1941, he did not include Masaryk's work in his bibliography. The liberal romanticist did not like the line taken by the liberal realist.

you may get individual saints under any type of social and political control, normal and healthy development of the mind and the spirit is possible only where people have the right to be themselves. You cannot have Jean Valjean and police inspector Javert as neighbors; one of them must succumb. Where the "altar" and the "throne" are in league to keep men and women in a state of pupillage, no proper unfolding of life is possible. No student can be expected to get on with higher algebra while suffering from toothache.

Out of many, two other recollections: At Easter, 1914, Federation workers organized a Conference, attended by students and professors—Austrian Germans, Czechs, Poles and Hungarians, together with guests from outside. The general theme for discussion was "Rebirth," and three main papers were given. National Rebirth was treated by a professor from Vienna; Social Rebirth by Dr. Eduard Beneš from Prague, and the Rebirth of the Individual by a Polish pastor from Silesia. The meeting took place in a village in the Duchy of Teschen, and the *lingua franca* of the conference was German. In the discussion following the first paper (on the Nation), we had a senior Polish colleague declaring frankly "I am an Austrian through and through!", with the Czech student spokesman replying "I am a Bohemian [i.e. Czech] through and through!" When analyzed it was seen that they were using the term in somewhat different senses, but the line of cleavage was nonetheless there.

Two months later, on the last Saturday of June—the day before the Serajevo assassinations—my wife and I were on the Vienna-Budapest express, on our way to a student summer conference. In the compartment were two or three businessmen, and I could not avoid hearing their discussion of the perennial question—peace or war. They came back to the basic issue, for them: *die Brotfrage*. In their view, if people had enough to eat, there would be no war.¹³ I put this months later to a Polish friend, and he rejected it out of hand. His comment was: "How many of us could have almost anything we want in respect of honors or of this world's goods, if we were willing to sell our birthright! But we are not, and I hope we never shall be." That, as I understand it, was essentially the position of Thomas Masaryk.

In conclusion, and leaving many things unsaid, I should like to report an incident from Masaryk's life that few in the English-speaking world will have heard of.

Early in the century a young Pole, coming from his Russian-ruled homeland, was a serious student of philosophy in Heidelberg. He lived to become one of the abler publicists of his generation, fighting not a few battles for his fellow Protestants. In perplexity about the forces at work in Poland that were bent in incorporating the nation into the vast sea of Russia, he wrote to Masaryk in Prague (whom he had never seen) for

¹³This amounted to acceptance of the ancient formula, *ubi bene ibi patria!*

guidance on the point "why oppression hurts man so unbearably." After some delay he received the following letter, which is worth quoting in full:

"Dear Sir:—

I have been ill, and for that reason my answer comes belatedly. Please read my book *Ideale der Humanität*, published by Conegen in Vienna. Lagarde's *Deutsche Schriften* will give you much food for thought. Have you read Herzen? All this is material for reflection. In the last analysis nationality is based on moral conviction, and for that reason we defend it against those who oppress it. But one must do more than just defend: one must reach out for higher ideals. The best patriots at times are the prophets who lead their peoples to higher ideals.

In the Polish-Russian conflict the Poles are wholly in the right, but they themselves should not oppress the Ukrainian elements in Galicia. This amounts to occupying the station (or 'place') of oppressors, which weakens one's own struggle for justice and makes it end in defeat.

Yours faithfully,

T.G.M."

In these simple words, addressed by a busy man to an unknown inquirer, we can see the majesty of Masaryk's mind, its great range, its unwavering honesty. Such witness is all too rare in history.

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SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNIST RULE

"Democratic centralism" versus national autonomy

by Eduard Táborský

IN THE LAST years of the Second World War the Czechoslovak Communists were among the most enthusiastic promoters of Slovak nationalism.¹ They lent their fullest support to a political program which, had it been carried out, would have transformed Czechoslovakia into a loose Union of two states. Whenever the Slovak nationalist spokesmen wavered and were ready to yield to Dr. Beneš' persuasiveness, and to settle for less than an extremist version of autonomy during the fateful 1940 Moscow negotiations on the formation of a new Czechoslovak régime, it was the Muscovite Quadrumvirate of the Czechoslovak Communist leaders, headed by Klement Gottwald, who prevailed upon the Slovaks to continue to press for the most radical demands.² Such a political importance did the Communists attach to their Party's identification with the "rights" obtained for Slovakia that Gottwald, then only Deputy Premier, reserved for himself the task of proclaiming, upon the Government's return to Czechoslovakia in April 1945, the "Magna Charta of the Slovak nation,"³ while allowing the then Premier Zdeněk Fierlinger to read the rest of the Government's Program.

This striking Communist eagerness to secure for Slovakia a status of virtual independence could hardly be taken at its face value. It ran too much afoul of the well-known Leninist-Stalinist principle of "democratic centralism" and its actual application in the Soviet Union. And indeed when the Czechoslovak Communists achieved a position of power and governmental responsibility following the end of the war and, in particular, when they seized complete control of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, their deeds with regard to the status of Slovakia remained far behind their lofty promises of the war years.

It is the purpose of this article to trace the successive stages of development in the political status of Slovakia from 1945 to the present and to show how Klement Gottwald's "Magna Charta of the Slovak Nation" was gradually being whittled down until it has now become yet another of the

¹Their main spokesmen in exile, both in Moscow and in London, harped incessantly on the touchy theme of Czech-Slovak relations, deliberately encouraging the most radical among the Slovak autonomists. Cf. various articles in the main Czechoslovak Communist periodicals, *Československé Listy*, published in Moscow, and *Mladé Československo*, published in London. Most authoritative among them were two articles, *Češi a Slováci* and *Znovu o Čechách a Slovácích*, by Václav Kopecký, member of the Quadrumvirate of Czechoslovak Communist leaders in Moscow. The articles were published in *Československé Listy* of September 15, 1943, and February 1, 1944, respectively.

²This writer obtained first-hand information about the above through his own participation in the said negotiations and his access to pertinent materials as Personal Aide to the late President Eduard Beneš at that time.

³Cf. *Program první domácí vlády národní fronty Čechů a Slováků*, a Government publication by the Ministry of Information, No. 2 (Prague, 1945), p. 41.

many "Potemkin's villages" which flank the road to the Communist utopia. Thus the article is intended to be both a contribution to the study of nationality policy and regionalism as applied in a specific area under Communist control and an illustration of the contradiction between Communist theory and Communist practice.

The pre-1945 background

The reasons why the political status of Slovakia was bound to become a burning issue following World War II are well-known not only to students of European politics but also, mainly because of the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939, to laymen interested in world affairs in general. Therefore, they may be disposed of briefly.⁴

After centuries of separation from the Czech lands Slovakia became part of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. No special status was either sought by her or granted to her at that time,⁵ though for a while a special Ministry for Slovak affairs was in existence. An autonomist movement soon developed, however, which had as its main political goal the establishment of a special Slovak diet. Following the Munich dictate of 1938, which led to the territorial mutilation of Czechoslovakia and the resignation of President Beneš, the Slovak autonomist forces, taking advantage of the weakened position of the Czechoslovak government, succeeded in obtaining a special status for Slovakia, including a provincial legislature, a Prime Minister and a cabinet with substantial executive authority, and a separate Slovak judiciary.⁶ When Hitler ordered the complete liquidation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the Slovak provincial government headed by Tiso proclaimed, at Hitler's behest, an independent Slovak state which became in fact a Nazi protectorate.⁷

During the war an underground Slovak National Council was established which came into the open in September 1944 when, in agreement with Beneš' Czechoslovak government in exile in London, it organized an uprising in Central Slovakia behind the German lines. In its very first enactment the Council assumed the exercise of the "entire legislative, governmental and executive power in Slovakia" and subsequently provided for the creation of a Board of Commissioners (*povereník*), appointed by and responsible to the National Council, each member of which was to

⁴For an up-to-date story of the developments relative to Slovakia and the Czech-Slovak relations cf. S. Harrison Thomson, *Czechoslovakia in European History* (Princeton, 1953), in particular chapters 14, 16 and 17.

⁵The so called "Pittsburgh Convention" of May 1918 which envisaged "her own administrative system, her own diet and her own courts" for Slovakia, was only a sort of pious *desideratum* expressed by Czech and Slovak organizations in the United States. Cf. Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-315.

⁶This status was first agreed upon by several Slovak political parties on October 6, 1938, (the so called "agreement of Žilina") and was subsequently enacted by the Czechoslovak post-Munich rump parliament in the form of a Constitutional amendment, dated November 22, 1938, No. 299 of the Collection of Laws.

⁷Regarding the position of the Slovak State after March 1939 cf. Eduard Táborský, *The Czechoslovak Cause*, London, 1944, p. 33 ff.

head a department of state administration.⁸ The Council itself was led by a Presidium of six men who also supervised the work of the Commissioners. All functions in these revolutionary Slovak government organs were evenly distributed among the Communist and the Democratic parties, which were the only two parties permitted to exist by the National Council.

The uprising was crushed by the Germans within two months and the Slovak National Council and all its organs had to disperse and go underground again. Before that happened, however, the Council managed to send a three-man delegation to London with a mission to prevail upon President Beneš and his government to accept the new arrangement. Though Beneš did not commit himself in any definite way at that time, he had to yield later to the joint pressure of the Slovak Democratic party and the Czech and Slovak Communists. During the subsequent negotiations in Moscow in March 1945 he was forced to accept practically all of their radical demands. In fact, even before Beneš could return to Czechoslovakia the shortlived revolutionary pattern of 1944 was re-established in Slovakia under the protective arm of the advancing Red Army.⁹

The 1945-1948 Intermezzo

For over a year thereafter the Slovak National Council, its Presidium and Board of Commissioners continued to govern Slovakia much as they pleased without bothering much about the President of the Republic and the central government. A drastic change came, however, immediately after the first parliamentary elections in May 1946. Having polled only 30% of votes in Slovakia as compared with 41% in the Czech lands, the Communists, realizing that their support of the Slovak cause was not politically profitable, abandoned their advocacy of Slovak autonomy and became instead instrumental in its radical curtailment.

Since the status of Slovakia had been determined primarily by political agreements between the Czechoslovak government and the Slovak National Council the change was made in the same way. According to the new arrangement, the so-called "Third Political Agreement" of June 28, 1946,¹⁰ all enactments of the Slovak National Council had to be submitted to the Czechoslovak cabinet. If the latter disapproved of them (which they could do on the ground that the enactment exceeded the jurisdiction of the Council or was contrary to the Government Program) the Presidium of the Slovak National Council could as a last resort lay the matter before a Board of Arbitrators consisting of the Speaker of the National Assembly,

⁸For a good survey of the political and constitutional developments in Slovakia from 1944 to 1947 cf. Josef Hoffman, *Zřízení československé republiky po osvobození, Slovník veřejného práva československého*, Vol. LXII, (Brno, 1948), p. 802ff. A summary of the activity of the Slovak National Council during the war may be found in Martin Kvetko, *K základom ústavného pomeru česko-slovenského* (Bratislava, 1947), p. 41 ff.

⁹The Presidium of the Slovak National Council renewed its activity by February 1945 and the whole Slovak National Council in April 1945. Cf. details in Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 812 ff.

¹⁰For a legal analysis cf. Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 812 ff.

the six members of the Presidium of the (central) cabinet and the Chairman of the Slovak National Council. As the Board had a Czech majority and since the Czech Communists, following their about-face of 1946, were definitely opposed to any radical Slovak autonomy, it was a foregone conclusion that the Board would side with the central government in any such controversy.

An even more radical restriction was imposed upon the Slovak Board of Commissioners. In addition to being responsible to the Slovak National Council they were made accountable to the cabinet which was also given the power to approve their appointment and to suspend their decisions. Moreover, they were thenceforth to be sworn in by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister.

The Constitution of the "Ninth of May" (1948)

This sharp curtailment of Slovak autonomy in 1946, which had been made possible only through the Communist reversal of policy with regard to Slovakia, foreshadowed clearly what was to come when the Communists seized complete power as a result of the February coup of 1948.

The Communist-imposed "Ninth of May" Constitution, which President Beneš refused to sign even at the cost of his own resignation, reaffirms the existence of the Slovak National Council as "the national organ of legislative power in Slovakia" and of the Slovak Board of Commissioners as "the national organ of governmental and executive power in Slovakia."¹¹ And it uses nine whole pages of its "Detailed Provisions" to spell out the rights and obligations of these Slovak bodies and to determine their relation to the organs of the central government. But they bristle with restrictive qualifications which take out almost all the substance of Slovak autonomy and leave little more than an empty form. This stands out very clearly if we compare the original 1945 version of Slovak autonomy with that of 1948.

The original arrangement, the so-called "First Prague Agreement" of June 1945, vested in the Slovak National Council "the legislative power in all questions, in so far as they are not reserved to the Czechoslovak legislative assembly." Similarly, all the executive power in Slovakia was vested in the Slovak National Council and its Board of Commissioners "in so far as it was not in the domain of the Czechoslovak government."

This presumption of authority in favor of the Slovak organs is completely reversed in the "Ninth of May" Constitution. The legislative powers of the Slovak National Council have instead been placed on a strictly enumerative basis and permitted only in ten fields of very limited political import, such as cultural matters, elementary and secondary education, public health, division of communes and districts, building regulations, maintenance of certain highways, handicrafts and retail trade matters of

¹¹Article IX of the "Fundamental Articles" of the Constitution.

guardianship and the care of orphans, and the like.¹² Moreover, in some of these instances the legislative authority of the Slovak National Council has been further weakened by various exempting clauses assigning the above mentioned powers to the Slovak National Council "save for such matters as are or shall be uniformly regulated by Acts" (of the national legislature) or "save for matters within the scope of the Uniform Economic Plan" (which embraces practically everything).

The scope of Slovak authority in the executive field has been reduced accordingly. With the exception of the above mentioned ten narrow fields of activity the Slovak Commissioners can now act only as executive organs of the central government and the central Ministers.¹³ They are accountable for their activity to the cabinet;¹⁴ the Board of Commissioners must "abide by the directives and instructions of the cabinet;" and the individual Commissioners must "abide by the directives and instructions of the respective Ministers" while the latter are entitled, if they so choose, to exercise their authority in Slovakia directly.

This drastic reduction of authority has been accompanied by other provisions, even more illustrative of the pitiful position of Slovak "self-government" under Communist rule. Thus the Slovak National Council is summoned and adjourned by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister and can be dissolved by him at any time.¹⁵ Its laws must be signed not only by its Chairman and by the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, but by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister as well.¹⁶ The latter has the right to refuse to sign any such law not only when it is incompatible with the Constitution or exceeds the powers of the Slovak National Council, but also on the ground that the law is inconsistent with the Uniform Economic Plan or with the national Budget. The final word in such a case rests with the cabinet which thus enjoys a virtual veto over all Slovak legislation.

While the Slovak National Council is authorized to give a binding interpretation of its Acts, such an interpretation "requires the approval of the Prime Minister in order to be valid." The Czechoslovak cabinet also has the right to initiate bills in the Slovak National Council, an arrangement most unusual in the relation of a central to a regional government. Equally striking is the provision that "the conditions of the franchise for the Slovak National Council, of the exercise thereof, and of the carrying out of the election of deputies" shall be prescribed by an Act of the central legislature.

The gradual decline of the political status of Slovakia is perhaps best illustrated by the successive changes in the mode of appointment of the Slovak Board of Commissioners. At first, the Commissioners were chosen

¹²Art. 96 of the "Detailed Provisions."

¹³Art. 95 of the "Detailed Provisions."

¹⁴Only in matters falling within the narrow scope of the legislative powers of the Slovak National Council are they accountable to the latter. Art. 118 of the "Detailed Provisions."

¹⁵Art. 102 of the "Detailed Provisions."

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Art. 110.

solely by the Presidium of the Slovak National Council and were responsible to the Council. By June 1946 such appointments had to be approved by the cabinet and the practice was initiated of having the Commissioners sworn in by the Prime Minister. Since June 1948 they have been appointed and may be recalled by the cabinet which also determines which Commissioner shall direct which department.

There is one more item of essential importance in this comparison of the original version of the Slovak status with its present day pattern under the "Ninth of May" Constitution, an item that has always been considered by the Slovak autonomists to be a vital part of their program. They have always insisted that once the status of Slovakia was agreed upon, it was to be guaranteed that any subsequent change would require the consent of the majority of the Slovak people. That is why they have always demanded that any new Constitution include a clause to that effect. And indeed, in April 1946 when the Czechoslovak Provisional National Assembly adopted the Constitutional Act establishing a Constituent Assembly and assigned to it the task of drafting and adopting the new Czechoslovak Constitution, Article Nine of the said Act provided that no constitutional act affecting the status of Slovakia might be adopted except with "the consent of the majority of the present members of the Constituent Assembly, elected in Slovakia." However, the "Ninth of May" Constitution no longer contains any such clause. In dealing with the procedure of constitutional amendments it prescribes a three-fifths majority of all the deputies, irrespective of whether they represent Slovakia or the Czech lands.¹⁷ As more than three-fifths of Czechoslovak legislators come from the Czech lands, anything at all can be done with the status of Slovakia even if all Slovak deputies oppose it.

The Slovak "autonomy" in practice

The developments following the adoption of the "Ninth of May" Constitution have continued the same trend. Meetings of the Slovak National Council have been less and less frequent. With the steadily increasing habit of doing things through administrative measures there is little left for the legislative work of the Council. At first, there were some attempts to provide an agenda for the Slovak legislature by assigning certain minor matters to it. For example, the National Assembly entrusted to the Slovak National Council in 1949 the task of legislating into existence three colleges, one for fine arts, one for drama and music, and one for veterinary medicine.¹⁸ But thereafter the practice was abandoned. Yet the fact itself that an enabling act of the central legislature is necessary to authorize the Slovak legislators to pass even upon such politically unim-

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Art. 54.

¹⁸Cf. Pavel Korběl, *The Development of Slovakia's Constitutional Position*, a mimeographed pamphlet of the Research and Publication Service of the National Committee for a Free Europe (New York, 1953), p. 32.

portant matters displays the virtual impotence of the Slovak National Council.

The Slovak Board of Commissioners has so far fared somewhat better. They have been meeting with more regularity, usually once a month and sometimes more. And they do not seem to be short of work. However, their work consists of little but trivial administrative matters. Even the official press communiqués reporting their agenda reveal that the Commissioners are occupied only with such matters as securing performance of agricultural work, assigning youth to jobs in accordance with the needs of economic planning, taking notice of measures to improve tourism, approving plans for state deliveries of grain, passing upon the publication of new textbooks for Slovak schools, and improving telephone service. However worthwhile and necessary such matters may be, politically it is all petty business.

Yet another trend began to assert itself soon after the "Ninth of May" Constitution had come into existence. Originally the Slovak Commissioners were supposed to take care of the execution of all the laws in the territory of Slovakia, i. e. not only of the enactments passed by the Slovak National Council but also of the statutes adopted by the national Czechoslovak legislature. The Czechoslovak Ministers were thus actually debarred from operating in Slovakia except indirectly, through the intermediary of corresponding Slovak Commissioners. In June 1946 this principle was weakened and the "Third Political Agreement" provided that "a Minister shall be entitled to exercise his jurisdiction in Slovakia also directly through the organs of his department" but it had to be done "with the knowledge of the respective Commissioner." The "Ninth of May" Constitution also continues to adhere substantially to the earlier arrangement in so far as it stipulates that "the Board of Commissioners (individual Commissioners) shall *in principle*¹⁹ discharge all governmental and executive power in Slovakia. . . . save for matters of foreign affairs, national defense and foreign trade." It even provides for twelve departments through which the Slovak Commissioners are to carry out the executive power in Slovakia both in their own right and on behalf of the central Ministers.

This constitutional pattern would thus seem to require that, whenever a change occurs in the jurisdiction of central ministries or a new ministry or central agency is established, the Slovak executive machinery be rearranged accordingly. And indeed this was done on several occasions in 1948 and 1949. But in 1950 the practice was changed. When a new Ministry of State Security was established on the Soviet model in May 1950 no corresponding Commissioner's office was established in Slovakia. The same failure to create Slovak departments as counterparts of newly created ministries has since been repeated in several important instances, though there have been other cases in which corresponding Slovak departments

¹⁹Italics mine.

have been created.²⁰ What the "Ninth of May" Constitution declared as the basic principle, i.e. that the ministries will operate in Slovakia through the instrumentality of Slovak Commissioners, has thus in the course of a few years become a matter of arbitrary decision of the central authorities.

Conclusion

The story of the development in the status of Slovakia from 1945 to 1954 is thus a story of a gradual but steady decline of Slovak self-government and autonomy, and of a corresponding continuous increase in centralization. The Slovak National Council has been turned into an assembly of ears to listen to the fanfares of self-praise by the Communist rulers for what they have done for Slovakia and a gathering of mouths ready to express gratitude and give promises of loyalty; an assembly meeting on rare occasions, mostly ceremonial, and occasionally passing on measures of minor importance. The Commissioners have become obedient executors of the orders of their bosses, the Ministers, who can, however, by-pass them whenever they choose to do so.

To talk of Slovak *autonomy* under such circumstances would be grossly to distort the proper meaning of the word. For the status of Slovakia as it has so far developed under the Communist rule amounts to little more than an odd unit of local government within a highly centralized system. Not only is it infinitely inferior, with regard to the scope of reserved powers, to the status of a state of an ordinary federal system, such as the U. S., Canada and Switzerland. But it is also below the position of a Soviet Socialist Republic, at least as far as the constitutional and legal status is concerned.

To begin with, while the Soviet Constitution enumerates, though very broadly, the powers delegated to the national government and leaves all the rest to the states,²¹ under the "Ninth of May" Constitution it is just the opposite. The powers assigned to the "Slovak National Organs" are narrowly circumscribed and what is not specifically assigned to them by the Constitution is reserved for the organs of the national government. Each Soviet Republic has its own Constitution, adopted (at least in theory) by its own legislature which can also amend it.²² The Slovaks have no Constitution of their own and the constitutional status of Slovakia is outlined solely by the Czechoslovak Constitution which, as stated earlier, can be

²⁰When seven new ministries were created in September 1951 (State Control Foundries and Ores, Fuel and Power, Chemical Industry, Heavy Engineering, Light Engineering, Forest and Timber Industry) only one of them (Forest and Timber Industry) was given a counterpart in a corresponding Slovak Department. Nor were Slovak departments created to parallel further additions to the roster of ministries in May and July 1952. However, in the ministerial reorganization which took place in January 1953 some of the new ministries were given corresponding Slovak departments while others were not. After the latest reorganization which took place in July 1954 there are twenty-five ministries as compared to only fifteen Slovak departments.

²¹Cf. Art. 14 and 15 of the Soviet Constitution.

²²Art. 60.

amended by a three-fifths majority of the Czechoslovak national legislature. Each Soviet Republic has a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers chosen by its Republican legislature and responsible, in terms of the Stalin Constitution, to the Supreme Soviet of the respective Republic²³ and not to the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R., while the Slovak Board of Commissioners is appointed and may be recalled by, and is primarily accountable to, the central cabinet.²⁴ Each Soviet Republic is granted by the Constitution "the right freely to secede from the USSR."²⁵ to "enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them,"²⁶ to have "its own Republican military formations" and not to have its territory altered without its consent.²⁷ None of the above is granted to Slovakia. The contrast becomes even sharper if we consider, on top of all this, the vast constitutional powers which the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia and his cabinet wield over the Slovak National Council (including the unlimited power of dissolution) and which have no counterpart under the Stalin Constitution.

Naturally, these substantial differences in the Soviet and Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement dwindle into insignificance when it comes to the crude realities of practical politics, since in both countries policy at all levels is determined by the dictates of the Communist Party leadership. But as far as the constitutional pattern goes, it is clear how inferior the position of Slovakia is even when compared to the constitutional status of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

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²³Art. 63 and 69.

²⁴Art. 114 and 116. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as well as the Council of the Ministers of the USSR may, however, annul the decisions of the Republican Ministers if they do not conform to law.

²⁵Art. 17.

²⁷Art. 18.

ON "HUMAN RIGHTS" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Peter Zenkl

FROM HER creation in October, 1918, until the fateful Munich Dictate of September 30, 1938, the Czechoslovak Republic was an island of humanitarian democracy in Central Europe. She preserved her unshakable rule of law long after authoritarian systems had been set up in the neighboring countries of Germany, Poland, Hungary and Austria. Under the leadership of her first two Presidents T. G. Masaryk and Eduard Beneš she withstood the onslaught of Nazi ideology and Fascist creeds. Her parliament continued to function regularly, even after Hitler had seized Austria by force and thus completed the encirclement of the last bastion of democratic ideals and usages standing in his way.

These facts speak for themselves and there is no need to advertise or substantiate them, as they are generally known. Masaryk's people enjoyed all human rights: personal freedom, equality of all citizens, inviolability of domicile, secrecy of mails, freedom of the transmission of news, freedom of residence, right of property, protection of the family and of youth, right to education, freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of expression, right of petition and freedom of assembly and association.

When the Western powers surrendered to Hitler and Mussolini in a vain endeavor to "save peace in our time," these precious rights and freedoms of the Czechoslovak people were destroyed. For six long years the unhappy Czechs and Slovaks lived under the shadow of a totalitarian dictatorship. The number of its victims amounted to many hundreds of thousands of Czechoslovak citizens, whose only crime was that they had remained faithful to their democratic and humanitarian ideals. The world at large paid heavily for the blunder which had been committed at Munich.

After the War, the overwhelming majority of those Czechs and Slovaks who had survived the ordeal of Nazi occupation looked forward to a restoration of their democratic system and the rule of law, without which such a system could not exist. They also expected to renew their cultural and political ties with the West, which had always formed part of their cultural heritage. At the same time, they were quite prepared to live in peace and harmony with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, provided that these did not interfere in the affairs of Czechoslovakia.

Unfortunately Czechoslovakia's Western friends, who by their heroic fight had contributed so much toward her liberation from the Nazi yoke, did not realize the danger which was threatening her from the other totalitarianism. It had survived the war, thanks to the prowess and endurance of the rank and file citizens of the Soviet Union, but also thanks to the immense material help of the Western Allies.

Having been relegated to the Soviet sphere of interest, Czechoslovakia tried to make the best of a bad situation, as did the Western powers on a large scale in the sphere of international relations. Neither succeeded. Czechoslovakia and her people paid for the failure with the loss of her liberty, due to the Soviet imperialistic desire to secure world domination. The non-Communist world is still paying its price by a continuous state of tension and insecurity, with heavy sacrifices for armaments and heavy loss of life on the various battlefields where freedom and slavery have been pitted against each other.

The purpose of this brief article is to show by a few examples the type of life the Kremlin has prepared for the Czechs and Slovaks in the "worker's paradise" and how they respect their own "legal order" in practice. Our starting point will be several provisions of the Communist-enacted Constitution of Czechoslovakia, which was passed by an obedient parliament on May 9, 1948, barely nine weeks after the February 1948 *coup*. It is indicative of the Communists' methods that their constitution contains almost all the provisions which apparently safeguard human rights but in reality are either restricted by "elastic" and "flexible" restrictive clauses or simply ignored in practice.

According to section 1 (2) ". . . men and women shall have equal status in the family and in the community and shall have equal access to education, and to all professions, offices, and honors." A few quotations from the Communist press show how women's "equality of status" is realized. "Thirty per cent of the employees in our plant [NITAS, national enterprise, Prague XX] are women. They work on machines which before were operated only by men. . . Although our plant works in three shifts, our women do not mind." (*Rudé Právo*, Prague, January 4, 1952).

"At the Julius Fučík Mine in Zelenky, district of Duchcov, the majority of the workers in the sifting department are women. . . They work the full eight hours on Saturdays also. In cases of need they report for work in brigades even on Sundays. . ." (*Lidová Demokracie*, Prague, March 11, 1952).

"We cannot tolerate that young healthy women should be idle at home when in addition to their household work they could assist in the building of socialism in many spheres. . ." (*Zemědělské Noviny*, Prague, June 25, 1952).

The "equality of status" enjoyed by certain citizens who are "guilty" of having been members of specified "proscribed" professions or occupations, is illustrated by the following quotes: "Our working population will certainly approve the regulation under which the benefits of the controlled market shall in future be denied to the remnants of the capitalistic class, e.g. to former factory owners, bankers, wholesale merchants, pre-Munich and Protectorate high bureaucrats. . ." (*Rudé Právo*, January 16, 1953).

"The quantities of obligatory deliveries to be made by the village rich [kulaks] shall be determined in accordance with the norms applicable to

individually operating farmers, with an increase of ten per cent. . ." (Extract from governmental ordinance of November 4, 1952, No. 57 of the Collection of Laws).

Sect. 2: ". . . on the basis of a resolution adopted by the council of the district national committee [old age and invalidism] benefits including widow's pay shall be reduced adequately, if need be down to the level of social benefits [700 Kčs or \$14.00 per month before the recent currency reform], in the case of important representatives of the former political or economic life and to their widows. . ." (From governmental ordinance of April 17, 1953, No. 22 C.L.)

Section 7 (2) of the Constitution reads: "The right to emigrate abroad may not be restricted, except by virtue of an act." This sounds fine but the implementation of this provision sounds different:

Section 95 of the Criminal Code of July 12, 1950, No. 86 C.L., stipulates:

"(1) Whoever leaves the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic shall be punished by deprivation of liberty from one to five years.

"(2) A Czechoslovak citizen who does not comply with an official order to return to the territory of the ČSR within the time limit set to him shall be equally punishable. . ."

According to section 10 (1) "the institution of marriage and of the family and motherhood are under the protection of the State." The following are two examples of the manner in which these provisions are interpreted.

When Ludvík Frejka was tried as one of the "accomplices" of former C. P. Secretary General Rudolph Slánský in November, 1952, his 20-year old son Tomáš wrote the following letter to the presiding judge: "I demand the most severe punishment—a capital sentence for my father. . . [he] was my greatest and most wicked enemy. . . I request you to submit this letter to my father and also if possible to allow me to tell him this personally." The letter was read in court and published by *Rudé Právo*, November 25, 1952. It must be understood that Frejka was accused of economic crimes committed in planning and carrying out of plans and not of neglecting or ill-treating his family!

Young Frejka spent the war years in England and went to school there. It is, therefore, very doubtful whether he wrote this letter of his own free will and accord. However, even if he did, a Prague Radio broadcast of September 3, 1952, addressed to the pioneers of the elementary and lower secondary schools (6 to 15 years) throws light on Communist educational methods and the way they "protect" the family:

"Today, September 3, is the twentieth anniversary of the death of the Soviet pioneer Pavlik Morosov, who did not hesitate to sacrifice his life for his motherland, for socialism and Stalin. . . He hailed from a kulak's family but he did not spare its members. He unmasked them as saboteurs of the country, and he was murdered by members of his family, by his grandfather and his cousin. . . Remember the little hero Pavlik Morosov and

imitate his example!" Soon after the execution of Mr. Ludvík Frejka, private sources reported that his son committed suicide.

Of the provisions dealing with "freedom of conscience and belief" section 15 states: "No one shall suffer prejudice by virtue of his . . . faith . . .", and section 16 declares: "Everyone shall be entitled to profess privately and publicly any religious creed. . ."

Three quotes from *Směna*, the official organ for the Slovak members of the Czechoslovak Youth League, the only Government-sponsored and controlled youth organization, are characteristic of the application of these principles in education:

"In our study circles [of the high school of Nitra] . . . we have discussed the theme 'The Origin and Rise of Religion' . . . As a basis we used Nikolska's publication 'The Origin of Religion' and . . . a special paper was read on every religious community showing in a concrete manner the reactionary task of religion as an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the ruling classes. . ." (*Směna*, Bratislava, March 30, 1953).

"Our youth is the standard bearer of progress and a new life and has no longer any use for religion. . . We do not need these intoxicating illusions of an immortal life, we want real life. . .in the Communist morrow . . ." (*Směna*, March 30, 1953).

"If we unmask today, before the eyes of the entire working population, the repulsive and degenerated faces of the Vatican gang, it has its profound reasons. . . The Vatican has become the most devoted watchdog of imperialism. . . In Italy alone the Vatican owns 465,000 hectares of land and real estate valued at 30 billion lire. . . In the Portuguese colonies it has many mines and plantations, electric power stations in South Africa. In Brazil and Argentina tens of brothels belong to the Vatican. . ." (*Směna*, July 12, 1953).

Under the heading of "Social Rights" section 26 of the Constitution proclaims: "All citizens shall have the right to work. This right shall in particular be secured by the organization of labor directed by the State in pursuance of the planned economy." Now let us see about the practices:

"Middle-aged women and mothers of little children too have to accept regular jobs. Why are we setting up so many nurseries and homes? For children of non-working women? Certainly not. . ." (*Práce*, Prague, March 4, 1953).

"Graduates [from universities and selective professional schools]. . . will be placed according to the State economic plan. . . will be obliged to work for a period of three years in the enterprise, offices, courts, institutes, and other institutions. . . which shall be determined for them by the Ministry of Education, or by the Ministry of Agriculture or by the Ministry of Forests and Timber Industry. . ." (From governmental ordinance of May 6, 1952, No. 20 C.L.)

The tasks of the "people's courts" in securing for the citizens the "social right" to work were described by doctor of law Jan Lukastik, a member of the lecture group of the C.P. Regional Committee for the Ostrava mining

and foundry region. After explaining that as a result of the recent currency reform the opportunities of the courts to "fight former capitalists and kulaks" had been reduced, the indoctrinator set forth:

"Consequently, there come more and more to the forefront, among the phenomena acting as a brake on our development toward socialism, those criminal actions which are perpetrated by people who have chosen the wrong road—shirkers, malingerers, disturbers of State and labor discipline. . ." (*Nová Svoboda*, Ostrava, July 24, 1953).

In every civilized country the backbone of the rule of law is an independent judiciary. Fundamental Article IX of the Constitution declares: "The judicial power is exercised by independent courts. . . The judges are independent in the discharge of their office, being bound solely by the legal order of the people's democracy."

This provision was interpreted by the Communist Minister of Justice Štefan Rais, according to *Lidové Noviny*, (Brno, January 30, 1951) in the following manner: "There is no court case, either criminal or civil, which would not require the judge to apply the political viewpoint in its solution. It is not sufficient for the judge to know the provisions of the law and its sanctions, but it is essential that he should also know its essence and function, its political contents and its political tendency. . ."

A member of the General Procurator's Office (the office of the Chief Public Prosecutor) said in a broadcast over the Prague radio on the tasks of the judicial organs on July 16, 1952: ". . . to fight the village rich every day, to humiliate and eliminate them from their economic and political positions in the villages—this is also a principle for the work of the judicial organs. . ."

On June 11, 1952, Minister Rais attended a national conference of attorneys in Prague and spoke on their tasks as counsels for the defendant in criminal cases: ". . . [The counsel] must not blindly protect his client's interests which are often egoistic. . . He must. . . abandon all tricks, pretenses and evasions. . . He must rely on the most mature, solely correct and truthful science in the world, the Soviet legal science. . ." (*Rudé Právo*, June 12, 1952).

The bluntest comment on the "independence" of the courts and judges came from Minister of National Security Karol Bacílek at the national conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Prague on December 17, 1952. Dealing with the Slánský trial which had just resulted in eleven capital sentences and executions and in the glorification of Gottwald, Zápotocký, Dolanský, Kopecký and Novotný for their part in "providing the material for the conviction of the accused," he "reassured" those who "today have a tendency to suspect everybody, to denounce everybody" that this was not necessary or feasible because "the question as to who is guilty and who is innocent will in the end be decided by the Party with the help of the National Security organs. . ." (*Rudé Právo*, December 17, 1952).

The preceding quotations from Czechoslovakia's Communist Constitution and the examples of their practical application are only a small

selection made at random from the wealth of material which is available. Their purpose is to show that Communist notions of law and order lead to total deprivation of the rule and law and to an inhuman system of lawlessness and arbitrariness. The Communists have no special higher concepts and morals in the field of international legal and political relations different from those they apply within their sphere and towards their own citizens. Any illusion that peaceful coexistence with them is possible in a civilized world governed by an international rule of law is bound to be cruelly dissipated and an attempt to achieve its realization places the fate of the world in jeopardy.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January, 1954

TWO ANNIVERSARIES OF SERBIAN LAW THE CIVIL CODE OF 1844 AND THE ZAKONIK OF DUSHAN

by Lazare Marcovitch

THE EVOLUTION of law is one of the prominent features of a progressive state, as the notions of law and rule of law are the essential elements in the constitution of society itself. The materialistic school of thought has tried to reduce the importance of law, and indeed to destroy its creative role in the formation of culture, not recognizing law as an independent and substantial element of civilization, and attributing to it a purely mechanical function devoid of any moral value. Law was treated as the mere expression of existing economic relations in a particular society, its function consisting simply of the regulation of the processes of production, distribution, and consumption of material goods.

The materialistic concept failed to give a true picture of law, or to explain its ultimate mission in society. The doctrine has been rejected by all peoples possessing a cultural history who have construed and developed their individual systems of internal law, as was the case with the Roman, Germanic and Slavic law. In the Slavic nations the notion of law is closely linked with concepts of justice and humanity.

The generally professed respect for law, therefore, has its origin in human nature, not in any external force. This may explain why cultured nations are proud of their achievements in the field of law and in their institutions of law and order. Perhaps it is one of the reasons why the American way of life is so highly rated by the Slavic nations as being based on principles of law and morality in accordance with the structure of the nation itself, whose constituent parts are united by a higher or transcendent idea.

The materialistic theory may be used as a political weapon, but it has been discarded as scientific doctrine. The opposite, idealistic concept sees in law the expression of justice and righteousness, destined to bring about a perfect political and social order based on peace and self-restraint, and penetrated by a faith in the goodness of man. It is in the tradition and national character of the Serbs and the Southern Slavs in general to be inspired by respect for the law as emanating from the spirit of the nation. It was the appreciation of these ideals which inspired preparations in Yugoslavia before the war for the celebration of two important centenaries: the hundredth anniversary of the 1844 Civil Code of Serbia, and the six-hundredth anniversary of the Code of Laws of Czar Dushan of Serbia.

The Civil Code of 1844 was the greatest single instrument in the modernization of the Serbian Principality after its liberation from Turkish rule. The Code was in fact an abbreviated reconstruction of the excellent Austrian Civil Code of 1811, but its adaptations helped to raise the small

Balkan state, Serbia, to the level of an advanced Central European democracy. For one hundred years the Serbian Civil Code has admirably fulfilled its purpose: to preserve internal peace, to protect private property, and to create from the renovated national kingdom a community based on law and devoted to the respect of law and order. In addition, it has served, together with subsequent Codes and judicial laws, as a basis for the establishment of a Serbian science of law. The study of law in Serbia has developed in close association with the traditions of Western Europe, whose universities were attended by many Serbian students.

A new Civil Code, more in agreement with the needs of all Southern Slavic regions, was drafted in 1944 to replace the Code of 1844. However, the project was thwarted by the war, and the Yugoslavs continued to live under a variety of civil laws, in the expectation that there would one day be proclaimed a uniform Civil Code for the whole union. These lines are a kind of belated homage to the apparently modest but historically highly valuable legislative work of the Serbian people.

The six-hundredth anniversary of the Code of Czar Dushan of Serbia is an event of exceptional historic importance. Adopted in two stages, in 1349 and in 1354, it represents the zenith of intellectual achievement for the medieval Serbian Kingdom, which was destroyed by the Turkish invasion after an autonomy of only two hundred years. Serbia suffered a bondage of four hundred years, but its national vitality was never broken. It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that, by a heroic struggle, the Serbs finally succeeded in recovering their freedom. Four hundred years in darkness and slavery had not altered the direction of a people whose strength of character and tradition is exemplified by the Code of the liberal and far-sighted Czar Dushan.

The Serbian State in the fourteenth century was at the height of its political and cultural development. In the face of the Turkish threat, which had disrupted all political and national foundations in the Balkans, the leader Dushan worked toward the creation of a combined Serbo-Greek Empire which he felt would effectively replace the tottering Byzantine State. (Dushan's grandfather, King Milutin (1287-1321) had been forced to abandon his plan of partitioning the declining Byzantine Empire and to join the Greeks under Adronicus against the invading Turks.) Rather than work toward the achievement of such an empire by the gradual occupation of Greek territories, Dushan proclaimed himself Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks in 1345, and allowed himself to be crowned in his capital city Skoplje, on Easter Day, 1346. He promoted the archbishop of Pech, the primate of Serbia, to the dignity of the Patriarch of the Serbian Greek-Orthodox Church. In 1349 the national Sabor (parliament) was convened in Skoplje and an elaborate code of laws and usages was presented in the solemn promulgation of the *Zakonik* or *Code* of Czar Dushan. The second part followed in 1354.

The Code has been studied extensively by scholars of the Slavic world, who recognize its value as a source for the study of ancient Slavic

culture. The famous Polish historian, Maciejowski, in his fundamental work on the history of Slavic law¹ has described Dushan's Code as the most national of all Slavic systems of law. Others who have contributed to the clarification and analysis of the document are: the Bohemians, F. Palacký and P. Šafařík; the Russians, A. Maikoff, Florinski, Zigelj and Taranovski; the Slovene, Fr. Miklosich; and the Serbs, Stojan Novakovich, Jovan Djordjevich, Nikola Krstitch, Dragisa Mijuskovich and quite recently N. Radojchich.

Little of this material which is written in the Slavic language is accessible to the western student. Fortunately, however, the Code has aroused the interest of many western Europeans, so that literature is available in other languages.

The French historian, Ami Boué, was so impressed with the Code that he translated much of it into French in his *La Turquie de l'Europe* (4 vols., 1840).² In the German edition of his work, *Die europäische Türkei* (1889), Boué speculates about what degree of social culture the Serbs might have attained if misfortune and fate had not brought them under permanent bondage.³ Another French study, Émile de Brochegrave's *L'Empereur Étienne Douchan et la Péninsule Balkanique* (Bruxelles, 1884), contains a chapter on the Code of Laws, with flattering appraisal of the work of Czar Dushan.

A much earlier but no less interesting book in German is that of the Hungarian, Christian J. Engel, who first attracted the attention of European scholars to the Code of Dushan. In his *Geschichte des ungarischen Reichs und seiner Nebenländer*⁴ Engel criticizes Dushan's method of ruling, but he admits that the Serbian Czar gave to the country a valuable code of laws. There is a German translation of a portion of the Code on pages 293-310 of this study. Engel's conclusions are categorical: "Neither Hungary nor other neighboring countries can boast of such a Code."

A more substantiated report on the Code is to be found in the work of Friedrich Rühls, professor of history at the University of Berlin. In his *Handbuch der Geschichte des Mittelalters* (1816), he states, "Stephan Duschán gab 1349 ein Gesetz, das sich unter den Denkmälern der Art aus dem Mittelalter vorzüglich auszeichnet. *Es haucht durch und durch den edelsten und mildesten Geist.*"⁵

The French lawyer, R. Dareste, has included a discussion of the Code of Dushan in his general history of law, *Études de l'Histoire de Droit*.⁶ C. Jireček, the Austrian historian who has produced some of the best sources for scholars of the Serbian Middle Ages, wrote an article on the Code of Dushan which was published in the *Archiv für slavische*

¹*Die slawische Rechtsgeschichte*, I. Band, Teil I, Abschnitt V.

²See volume II, p. 65, and IV, pp. 426-441.

³Cf. particularly vols. I, p. 347 and II, pp. 470-477.

⁴III. Teil, *Geschichte von Serbien und Bosnien*, 1801, p. 293 ff.

⁵*Op. cit.*, III, p. 845.

⁶1. ed., 1889; 2. ed., 1908, pp. 229-235.

Philologie. In it he discussed the study of the Code made by Stojan Novakovich, widely-known Serbian historian.

The author of this present note has published in German two informal papers, one on the Code itself, and the other on the handling of estates in Old Serbia as prescribed in the Code.⁷

For British-American readers the recently published work of Malcolm Burr, *The Code of Stephan Dushan, Czar and Autocrat of Serbs and Greeks*, is of great interest. Translated from the Old Serbian, with notes, it appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review* (1949, 1950), and should be very instructive, even for Slavic readers.

All of the studies mentioned are historical or linguistic in character. A complete juridical examination of the Code, on a comparative basis, has not yet been undertaken. The Code surely deserves to be thoroughly examined from this point of view, as it appears to be a systematic body of law. It is recognized as a framework for the maintenance of legal order, remarkable for its dispositions in spite of the imperfections and injustices of the period in which it was drafted. Its transformation of arbitrary rule by the monarch and the great landlords to legal control by one ruler must be ranked as a remarkable achievement for the fourteenth century. The Code of course was a mixture of Roman-Byzantine law with Serbian laws and customs, but this would in no way diminish its importance. Any future study should be focused on the organizational qualities, i.e. on the juridical content, so that the expressed or implied principles of the Code may be clarified and defined.

In 1949, when a modest celebration of the hundredth and six-hundredth anniversaries of the respective codes was organized by the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade, various informal studies on the origin and composition of the Code of Dushan and some very useful bibliographical notes were published. It is to be hoped that, in 1954, the commemoration of these great monuments in Serbian culture will be adequately completed.

BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

⁷See *Zeitschrift für die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, 1909, XXII, 129-139, 161-168.

NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE

Roughly within the past year the tempo and intensity of the movement to regain for Germans expelled from the Baltic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other non-German states their property and civil rights in their former lands has very markedly increased. From this distance it is not completely clear whether this is a spontaneous movement or whether the Bonn government is at the root and helm of the campaign. It would have been possible to expect that the longer these Germans remained in West Germany and shared in its remarkable economic and political rebirth, and became thus not only politically and socially acclimatized but even enthusiastically so, the less acute would be their longing to return to lands that are anything but prosperous under Soviet direction and exploitation. But the reverse seems to be the case, and the worse the conditions of life behind the Curtain get—according to all impartial reports—the more anxious the former Silesians, East Prussians, Sudetenlanders etc. seem to be to return. It is more than a little puzzling.

In 1950 there were reported to be 50,000 Sudetenlanders at the Kempten Rally, in 1951 at Ansbach 100,000, in 1952 at Stuttgart 200,000, in 1953 at Frankfurt about 300,000 and at Munich in 1953 a full half million. Each of the groups, those from East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, the Sudetenland, has its political organization, a federal assembly, and is in close touch with the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene. Just how considerable the financial support this ministry gives to each of the groups is not a matter of public record. But there is no doubt of its active sponsorship of their manifold activities. The number of periodicals these groups publish, weekly news services, monthly journals of discussion, *Bildberichte*, imposing and expensive collections of documents, is most impressive. The English in which many of them are published is rather better than average translation English. One wonders what course this campaign will take in the next few years, and what its place is or will be in total German policy in Europe.

S. H. THOMSON

* * *

An Eastern European Studies Program has been inaugurated at the University of Texas beginning with the fall semester 1954-1955 as a joint enterprise of the departments of government, economics, history, sociology and geography. The area covered in the Program includes the Soviet Union, its European satellites and Yugoslavia. The Program is on an undergraduate level and leads to the B.A. degree with concentration in Eastern European Studies. It consists of courses related to the area within the four departments as well as in the Russian and/or Czech languages and an Interdepartmental Seminar. It is hoped that the Program will in due time develop on the Graduate level as well.

Further particulars may be obtained from Prof. George Hoffman, Department of Geography, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

* * *

As an exception to the JOURNAL's general preference for the avoidance of polemics, we publish the following letter from the Director of Research at the Mid-European Studies Center of New York City. The author to whose views he takes exception, Mr. Vladislav Paulat, wrote in the April 1954 issue of the JOURNAL as a Research Associate of the same institution.

July 30, 1954

The Editor

Journal of Central European Affairs

Dear Sir:

Mr. Vladislav Paulat's article "Investment Policy and the Standard of Living in East Mid-European Countries," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, April 1954, sheds little light on a vital and difficult economic problem of the Mid-European area.

The article begins with the novel proposition which implicitly charges the late Lord Keynes with the fatherhood of the labor theory of value as applied by communist economists. Certainly he should have mentioned at the very least, the names of the men traditionally associated with this concept: Smith and Ricardo, or even Marx, who adopted Ricardo's offspring only to abuse it.

The attempt to link Keynesian economics with the current Communist practice is the more astounding in view of the treatment accorded to Keynes and his writings in Communist economic literature (for example, see E. Bregel's "Apologia inflatsii v sovremennoi burzhuaznoi poli-ekonomii," in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1954). To understand the Communists' unqualified rejection of Keynesian economics one need no more than read Keynes' principal work, especially its concluding chapter. It is clearly inconceivable that the Communists could accept either a body of doctrine which completely rejects their concept of history, or a policy which looks towards reform and rejects revolution, as well as a social philosophy which postulates the preservation of individualism as

the best safeguard of personal liberty. . . (which) greatly widens the field for the exercise of personal choice. . . the loss of which is the greatest of all losses of the homogeneous or totalitarian state.

The particular passage in Chapter 16 of Keynes' *General Theory* which Mr. Paulat adduces in support of his assertion is no more than an obiter dictum bearing mainly on the choice of appropriate units for measuring the level of employment and income. Here Keynes is not concerned with the problem of what determines value. He is concerned with the determination of the level of employment. This being the case, it is preferable to regard labor as the sole factor of production and assume that it operates in an essentially static environment ("technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand"). In such a simplified setting changes in income and employment will be perfectly correlated and easily measurable. In Keynes' own words:

This partly explains why we have been able to take the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our economic system, apart from units of money and time.

In the hands of Mr. Paulat the preceding statement acquires the following puzzling form (p. 38):

This theory partly explains why Communist economists have been able to take the unit of labor as the sole physical unit required in the Communist economic system apart from units of money and time.

Having stated in a previous sentence that in Communist countries consumption is a residual of income after the government investment plans have been met, Mr. Paulat writes (p. 38):

the well-known Keynes' equation Y (national income) equals C (consumption) plus I (investment) has been simply changed to: Y equals I plus C so that investment (I) is a constant and consumption (C) a dependable variable.

The equation cited is well-known, but it does not lend itself to variation. It is nothing but an identity, and under no circumstances can it be construed as a functional equation defining causal relationships. The order of introduction of the component terms has nothing whatsoever to do with their nature.

On page 42, Mr. Paulat states:

Not even the Communists in the captive countries could change the classical Keynes' equation: Savings equal Investment.

Since the equality depends purely and simply upon the definition of Savings and Investment, it is no wonder that even the Communists could do nothing about it.

Immediately following, Mr. Paulat declares:

(The Communists) however misinterpreted another of Keynes' principles: 'Current investment means an addition to the value of capital equipment which has resulted from the production activity of the relative period.' When translated into communist language, this principle was changed as follows: 'When the working class is not inclined to save, it must work at wage rates fixed by the government.'

Apparently, Mr. Paulat is trying to say that investment in Communist countries results from "forced savings." But Keynes' statement is not at all concerned with the way in which savings are realized. It is difficult to imagine why the author, on page 50, thinks that "in a socialist economy the role played by national income seems to be more important than in 'capitalistic' countries?"

There are many more statements of this sort and it is therefore difficult to come to grips with Mr. Paulat's reasoning. Both Keynesianism and Marxism have been subjected to much misrepresentation in their time and any article which would place these ideas in the perspective of intellectual history would be a major contribution.

Mr. Paulat is free to express an opinion on economics, or any other subject, but he should make clear that he writes as an individual whose views do not represent those of the Mid-European Studies Center.

Sincerely yours,
J. B. Hoptner
Director of Research

BOOK REVIEWS

MOODY JOSEPH N., ed., *Church and Society. Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements 1789-1950*. New York: Arts, Inc., 1953. Pp. 914. \$12.00.

The authors of this international symposium are mainly concerned with the social and political movements of Roman Catholics and their efforts to erect a theoretical structure for these activities.

In order to give the reader a clear picture of Roman Catholic social and political thought and movements and to protect him from any generalizing in such a vast and complex field, the editor of this work, Joseph N. Moody, Professor of Modern European History at Cathedral College and Notre Dame College, broke down this study on a regional or national basis: The Papacy (The Church and the New Forces in Western Europe and Italy) by J. N. Moody; three authors contributed studies about France: J. N. Moody, Charles N. Micaud and Paul Vignaux; Belgium by Henry Haag and J. N. Moody; Germany and Austria by Edgar Alexander; Poland by Adam Zołtowski and Zbigniew M. Ossowski; Czechoslovakia by J. Pecháček; Hungary by William Juhasz; Spain by J. N. Moody; Latin America by Carlos E. Castenada and Carlos D. Hamilton; England by Christopher Hollis; United States by Francis Downing.

Most of these chapters are followed by some selections by Roman Catholic authors on political and social questions, "as representative as possible of the major trends of Catholic thought."

This timely work on Roman Catholic social and political ideas and movements, written by Roman Catholics and dedicated to Cardinal Spellman, represents in most parts an objective scholarly study. The authors do not hesitate to be critical of Roman Catholic personalities and movements if they feel that an unbiased inquiry calls for a negative judgment. This symposium will be, therefore, welcomed not only by students of history, sociology, political and labor problems but also by all those who are concerned with the future of Europe and of the world, and who try to evaluate the potentiality of Roman Catholic forces in the present struggle between the East and West.

This international Roman Catholic work seems to underline the fact that Roman Catholicism, in spite of its impressive ecclesiastical and dogmatic unity, does not represent such a unity when it comes to political and social ideas and actions. Not only are there great divergencies between countries. Great differences exist also among Roman Catholics in individual countries as for example in France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, etc. Seemingly, Roman Catholicism is far from being, socially and politically, the monolithic and centrally controlled force it has been often held to be.

An excellent bibliography which includes literature up to 1952 makes this work even more valuable. The only criticism of this symposium as a whole which the reviewer would like to make is, that some subjects are too long, particularly the study on Germany and Austria which takes more than a quarter of the book, while others are too short, as for example those on Spain or Czechoslovakia.

J. N. Moody opens the symposium by an excellent study of the modern papacy in regard to political and social problems. Naturally, he also speaks

about Italy and the Christian Democrats. Unfortunately, his analysis does not include the post-war years of Italian politics and does not explain the role played by the Christian Democrats and particularly de Gasperi—a subject of primary importance in European politics of today.

The study on Germany and Austria by Edgar Alexander (pp. 325-583) is a scholarly work *par excellence*. It is only to be regretted that the author of this monograph did not elaborate on German Roman Catholicism under Hitler's régime, and that he did not include in his brilliant and long study an analysis of CDU (*Christlich-Demokratische Union*) and of Konrad Adenauer. CDU represents a new type of Christian Democratic Party in Germany and in Europe because it is open also to protestants who helped CDU and Adenauer to win.

Edgar Alexander, former member of the German Catholic Party *Zentrum*, does not hesitate to express a shattering criticism of the late chairman of *Zentrum*, Prelate Ludwig Kaas who, in his opinion, was "anything but a political leader, or rather was a contributor to the catastrophe of 1933 which he helped to bring about" (p. 471). Both Kaas and Brüning showed "complete blindness to the sociological changes in the political party structure" and gave "the death sentence to Political Catholicism in Germany" (p. 474). The author is no less critical of Political Catholicism in Austria, "Austrian Clero-fascism", which in his judgment destroyed Austrian democracy (p. 480). Kurt von Schuschnigg is embarrassing to the author "by the personal egotism, the political arrogance, the meta-political confusion plus flagrant abuse of the categories of Christian political thinking" (p. 485).

These are just a few indications that this symposium is not a propaganda trumpet but an objective study which protects nobody from scrutiny. Two studies on Poland by Adam Zoltowski and Zbigniew M. Ossowski represent a new trend in modern Polish Christian Democracy which started "somewhere between November 1939 and June 1940" (p. 619). Speaking on economic problems of Christian Democracy, Ossowski reveals that Polish Christian Democrats are not afraid of "socialization": "To control adequately key industries, all mining and heavy industries, as well as big financial organizations, will be socialized, but not state-controlled" (p. 618). According to Ossowski, the Polish Christian Democrats have definitely outstripped both nationalism and the concept of the "élite" and are guided by the "personalist ideas of international and social Moral Order". They believe that "social justice will be applied at its best within the democratic system" (p. 631).

The article on Czechoslovakia by J. Pecháček is rather disappointing. It is one of the shortest contributions (pp. 633-657) and it seems to lack that objective spirit and approach which characterizes the major part of this symposium. One has the impression that this paper was written chiefly to belittle Thomas G. Masaryk.

This is a strange approach. In a symposium of such a high calibre, the following statement seems to be out of place: "For centuries two traditions had been at war with each other in that part of Europe. The tradition of St. Wenceslas and of Cyril and Methodius opposed the tradition of Hus, Zizka and Comenius; Catholicism and Reformation; Christian universalism and spiritual and social union of the Christian West, against national individualism and Christian anarchism" (p. 641).

William Juhasz presents a good study on the development of Catholicism in Hungary in modern times which covers also conditions under the Communist

régime. Even if he believes that the Catholic Church represents the "sole organized ideology" with which the Communists have to reckon, he is not intolerant toward others—an attitude which we find among most contributors to this symposium.

The value of this international Roman Catholic symposium could have been increased by a supplementary study on international relations between various Christian Democratic parties and Christian Labor Unions, and by a study of exiled Christian Democrats from the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Only the chapter on Poland mentions the existence of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe formed by the exiles. The fact that this book is full of misprints has no bearing on its high scholarly quality and on the job so ably done by its editor and writer of several contributions, Joseph N. Moody.

Munich, Germany

BLAHOŠLAV S. HRUBÝ

HÖLZLE, ERWIN, *Russland und Amerika; Ausbruch und Begegnung zweier Weltmächte*. München: Oldenbourg, 1953. Pp. 308. DM 19.50.

No topic seems more timely and important at the moment than that of the relations of Russia and America. Erwin Hölzle undertakes such a study. The title of his book does not make it clear that his work goes only to about 1870; but the author promises us for next year a second volume which will lead to the present; and when this is completed—and if it lives up to the standards of the first volume—the whole will, indeed, constitute the most comprehensive and, so far, the only adequate presentation of this portentous phase of history. It should promptly be translated.

The work of the German historian shows us the way in a field in which an elaborate treatment is long overdue. He is providing us with a necessary basis and with stimulation for a work broad in scope and minute in detail. He has the advantage of being a neutral observer sympathetic to both sides, and he possesses the linguistic and historical knowledge which enables him to use the sources and to come to pertinent conclusions. To be sure, various authors have dealt more painstakingly with individual parts of the story. Hölzle has studied them. Hildt, Golder, Hecht, Whitaker, Laserson are but a few examples of the numerous American authors whom he cites; Okun from Russia and Staehlin and Gitermann from Germany and Switzerland respectively have contributed also to his study. R. S. Tompkins' *Alaska; Promishlennik and Sourdough* seems to be one of the few works not consulted.

Although at the moment Hölzle's book may well represent the best that has been written on the relations of Russia and America, it does not claim to be and certainly will not be—in an age when every generation rewrites history—a definitive analysis or presentation. Future times will make it possible, we hope, to consult Russian archives and source material more extensively than past and present conditions have allowed; and although we have not gained much new information from historians like Okun, who, for his work on the Russian-American Company, had access to the archives of Moscow, Leningrad, etc., we may still suspect that, especially for an understanding of Russian reasoning and for an investigation of economic connections, much additional information can and ought to be gathered in Russia.

Aside from the question of sources, which in Hölzle's book are necessarily largely American in origin, we should perhaps question certain general attitudes

and, with occasional pedantry, some of the minor points. Was the American question the only one left unsettled by the Congress of Vienna and its peaceful solution the main task of the Holy Alliance (p. 95)? Was the American-Russian treaty of 1824 such a blow to the Russian American Company that the company's decline dates from its conclusion (p. 134); and was dissatisfaction with Russia's "soft" external policies a significant factor in the Decabrist rising (p. 148)? Such and other statements may well be scrutinized. A criticism of the style may also be in order. Despite the shortness of sentences—perhaps influenced by the author's reading of English books—clarity and simplicity of style could be improved upon, especially since the author presses a vast amount of information into a comparatively small book. Finally, the arrangement of footnotes, bunched together as they are at the end of paragraphs, only partly serves the purpose for which footnotes have been invented. A full bibliography is lacking, and where the list of abbreviated titles does not include a source, its identification becomes difficult for the reader. However, such criticisms should not be interpreted as detracting from the essential value of the work.

The story is divided in three parts. The first, up to the Congress of Vienna, marks cooperation between the two powers on the flanks (*Flügel*) of Europe in East and West. This cooperation was determined by competition with England. Unlike Hildt, Hölzle gives less emphasis to the struggle of the USA for recognition by Russia; nor does he lose sight of the powerful influence which Europe and internal European affairs exercised on both Russia and America and their relationship. He shows how, in connection with Russia, Washington's principle of non-entanglement in European affairs was little more than a pious wish. Facts were stronger; and just as the Seven Years War entangled America, so did the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath assume world-wide proportions, and force upon the United States a conduct of affairs that was largely determined by European decisions and events. A reflection of this, and a resulting dilemma owing to United States opposition to England, are traceable in all relations with Russia.

While dealing, during this first period, with many political problems, the author does not neglect—and that is one of the special merits of the book—the links and influences of ideas on both sides. He gives an account of the inspiration which the American War of Independence provided some circles in Russia, and he cites Radishchev as one example. He traces in the words of the diplomats, particularly of Alexander I, such liberal ideas as coincided with the principles on which the United States was built. Occasionally he may go too far, taking diplomatic language for political deeds. As to the economic aspects in the field under discussion, it is to be regretted that both in America and in Russia the solid groundwork for their analysis and for entrepreneurial action has not yet been completed and published. Therefore, the author could not take economic forces adequately into consideration and, beyond diplomatic action and ideological trends, give a picture of the men and methods whose commercial activity and desire for profit to determine the direction of Russian-American relations.

The second part of the work deals with the period from 1815 to 1825. Much stress is laid upon the thoughts and deeds of John Quincy Adams, whose distrust of England strongly influenced Russo-American relations. Nevertheless, a growing antipathy can be traced between the two nations, as the center of their interests shifted from the economic to the political sphere (p. 139). America's attitude towards Alexander's Holy Alliance discloses this trend, espec-

ially after the Holy Alliance began to interest itself in the Latin American revolutions. The subsequent evolution of the Monroe Doctrine could not fail to affect Russian-American relations. In discussing it, Hölzle has made the most perspicacious use of available American studies; unfortunately an "Economic Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine", focusing upon the influence of concrete commercial interests, is still lacking. Some day, after due investigation, such a study may help to explain parts of the diplomatic scene. Another aspect of the Monroe doctrine is, however, well taken into consideration, namely the issue bearing upon the possession of the Pacific Coast, in the extent to which it played a role in the thinking of Adams and Monroe. Here we find arguments and considerations which foreshadow the later sale of Alaska (p. 113).

The factual presentation of the author is interspersed with thoughts on general problems that occupied, brought together, or divided Russia and America. During the first stage it was a common interest in maritime law, in which the enemy, England, who owing to her sea power was able to rely on force—a monster comparable, according to Adams, to Napoleon on land—was obviously not interested. In the second period, the general problem of self-determination of the nations entered. Hölzle shows that, at least in theory, Russia and America were not as far apart as the antithesis of autocratic and liberal government might suggest. A third general problem interesting both sides was that of federalism. Questions of a federal constitution of government played a role for instance in the Decabrist revolt, and they became increasingly important with the progress of the revolutionary movement in Russia. They were also an issue for the Russian ruling groups. Parallels between America and Russia readily offer themselves; Hölzle investigates them and, in working them out, shows how the two flanking powers, though heirs of European philosophy, both followed their own independent though, in some respects, related path.

The third period, 1825 to 1870, is a rather uneventful one. Quite correctly, Hölzle points out that opposition to England continued to constitute a certain link. But Russia, whose eastern expansion led to increased rivalry with the British, overestimated American antagonism—an antagonism which lessened owing to a number of amicable settlements with England that left the United States in possession of what she desired. Commerce is again little emphasized by the author, but due attention is given to the Far East, where the Russian-American encounter was, at this stage, of a friendly nature—even if it presaged possible future friction.

The three major events during this third period were, of course, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, and the sale of Alaska. Again—and in the dawning age of technology more than ever—in each instance strict isolation turned out to be an impossibility. Basing his research on American and on the few Russian sources edited by Americans, such as Golder, Hölzle very adequately brings out the tendency of the United States during the Crimean War and of the Russians during the Civil War to play an independent role in the so-called balance of power system. Both times it was the aim of one or the other side to challenge England's position, and both occasions give the first signs of the ascendancy of America and Russia, who will eventually replace England as arbiter of the system.

Despite the yet impending climax of British imperial expansion, the decline of England's position can also be traced in connection with the sale of Alaska. It coincides in time with French imperialism under Napoleon III and Germany's

rise under Bismarck; but these two nations as well as England will soon be dwarfed by the two newcomers who settled peacefully the most critical issue that might have arisen between them. This portentous change in the balance was felt even within the British Empire where, as Hölzle points out, men like John R. Seeley gave expression to their fears (p. 218).

The final chapters of the work are devoted to an analysis of the influence in Russia of American democratic ideas, which, for lack of socialist content, failed to become a force there, despite the interest of Russian radicals in the American system. Likewise, Hölzle discusses the impact of Russian social-revolutionary trends, which failed to inspire reformers in America, notwithstanding the personal influence which visitors like Bakunin, Plekhanov and others tried to exercise. A meeting of Russian and American minds was not brought about.

It may be hoped that Hölzle will not hurry the publication of his second volume; that he will give as clear and penetrating thought to it as to the first part; and that by leading the work to a good conclusion he will furnish us with the first full and understanding history of the relations of America and Russia.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

QUAZZA, GUIDO, ed., *La diplomazia del Regno di Sardegna durante la prima guerra d'indipendenza, Vol. III: Relazioni con il Regno delle Due Sicilie (gennaio 1848-dicembre 1849)*. Published under the Auspices of the Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento italiano, Comitato di Torino. Turin: Museo nazionale del Risorgimento, 1952. Pp. xc, 415.

The hundred years' anniversary of the revolution of 1848 has inspired a number of studies of the Italian revolutionary movement of 1848-49 and of the Risorgimento in general. Not only have several general histories been published, but also a number of good monographic studies have been brought out. In addition, valuable archival materials hitherto unpublished have been made readily available to scholars. Among them are the Sardinian foreign office documents for the years 1848-49 which for the first time are now in the process of being published under the auspices of the Turin Committee of the Institute for the History of the Italian Risorgimento. The volume reviewed here is the third in this series.

The documents are preceded by an excellent 90-page preface by Guido Quazza, in which he traces the main phases of Sardinian-Neapolitan relations in 1848-49 and points out how the documents in the volume throw new light on them. The documents are grouped in three parts. First are the instructions of the Sardinian minister of foreign affairs to the Sardinian ambassador at Naples. The next and longest section consists of the reports of the Sardinian plenipotentiaries at the Neapolitan court to the Sardinian foreign ministry. Last are the dispatches of diplomats sent on special missions to Naples: Rignon, Plezza, Dino-Talleyrand, and Balbo. There is a satisfactory index.

The documents give new information on the state of public opinion in Naples and Sicily during various phases of the revolution, and, among other things, upon the tortuous duplicity of the Bourbon king of the Two Sicilies, the Anglo-French attempts to mediate the Neapolitan conflict with Sicily, the jealousy of the Neapolitan government of the growing popularity of Sardinia because of her leadership in the "national war" against Austria, and the increasing

dependence of the Bourbons on Russia and Austria during the year of 1849. They also show that the pro-Sardinian picture given by Bianchi and other historians who have depended largely on his documents on Italian diplomacy is not warranted. From reading the volume here reviewed, one realizes that Sardinian foreign policy was not motivated wholly by idealistic, unselfish Italian nationalism but also at least partly by expansionist ambitions.

University of Texas

R. JOHN RATH

BOHATEC, JOSEF, *Der Imperialismusgedanke und die Lebensphilosophie Dostojewskijs*. Graz-Köln: Hermann Böhlau Nachf., 1951. Pp. 364. \$5.80.

The author of this book is professor emeritus of theology at the University of Vienna. His former works dealt with Calvin and the problems of natural law. In his present work he presents Dostoevsky not so much as the great novelist and psychologist but as the great politico-religious ideologist as Dostoevsky preferred to be considered. For Dostoevsky's novels are not only tales of melodramatic plot, they are at the same time religious philosophical treatises and political pamphlets. It is gratifying that Professor Bohatec concentrates on this neglected side of Dostoevsky, under special emphasis on his famous "Diary of an Author" which has long been inaccessible to Western readers.

The results at which the author arrives are in no way new. Most people will agree with him that Dostoevsky was the foremost spokesman in the nineteenth century of a Russian messianic imperialism, and that this imperialism, though always with power-political concrete goals (especially as regards the conquest of Constantinople, the "liberation" of all Slavs under Russian leadership, and finally even the conquest of the whole of Asia as a preliminary step to a death blow to the West) was motivated by ideologies which were sincerely believed in and were not only masks for the will to political expansion. The very same can in my opinion be said of Lenin and his generation of communists.

Professor Bohatec rightly defines Dostoevsky's imperialism as a "mit dem Sozialismus verknüpfter Volksimperialismus" (an imperialism based upon the Russian folk and intimately connected with socialism, a Russian socialism fundamentally different from Western socialism). In that sense, though the author never mentions it, Dostoevsky's imperialism was the forerunner of Hitler's and Stalin's anti-Western national socialism, with one important difference, however, that Dostoevsky's ideology was spiritualist and Christian, while Hitler's and Stalin's ideologies were crudely materialistic and anti-Christian, biological in the one and economic-technological in the other case.

Professor Bohatec distinguishes, following Dostoevsky himself, an imperialism of force, which he identifies with the imperialism of Rome and the West, and an imperialism of love which he sees embodied in Russia's striving for world leadership. Dostoevsky's philosophy of life was deeply influenced by Western romantic thought, yet Dostoevsky believed that only the Orthodox Russian knew how to "live, love and suffer," that the Orthodox Russian alone presents a true community, and that without this background all imperialism degenerates into a brutal thirst for power and into isolationist individualism, the enemies and destroyers of all true life which is based on love and fellowship.

For the reader who is not familiar with Dostoevsky's ideology and metaphysical and political thought, the book will be valuable especially for its many quotations from the "Diary of an Author" and other works which are however

quoted only from German translations. On the other hand Professor Bohatec accepts too much of Dostoevsky's self-estimate, especially in his judgment of English imperialism and Western liberalism and in his underplaying the dangerous ambiguity which often makes it difficult to distinguish the imperialism of love from world conquest and which idolizes the Russian people so that it becomes the only true bearer of the fulfillment of history and thereby called to world domination.

City College of New York

HANS KOHN

DRACHKOVITCH, MILORAD M., *Les socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre, 1870-1914*. Genève: Librairie E. Droz, 1953. Pp. xi, 385. 20frs.

This learned monograph reads like a running comment on Bayle's famous dictum: "It is very important not to think that people act according to their principles." Before the First World War the Socialist International and its two most important sections, the French and the German parties, were never able to solve the conflict between the creed of internationalist solidarity and patriotic impulses, between revolutionary convictions and reformist practices. By describing the course which the leadership of both parties attempted to chart between those opposite poles of attraction, the author furnishes a valuable contribution to the intellectual and political history of European socialism.

While the book covers ground which has been explored thoroughly before, especially the part dealing with the party of Guesde and Jaurès, it affords new insights into the mentality of "revolutionary metaphysicists" which is undoubtedly what most French socialists were. The often neglected strength of Proudhonian tradition in French socialism is rightly stressed and explained, at least in part, by the economic structure of the country. The analysis of Jaurèsian contradictions is interesting, although the interpretation of the great tribune's main work, *L'Armée Nouvelle*, never quite comes off. When he approaches the decisive days on the eve of the war, the author is quite correct in extending his narrative beyond the socialist party to the ranks of organized labor. The renegeing of its internationalist principles by the syndicalist movement was indeed an even more convincing proof of the strength of patriotic traditions, than the new alignment of the socialist leaders who in their majority were not only intellectuals, but also at heart good French *républicains*.

The chapters devoted to the development of the German Social Democratic party are not less interesting. Yet here, in this reviewer's opinion, neither the author's sources are as impeccable nor his evaluation as balanced as in the preceding part of the volume. While the *Protokolle* of the party's annual conventions are used with discrimination, the analysis draws all too often on French writings about the teutonic branch of the International, and therefore sees Germany mostly through Gallic eyes. The magistral study by Kurt Brandis, *Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie bis zum Fall des Sozialistengesetzes* (Leipzig, 1931) is altogether ignored, although in regard to the internationalism of the German social democrats Brandis reaches the same sceptical conclusions as the author. Such contributions of American scholarship to the questions here investigated, as the articles by Carleton Hayes and Sinclair Armstrong, are not noted either. A comparison between Dr. Drachkovitch's and the American studies would actually show that the latter succeeded in penetrating to more original sources than the former.

The author's thesis that rarely if ever the internationalism of the S. P. D. was more than verbal and that its outlook on foreign affairs was determined by a definite if broad nationalism is certainly warranted. But there is throughout the study an assumption that whenever the French socialists are found wanting this is due at worst to confusion, while on the part of their German counterparts some deliberate scheming is made responsible.

The re-evaluation of the role Marx and Engels played in the International is most challenging but seems to suffer from the same biased view. At one point (p. 244) the author defends himself against the possible reproach to have classified Marx and Engels as "pangermanists," only to call Marx a little later (p. 350) a—"pan-Allemand."

All this hardly detracts from the interest of the monograph as a searching and well-informed, if at times somewhat provincial, analysis of a problem which holds both historical and political significance.

University of Colorado

HENRY W. EHLMANN

FELLNER, FRITZ, ed., *Schicksalsjahre Oesterreichs, 1908-1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs. Bd. I. 1908-1914.* Graz-Köln: Hermann Böhlau Nachf., 1953. Pp. xix, 295. \$4.40.

So long as scholars concern themselves with Austria-Hungary in the final stage of its existence, the diary of Josef Redlich, the product of a liberal, cultured, and perceptive pen, will command study and respect. It is a veritable quarry of inside information on domestic political and economic problems, and records conversations on foreign affairs with senior policymakers and other weight-carrying individuals. In point of time, this installment parallels in part Joseph M. Baernreither's *Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches* (Berlin, 1928), which Redlich himself edited; these two German Bohemians, the first a Conservative, the other an independent Liberal, shared similar views on the necessity of constitutional reformation and on nationality problems.

A university professor in two hemispheres, the author of works of prodigious erudition on aspects of British and of Austrian government, and an internationally esteemed expert on law, Redlich entered political life as a deputy in the Moravian Diet and in 1907 he was elected to the Austrian Reichsrath, an office he was to fill until the Danubian Monarchy disappeared. More than once he was spoken of for a ministerial post, but that responsibility was denied him until the Hapsburg state had reached the edge of the precipice.

Redlich's dynamic personality, keen analytical qualities, wide-ranging intellectual interest, tireless devotion to public business, and effectiveness as a speaker quickly brought him to the front in Austrian affairs and afforded him ready access to those who counted in statecraft. A singularly fascinating conversationalist, he attracted to his cultivated home in Vienna individuals of distinction, both from the monarchy and from abroad.

This section of the diary opens in November of 1908 and closes with Redlich's philosophical meditations on the last day of 1914. It is not a continuous day-to-day record; gaps abound, and sometimes Redlich set down his experiences over several days at one writing. Where dates of entries are in error, the editor has endeavored to rectify them. Such lapses on Redlich's part raise questions regarding the verbal accuracy of what he wrote. While matters of public interest occupy most of the pages—the early months of the First World

War cover a sixth of the whole—there are also appraisals of books, moving eulogies on friends, and chance reflections on social habits and on the politics of a foreign country, the United States included. Although Redlich kept special day-books on his trips to the United States, the editor has chosen to omit them from this publication.

An immense gallery of celebrities with whom Redlich had associations studs the pages. It would be easier, in fact, to mention the outstanding personalities of Austria-Hungary who are missing than to enumerate those who are present. Whole-souled Austrian that he was and a Hapsburg loyalist, Redlich warmly applauded the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and awarded high marks to Aehrenthal as director of the Ballplatz. With the foreign minister, who treated him as a "friendly brother," Redlich had many intimate conversations on international and internal issues; at Aehrenthal's death, Redlich confided to the diary, "Blessed be his name and his memory for as long as Austrians are living." His judgment on Berchtold fluctuated, but eventually he is written off as a "happy-go-lucky type."

With few exceptions, top Austrian and Hungarian politicians pained Redlich deeply and parliamentary turbulence intensified his anguish. In a mood of gloomy despair he wrote in 1911, "Wann wird der Cäsar kommen, der in beiden Ländern—hier und in Budapest—sein Schwert in die Waagschale werfen wird" (p. 90). He pinned his faith for the re-organization and preservation of the monarchy upon the heir-presumptive, Francis Ferdinand; on the day of his murder, Redlich sagely commented, "Dieser Tag ist der Tag eines weltgeschichtlichen Ereignisses . . . Die Schicksalsstunde der Habsburger naht . . ." (p. 235).

Welcoming war in 1914 as an imperative necessity and in the belief that a foreign struggle would somehow silence centrifugal tensions, Redlich saw service in Galicia as a Ballplatz observer. His spirit was cheered by popular enthusiasm for the war, only to revert to dark pessimism as military setbacks and food shortages mounted. He records the tides of the battlefield in vivid prose.

The editor has written a biographical introduction to the diary and has provided notes on major events. His decision to relegate notes on personalities mentioned by Redlich, many of them comparatively obscure, to the second volume handicaps the reader. Certain names are given inaccurately—Edward III for Edward VII (p. 2), Chiroll for Chirol (p. 101), Cunningham for Cuninghame (Montgomery-Cuninghame) (p. 110), Harald Spender for Harold Spender (p. 195), and a few errors have gone undetected (p. 196; p. 212; p. 241, n. 32). These minor failings aside, the editorial task has been commendably executed.

The University of Rochester

ARTHUR J. MAY

LUKACS, JOHN A., *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe*. New York: American Book Company, 1953. Pp. 878. \$7.50.

The loss of independence twice in one decade on the part of the small states of Central and Eastern Europe is a major international calamity. Who is responsible for their tragedy? Professor Hugh Seton-Watson in his *East European Revolution* (first published in 1950) attributed the responsibility principally to the internal instability of these countries and their refusal to cooperate. Professor John A. Lukacs also admits that "much blame falls on the hot and unruly heads of the new central-eastern European states themselves" but adds that "the blame must be at least shared by the Great Powers and not the least

by the Western Allies, France, Britain, and the United States" (p. 8). In the subsequent pages he leaves little doubt that he considers the Great Powers principally to blame. Much of this massive volume is a passionate indictment of the villainies of Hitler and Stalin, but also of the short-sightedness of the western leaders, particularly of President Roosevelt and the American military commanders.

This book therefore deals almost exclusively with the diplomacy and military strategy of the Great Powers, as they affected the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe between 1934 and 1945, that is, from Hitler's first attempt to disrupt and nazify Austria to Stalin's occupation of the whole region in preparation for its bolshevization. There is a brief introductory chapter, "The illusion of independence; 1917-1934," and an "Epilogue," summarizing events since 1945. There are, moreover, two special chapters devoted to Russia and Munich and to Churchill and the Balkan invasion debate respectively.

To prove his thesis the author has marshalled an impressive array of evidence, culled and collated from the Nürnberg documents, British documents, the State Department publication of the German documents, various "colored" books, monographs, periodicals, and a vast mass of memoir literature. The Italian literature, relatively little known in this country, yields a particularly rich store of information. Valuable also is the use of unpublished documents relating to the Hungarian negotiations with the Allies for a separate peace. Quite novel—at least to this reviewer—is the information about the role played in these negotiations by Otto Habsburg and his cordial relations with President Roosevelt.

To digest such a mass of material in such a short space of time, as Professor Lukacs allows himself, naturally presents certain difficulties. The author often resorts to using long direct quotations where a shorter digest would have been more enlightening to the reader. The special chapter of Russia and Munich is a vast catalogue of who-said-what-to-whom about it, which does not quite succeed in clarifying the Soviet position. Certain essential pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are missing, and they probably can be found in the Soviet archives only. There is a lack of proportion between the treatment of Axis and Allied diplomacy, resulting no doubt from the fact that there is more material available on the former than the latter, but also from a certain haste in trying to finish the book. There is the usual confusion concerning the orthography of Slavic names. "Tsvetkovič" should have been Cvetković, "Tsintsar-Markovič" Cincar-Marković, "Masardjik" Masařík, "Malinowski" Malinovskij, "Šaba" Šeba, "Čatlos" Čatloš, "Šrobar" Šrobár, etc.

Professor Lukacs, an emigré from Hungary, residing and teaching since 1946 in the United States, was a witness and a victim of many of the events he describes. It would be expecting him to be superhuman to write of them entirely without passion. Many American readers of this book will not agree with his severe censure of the American wartime leaders. Many students of Central and Eastern European affairs will not agree with his indulgent attitude towards the conservative leaders, like Admiral Horthy, Tsar Boris, Generals Antonescu and Nedić, and with his severe judgment of liberal leaders, like Beneš. But all will agree that here is a very important contribution to Central and Eastern European history as well as to general world history.

Florida State University

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

Les Mémoires du Maréchal Mannerheim 1882-1946. Préface du Général Weygand. Traduit et adapté du suédois par Jean-Louis Perret. Paris: Hachette, 1952. Pp. 429. Frs. 975.

In these memoirs, which first appeared in Swedish and Finnish in the year of his death (1951), Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim renders an impressive account of his long and distinguished career. He begins with his attendance at a Finnish cadet school in 1882 and ends with his retirement as President of the Finnish Republic.

Born of a family of Swedish origin, Mannerheim entered the Tsar's army at age 19, Finland being then an autonomous grand duchy under Russian sovereignty. He served in the Russo-Japanese war and in World War I distinguished himself as a General of the Cavalry. Notable are Mannerheims' observations on the Bolshevik uprising of 1917 which he thinks might easily have been quelled by speedy resolute counter measures.

Returning to Finland in 1918 the general found his country engaged in the struggle for independence from Bolshevik Russia. His account of the ensuing military operations is abridged in this translation. The German version (1952) is closer at this point and also includes the chapters on Mannerheim's travels in Asia, the hunting expeditions, and his social welfare activities following the War of Liberation. M. Perret feels these portions are of interest to the Northern rather than to the continental reader. The reviewer has not had access to the English translation (London, 1954).

In the course of his career as commander-in-chief, diplomat, and head-of-state, Mannerheim encountered many contemporary statesmen and military leaders and records his impressions and conversations with them. He admires Winston Churchill but says of Britain's declaration of war on Finland in December 1941: "... tout en enregistrant cette nouvelle preuve que la morale n'a rien à voir en politique." Mannerheim cannot be accused of violating his own principle of morality, for he did not, for example, make common cause with the Nazis. The joint operations which he undertook with Germany were defensive, and their military coordination ceased when national self-interest prompted an armistice with Russia. At Lake Saima, where Mannerheim spent his seventy-fifth birthday on a tour of inspection, Hitler spoke with amazing frankness of the German underestimation of Soviet strength and of Italy's weakness.

The memoirs serve as excellent source material for the Winter War (1939-1940) and the War Resumed (1941-1944). The reader is made aware of the importance of Finland's role in world politics. Though reproaching his countrymen for their lack of military preparedness, Mannerheim commends them for achieving internal unity. He criticizes the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, for their failure to create a Northern neutrality pact. He feels this might have prevented the Germans from invading Norway and deterred the Russians from their attack on Finland. He points out that the Finns were the first to recognize the danger of Soviet expansion and to halt Bolshevik aggression at a time when the Western Powers were deeply involved in their internal affairs and the problem of Germany. The Fieldmarshall warns posterity that dissension in one's own ranks can be more deadly than the enemy's weapons.

Hoover Institute and Library
Stanford, California

HILDEGARD BOENINGER

BOUSCAREN, ANTHONY T., *Imperial Communism*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. Pp. 256. \$3.75.

Imperial Communism is a book with a purpose: the presentation, in short and clear form, of the menacing scope of the communist threat, sustained by a series of concentric and continuing impulses which have their origin in the Kremlin. The greatest virtues as well as the most evident defects of the work are inseparable from the broad dimensions of a survey which takes in the nature, history, and workings of the Russian Soviet system and its satellite communist movements everywhere in the world. In circumscribing the globe with giant strides, the author drops most of the impedimenta of countless scholarly minutiae.

Professor Bouscaren approaches the task as one who feels that there is no further need of weighing endless and often confusing columns of pros, cons, or neutral items. He accepts the communist conspiracy as an established fact and only adds citations to demonstrate the consistent and enduring nature of Soviet policy bent on world-wide subversion and conquest. For this purpose, he quotes frequently from the pronouncements of Lenin, Stalin, *Pravda*, as well as from the records of the successive Communist Party Congresses in Russia. There are repeated references, without any pretense of more than a casual documentation, to David Dallin, James Burnham, Timothy Taracouzio, and others. A "Selected Bibliography" lists merely thirty books and eight periodicals, far less than are referred to in the text proper. *Imperial Communism* unquestionably rests on an extensive knowledge of the literature dealing with the machinations and underlying objectives of the Soviet Union and of auxiliary communist movements within the Russian orbit as well as in the free world.

Numerous instances of Soviet shifts in strategy are cited to illustrate the elasticity and success with which Russia has been able to hoodwink a hope-deluded world. Professor Bouscaren, however, does not waste time and space on polemics, accusations, and a belaboring of past mistakes in evaluating Soviet policies. If he refers to a "Litvinov legend," based on the latter's assertion that the USSR would never start a war, it is done primarily to dispel an illusion which undeniably found many believers in the 1930's and may still be regarded as evidence of a lost Soviet innocence which might burgeon out again under favorable circumstances. Back in ". . . middle thirties, the foreign communist combed his hair, put on a tie, put the bomb away in safe-keeping, wore a blue serge suit, and appeared as an honest 'liberal' who wanted to improve living standards, correct abuses, and fight Fascism." Similar examples from the record are cited against any current temptation to hinge our hopes on any minor conciliatory move and declension of the word peace on the part of the Soviet Union.

As for contemporary American policies, the author questions the effectiveness of the "Point Four" program designed to combat communism through a boost in the standard of living. All our aid between 1948 and 1952, it is asserted, failed to decrease pro-Soviet sympathies in Europe. "It remains to be seen which of two courses is to be followed: a continued policy of expansion and conquest by the Soviets, or a policy of liberation by the free world led by the United States. Peaceful coexistence, through Russia's choice and not that of the free world, is not a reliable alternative" (p. 251). Professor Bouscaren also cites Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times* against those who find an unwarranted comfort in a comparison of Soviet and American steel production figures. Japan, with a capacity of no more than seven to eight million tons annually, kept us palpably occupied for over three years in World War II.

Imperial Communism was not written for the specialist, though the latter may find useful some of the few concrete references found in the text. The book is directed to the informed reader and alert individual who desires a brief survey of the policy, goals, and strategy of the Soviet Union, unweighted by many of the imponderables which make prediction difficult. The first three chapters succinctly and clearly describe the basic goals of Soviet Russia, illustrated through a short summary of the "zig-zag" course pursued by Russia and communism since 1917. Most of the work is concerned with a world-wide roll call of communist leaders, activities, and organizations in every country or region, with the omission of South Africa appearing as a conspicuous gap. In the latter case, the author pleads the absence of any adequate information.

This portrayal of the global ramifications and history of the communist threat, substantially drawing its strength from the military and diplomatic might of the Soviet Union, is effective in demonstrating the gravity of the major problem of our time. It can serve as a ready reference work providing the bare outlines of communist strength and leadership in any given land or area. Even the specialist may find it useful in this respect. *Imperial Communism* can find a place on every bookshelf, even though some may feel that the author's pessimistic conclusions are not as inevitable as appears from the text.

Montana State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

HILGER, GUSTAV and ALFRED G. MEYER, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941*. New York: Macmillan, 1953. Pp. ix, 350. \$5.00.

Mr. Hilger was for almost twenty years a counselor of the German embassy in Moscow and chief of its economic section; Mr. Meyer is a political science professor. The two have cooperated to work Mr. Hilger's memoirs into an account of Russo-German relations between the two world wars. The result of this cooperation is not quite satisfactory; for the scholarly parts of the book add little to our knowledge while the personal imprint, which gives meaning and dimension to the recollections of statesmen, has been drowned in an attempt to give a full account of German-Russian relations. Material has consequently been added which is not derived from Hilger's personal experiences.

The story begins with Brest Litovsk and describes initial Soviet-German relations with their promising and disheartening features. Hilger became the first post-war German representative to his native Russia, charged with looking after the exchange of war prisoners and, later, with administering aid in Russian famine areas. After Rapallo he was made a member of the staff of Germany's first ambassador, Brockdorff-Rantzau, and he gives a lively and interesting picture of this remarkable man. Hilger emphasizes that the need for East and West to trade and economically to complement each other accounted but little for the first German-Russian commercial arrangements. Economic factors did not gain real significance until later. It was political considerations resulting from continued French recalcitrance and western slowness in coming to an honorable understanding with Germany which made possible the "Rapallo era."

Politics, not economics, Hilger feels, also remained the key to German-Russian relationships later when, with Hitler's accession to power, conditions were changed. According to Hilger, a greater change occurred then than those who observed continued practical cooperation were ready to acknowledge in the

face of the vociferous mutual denunciations. Hitler's attitude toward Russia from the beginning was entirely negative. Only as a "logical" consequence of the Munich arrangements (p. 289) did he turn to Russia, which had long been interested in a compromise and to which the war of 1941 came—at least at the moment of its outbreak—as a surprise. With war, Hilger's own plans and hopes for peace and cooperation between his two fatherlands, which he thought enhanced by the treaty of 1939, came to an end.

There are many aspects of German-Russian relations on which Mr. Hilger is silent, many personal experiences—and also much factual data—which would interest us but which are precluded by the general scheme of the book. On the other hand, we do find a number of noteworthy sidelights. Thus, Hilger deals with the opposition to the NEP of the lower levels in the Soviet hierarchy; with the position of Stalin, who alone and without consulting the Politburo could and did decide policies in Russia; with the military cooperation of Seeckt and Chicherin, the treaty of Berlin of 1926, and a number of diplomatic incidents which illustrate the conduct of international affairs by the Soviets. As a whole, the book, which gives mainly a survey of German-Russian relations, is written with sympathy to both sides and with objectivity.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN W., *The Nemesis of Power. The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1953. Pp. 829. \$12.00.

The author's main theme in this lucid and carefully documented volume is the dismal failure of the German officers' corps and with them the German army whenever they got involved in politics, and their share of responsibility in bringing Hitler to power, and in the final catastrophe that put an end to the Third Reich.

John W. Wheeler-Bennett with his first-hand knowledge of political developments in Germany, his previous writings on contemporary German history and his most recent research on captured German documents, has produced a *magnum opus* on the German army.

The major part of the book, in fact about 500 pages, are devoted to the strange and shifting relationship between the German army and Hitler. Part II of the book covers the period from 1920-1933 when some "political" generals, such as Schleicher, labored under the illusion that they could use Hitler and the Nazi Party for their own nefarious political schemes. Part III begins with 1933 and shows how step by step the army sold out to the Nazis, and thus lost that professional and political detachment in which the old army had prided itself.

Anyone interested in studying the earlier political ventures of the Prussian General Staff may do so by reading Walter Goerlitz' *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*. Anyone intent on comparing and contrasting two equally authoritative versions of the Nazi generals in politics, should use Telford Taylor's *Sword and Swastika*.

All three authors are in agreement that the sporadic interference of the General Staff in civilian governmental affairs was bad, but that it was disastrous for the German officers' corps to have helped in bringing the Nazis to power, and then to have stood by passively at a time when only the army could have changed the course of events.

John W. Wheeler-Bennett describes with dramatic skill the unsavory characters in the German army that strutted across the stages of history with their Nazi decorations and Marshall's batons. Not one facet of their political activities is left out, everything is painstakingly documented. At times, details of their private lives have been dug up from letters, or from conversations with friends and relatives of the men who played so important a role in the total collapse of Germany in 1945, and the men who sacrificed their lives in an attempt to eliminate Hitler. The author does justice to both the men of the resistance and those army men who aided and abetted Hitler to the bitter end.

The author is at his best when his facile pen describes the activities of individuals in moments of crisis, and the impact of their actions. Even in the first two chapters, condensed as they are, he does not fail to give extraordinarily vivid character sketches of Luettwitz and Kapp while describing the period from the armistice to the Kapp-Putsch, that first abortive plan to set up a military dictatorship.

While giving an account of the masterly fashion in which Seeckt, disdainful of the Republic to train an army of professional soldiers loyal to him but indifferent to the fate of the German Republic, the author cannot resist the temptation of describing in almost glowing terms the ability and personality of the man Seeckt. There can be no doubt as to Seeckt's military genius in creating the Reichswehr, and his talent in enlisting the aid of German industry in the illegal rearmament of a supposedly demilitarized Germany. But in politics, it seems to me, he was as irresponsible as most German generals, and either incapable or unwilling to see the concomitants of his pro-Russian policy. By contrast with Schleicher, the political intriguer *par excellence*, Seeckt may seem relatively non-political and intent only on salvaging the best officers of the general staff and the army for future use, but he was deeply involved in the political gamble that staked all its cards on Russia. The ties which led from the Reichswehr to the Red Army, and from German armaments firms to factories and experimental stations for new equipment and airplanes in Russia were held in those same hands which are so eloquently described by John W. Wheeler-Bennett: "Long, thin, sensitive, they might have belonged to Cellini or to Chopin. . . ."

Every reader, whether historian or layman, will be spellbound by that part of the book which shows the unrelenting degradation of the once proud German army as soon as Hitler, Himmler and Co. were firmly in the saddle. This was done by the simple device of discrediting reputable, but politically independent officers, and by advancing the Nazi bootlickers among the officers' corps to high military posts which carried with them well-sounding titles, glittering decorations, landed estates, marshall's batons, but practically no power or influence.

The lack of esprit de corps and courage displayed by most German officers when officers with a sense of pride and independence of mind were besmirched by the Nazis, forms a chapter in the history of the Germany army which no amount of heroism on the part of individual officers can wipe out. They missed their chance in the early days of the Nazi régime when they could have done something about injustice done to one of their own, just as most of them missed their chance later when injustice was done to millions of innocent people. At no time did the officers' corps as a whole show righteous indignation, or do something to protect their own officers' caste and their own people from the outrage of the Hitler régime. Those who tried it on July 20, 1944, were betrayed and shot by other officers who thereby hoped to save themselves.

Among the thousands who were tried and executed were some of the cowards, but also some of the most courageous men and women.

Wheeler-Bennett ends his book with an epilogue in which he asks the pointed question whether "a new spirit is abroad in Germany" today when we are contemplating the recreation of a German army under EDC.

Vassar College

ALMA M. LUCKAU

RASCHHOFFER, HERMANN, *Die Sudetenfrage*. München: Isar Verlag, 1953. Pp. 480. \$6.50.

The German-Slav borderlands across Central Europe have for a long time been a subject of trouble and friction. But with the possible exception of the German-Polish frontier feuds none of them has been more bitter and played more havoc with international relations than the tug-of-war over the hilly strip of land along the Czechoslovak-German boundary commonly known as the Sudeten areas.

Mr. Raschhofer subjects the international developments affecting those areas to a thorough analysis from the viewpoint of international law. After dealing briefly with the events prior to 1918, the author discusses at length the developments of World War I leading to the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia, which included the "Sudetenland" within her frontiers. His emphasis is, however, on the period beginning with 1938 and therein also lies the main contributions he attempts to make.

The essence of Raschhofer's thesis may be summarized as follows: On September 21, 1938, Great Britain, France and Czechoslovakia reached an agreement (*Einigung*) whereby Czechoslovakia ceded to Germany the Sudeten areas. The subsequent agreement, concluded at Munich on September 30, 1938, among Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, which he characterizes as "collective adjudication", confirmed the cession and provided for its "technical execution." Once the transfer of the Sudeten areas had been carried out the Munich agreement "became an executed treaty and thereby a fully valid international legal document" ("*ein rechtskräftiges Völkerrechtsinstrument*"). This view of the Munich agreement is at least highly debatable and many have held that it was invalid from the beginning (cf. this reviewer's *Czechoslovak Cause*. London, 1945). Even so it may be conceded that a strict reading of international law grants some justification for Mr. Raschhofer's contrary thesis. This cannot be said, however, of the author's fantastic assertion that the Munich settlement is still legally in force as of today and that, consequently, the Sudeten areas still legally belong to Germany and are only in an "interim protective holding" (*interimistischer Besitzschutz*) of Czechoslovakia. With astounding lack of sense for objective evaluation, the author fails to draw proper conclusion from the fact that not only Czechoslovakia, but also Britain, France and Italy have officially repudiated the validity of the Munich agreement; that according to the rules of international law the flagrant violation of the Munich settlement by Germany gave all the other parties thereto an unquestionable right to repudiate it and render it thereby void; and that the Allied Declaration regarding the German capitulation in June 5, 1949, specifically referred to the German boundaries as of December 31, 1937.

Indeed, according to Mr. Raschhofer, the territory that Hitler had wrested

from Czechoslovakia in 1938 could be returned to her *legally* only in one way, namely, through "the consent of the ceding state", i.e. Germany.

The liberties which the author takes with legal interpretations when he touches upon the "Sudetenland", are perhaps best illustrated by the contrasting conclusion he reaches in the case of Austria. To him Austria is no longer legally part of Germany because Austria was annexed by Hitler without any agreement to that effect and her separation from Germany in 1945 was just a "de-annexation." On the other hand, the "transfer of sovereignty" in the case of the Sudeten areas was not an annexation but an "adjudication" by the Great Powers on the basis of Czechoslovak readiness to cede.

Is not Mr. Raschhofer aware of the overwhelming evidence that there was no more "readiness" to "cede" on the part of Czechoslovakia than there was on the part of Austria? And is the question of coercion against Czechoslovakia without any legal bearing on the validity of an international agreement?

The University of Texas

EDUARD TÁBORSKÝ

HUBATSCH, WALTHER, *Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940*. Göttingen: "Musterschmidt" Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952. Pp. 511. DM 29.80.

This book forms part of a series of studies on contemporary issues published by the *Institut für Völkerrecht* at the University of Göttingen. Its author, Professor Hubatsch, who has written several works on German-Scandinavian relations, presents a description of the diplomatic prelude, the planning and execution of the invasion of Denmark and Norway until the capitulation of Norwegian forces, on June 10, 1940.

Using as a motto for his work Churchill's statement: "The two Admiralties thought with precision along the same lines in correct strategy," he shows that English as well as German naval authorities were urging their governments to occupy Norwegian ports, to gain firm control over the flow of Swedish iron ore through Norwegian territory, and to expand the operational bases of their fleets. He contends that Germany's primary reason for occupying Norway was to forestall an impending British invasion, and that the decision to occupy Denmark was taken to ensure German communications with Norway.

The chief portion of Professor Hubatsch's book is devoted to a detailed account of the actual invasion which is of particular significance because Germany's Scandinavian campaign constitutes the first large-scale combined operation of army, navy, and air force. His description of the political aspect of the invasion brings out the importance of *Reichsleiter* Rosenberg on whose instruction Quisling was installed as Prime Minister of Norway.

In analyzing the results of the invasion, Hubatsch concludes that it assured Germany of a steady supply of Swedish iron ore required to carry on the war. On the other hand, huge naval losses incurred by Germany during the invasion, together with Britain's occupation of Iceland, largely neutralized gains from the acquisition of Norwegian naval bases. He believes that it might have been wiser to let England take the initiative in invading Norway. This would have weakened British forces for the impending battle in the West.

For his work, Professor Hubatsch utilized a wealth of hitherto unpublished material, including the *Lageberichte des Wehrmachtsführungsstabes*, and diaries

of German staff officers. He uses the most recent German, British, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish documents for the diplomatic background.

While critically analyzing documents of the Nuremberg Trial (p. viii), of the British (p. 150) and Swedish (p. 135) governments, the author does not express any criticism of the German Whitebooks of 1940, which are freely used by him, and which undoubtedly include tendentious material. Also, in juxtaposing British and German plans regarding Norway, he fails to mention the fact that Britain had no political designs on Norway, and he minimizes the connection between Germany's immediate military aims and her ultimate plans to nazify Norway and to incorporate her in a Greater Germanic *Reich*.

Nonetheless, his book constitutes an important contribution to an understanding of the Scandinavian phase of World War II. It is of particular value to military historians. Excellent maps and sketches, and an appendix which occupies almost half of the book and includes, in addition to the *Lageberichte*, extracts from the diaries of Jodl and Rosenberg, enhance its usefulness.

Berkeley, California

ALEXANDER LIPSKI

GAROSCI, ALDO, *Storia dei fuorusciti*. (No. 11 of series, *Libri del tempo*.) Bari: Laterza, 1953. Pp. 309. Lire 1400.

Students of contemporary Italy will be grateful to Aldo Garosci for this excellent history of the anti-Fascist *émigrés* between 1922 and 1945. Few men are better qualified than he to write such a study. An expatriate himself, Garosci became intimately acquainted with the leading Italian *fuorusciti*. Like the majority of his confrères, he made his headquarters in Paris, but he went to Spain during the early phase of the civil war, and when the Germans invaded France he fled to the United States. In 1943 he returned to Italy with assistance from the Allies.

Garosci already has written much about the emigration. In 1945 he published *La Vita di Carlo Rosselli* (Florence: Edizioni "U"), a two-volume biographical study of the distinguished *émigré* who founded the "liberal socialist" Justice and Liberty movement, of which Garosci was a member. Subsequently he prepared the section on Italian communism in the study edited by Mario Einaudi, *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), and in Rome in 1950 he published serially in *Mondo* some of the material contained in the book under review.

In *Storia dei fuorusciti* Garosci has assigned a more equitable amount of space to the competing political groups than was possible in his earlier, more specialized studies. The author gives a clear account of the relations between Nenni's Socialists and the Communists during the Popular Front era, and he presents much new information about the period after the assassination of Rosselli in 1937. Considerable attention is given to the conversations between the *émigrés* who fled to the United States in 1940 and officials of our State Department. These discussions were of some importance in shaping this country's war-time policies toward Italy. Garosci also offers an interesting but brief discussion of the impact of foreign residence upon the writings of Gaetano Salvemini, G. A. Borgese, Angelo Tasca, Ignazio Silone, Franco and Lionello Venturi, Leo Valiani, Silvio Trentin, and others.

In the preface to his book Garosci states three problems he seeks to answer: Who were the expatriates? Can one formulate a general problem regarding the

émigrés, or can one simply indicate different problems and solutions for different periods and personalities? How did the *émigrés* influence the destiny of Italy? Eight chapters, crammed with details, furnish the answer to the first question and chronicle the activities of the *fuorusciti* between 1922 and 1945. The expatriates came from no single social stratum and their economic and political beliefs covered the widest possible range. It is virtually impossible to draw any conclusion regarding the work of the *émigrés* that would be valid for all groups at all times, Garosci declares.

With respect to the question whether the *émigrés* influenced the destiny of Italy, Garosci takes issue with those people, particularly the neo-Fascists, who deny that the *fuorusciti* contributed anything worthwhile to Italy's development. He also crosses swords with those, like the late Benedetto Croce, who have asserted that, although the *émigrés* were often personally worthy and performed a useful function as critics, their impact upon Italian history was quite restricted in comparison with that of the men who stayed home. Those who share Croce's view apparently seek to draw an analogy between the recent anti-Fascist emigration and Mazzini's foreign-based conspirators of the last century. According to this school of thought, Mazzini's role was of less practical importance in unifying Italy than that of the domestic liberal forces headed by Cavour; in like manner the work of the twentieth century *émigré* conspirators was less important than that of the domestic anti-Fascists. Denying the validity of this analogy, Garosci points out that no internal opposition movement of "Cavourians" emerged in Mussolini's Italy. Moreover, he places great emphasis upon the moral influence that the *émigrés* have exercised on contemporary Italy; and, finally, he stresses that during the northern Italian Resistance between 1943 and 1945 the work of the ex-*émigrés* became inseparably fused with that of the domestic anti-Fascists. Garosci concludes, "There is only one history of Italian freedom, and the history of the expatriates quite legitimately forms a part of it" (p. 260).

The subject of the anti-Fascist emigration is one of the most controversial in Italian historiography; Garosci is therefore to be commended for his generally cautious and dispassionate analysis of the work of the dozen or more rival political factions. His comments and conclusions, however, will not please all of his readers. The Italian Communists unquestionably will think that they have been maligned, and some of the liberals and monarchists may feel that their roles were slighted. This critic believes that most of Garosci's judgments are well founded and about as impartial as one can reasonably expect of a writer who was personally concerned with what he discusses and who, quite understandably, has deep moral convictions on the subject of Fascism. This reviewer's only criticism relates to some of the book's literary style. At times he had the feeling that the book may have been hurried into print. Some of Garosci's comments could be clarified by shorter sentences and simpler syntax, and occasionally the author has hedged his conclusions to the extent that they lose considerable significance. In not all instances are sources of quotations and information given. These are minor defects in a book which is a signal contribution to recent Italian history.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

CAROE, SIR OLAF, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. London and New York: Macmillan, 1953. Pp. vii, 300. \$5.00.

Sir Olaf Caroe, who spent more than 25 years in the Indian Civil Service,

and is the author of *The Wells of Power* (1951), has now turned his attention to Soviet Central Asia. His new book is a product neither of direct personal experience—for obvious reasons—nor of extended original research. But it is of much importance because he has brought conveniently together, in clear, concise and succinct form a great body of material, drawn from Russian, Turkish and Soviet sources, which throws considerable light on developments in a very important part of Asia—and of the Soviet Union.

Sir Olaf's work is composed of three essential parts, the first two of which dealing briefly with the long past, treat of "The Muslim Period and the Tsars" and the transition, ca. 1917-1924, from Tsarist authority to Soviet domination. Without doubt, it is Part III, concerned with "Soviet Pressures," which will interest most students and readers because it deals with the contemporary scene, and points out the serious distinction between Communist pretense, proclamation and propaganda and Soviet practice in Central Asia which has served as a kind of "window display" for kindred peoples on the other side of the frontier in Iran and Afghanistan, in particular. This section, for instance, is concerned with the problems of nationalism and the Soviet Colonial Empire, Russianization, collectivism and the suppression of nomadism, industrialization and public works, literature and the question of "Deviationism." The author has some especially interesting reflections on the question of "self-determination," as applied to the republics of Soviet Central Asia, particularly as it relates to the "higher right of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which highlight the Soviet role as a leader in the "liberation" of the peoples of Asia. Similarly, his analysis of the process of Russianization is interesting in the same connection. But of equal interest, perhaps, is his characterization of Soviet economic exploitation of these peoples of Central Asia, many of Turkish ethnic origin. The author has also brought together something of the story of this area and its peoples during the course of World War II, of soldiers taken prisoner by Nazi Germany and exploited for its own secular purposes. He is not an advocate of Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamism. He does believe, however, that there are possibilities for a national revival in Soviet Central Asia, along independent lines, and that to "bring about the disappearance of the nations of Central Asia by complete assimilation," the Soviet Union would "have to torture and oppress these millions for centuries."

The book is soberly written and well documented, with a good bibliography for further reference and research. There are, in addition, four black and white maps showing the physical characteristics of the area, the Russian advance in Central Asia, the railway network and the linguistic distribution.

Arlington, Virginia

HARRY N. HOWARD

LABUDA, GERARD, *Pierwsze państwo słowiańskie - Państwo Samona (First Slavonic State - Samo's State)*. Poznań: Biblioteka Historyczna pod redakcją Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk (Historical Library edited by the Poznań Friends of Science Society), 1949. Pp. vii, 357.

Labuda has compared and meticulously analyzed the limited sources available on the subject of the first Slavonic State. His conclusions, although they seem plausible, cannot avoid being subject to controversy.

In the first chapter Labuda lists and appraises bibliography on Samo (23 pages). It is his opinion that the best synthetic outline yet published is the one by Václav Novotný (*České dějiny*, Prague, 1912). In the second chapter the

author deals with all the sources (Fredegarius, *Gesta Dagoberti regis, Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum*, Aimon de Fleury, *Vita sancti Virgilii*, Auctarium Garstense). Labuda reaches the conclusion that the unique primary source is the chronicle of Fredegarius, and this text is thoroughly analyzed in the third chapter. The author defends his thesis that all the information contained in this chronicle was obtained through some intermediary, without, however, diminishing its basic authenticity.

In chapter four Labuda tries to establish the nationality, race and place of origin of Samo, whom he classifies as probably a romanized Celt, a Frankish subject, and a merchant of the region of the city of Sens. The cradle of his state was probably Moravia. The fifth chapter is on the socio-political genesis of the state of Samo. Apparently at the time Labuda's book was published in Poland the pressure of official communist theories was not yet strong enough to affect Labuda's analysis of "The First Slavonic State." Despite the official Soviet theory of the class origin of states, Labuda attributes the formation of Samo's state rather to the pressure of the Avars and of the Franks than to the social struggle. He distinguishes furthermore between the Slav tribes in Carinthia, Moravia and Slovenia under direct Avar domination and other Slav tribes which were independent. At the end of the sixth and at the beginning of the seventh centuries, these Slavs formed an alliance with the Avars, this alliance being of the "foedus iniquum" type where the Avars were dominant. It is true that the Slavs of Moravia revolted against the Avars, but Labuda states that these Slavs were aided by other Slav tribes. He quotes Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*, vol. III, which describes a Slav invasion of the Balkans in 622-627. The Byzantine empire probably tried to influence the Slavs to push back the Avars from Dalmatia. According to the chronicle of Fredegarius, Samo arrived in Moravia soon after the beginning of the Slav revolt. His role probably consisted of negotiating a rapprochement between the Franks and the Slavs, and his deed won him the crown of the Slav state.

The revolt in Moravia, however, was only a part of the general movement of the Slav tribes, aided by the Byzantine empire, against the Avars. A conflict between the Franks and the Slavs was caused later by Samo when, as the Slav king, he did not recognize the sovereignty of Dagobert. Samo died in 658 or 659. Labuda admits that there is a complete lack of information available on the Slavs of Central Europe for this period; however he feels that there is no justification for the belief that after Samo's death his state ceased to exist. On the contrary, the Great Moravian state of the ninth century is probably a direct successor to Samo's state. In his sixth chapter the author discusses the political institutions, the frontiers and foreign relations of the state of Samo. The work is completed by four addenda. In the first, Labuda maintains that the chronicle of Fredegarius was written in St-Jean-de-Losne (Latona) near Chalon-sur-Saône, ancient capital of Burgundy. In the second he discusses the meaning of the term "befulci" used by Fredegarius, claiming that it is a Lombard word meaning "shepherd." In the third Labuda lists the Avar invasions in Franconia from 562-567 until 595. In the fourth he establishes the chronology of the Byzantine wars against Avars and Slavs at the end of the sixth century. A seven page summary in French is to be found on pages 351-357. The official organ of the Warsaw Historical Association, *Przegląd Historyczny* has praised Labuda's book as the best work of Polish scientific literature on the subject. There is no doubt that this erudite book is really

useful both for reading and teaching purposes. Unfortunately it lacks an index and the table of contents is insufficiently detailed.

University of Montréal

LUDWIK KOS RABCEWICZ ZUBKOWSKI

RASPI, SERGIO, *Relazioni fra Piemonte e Corsica durante la guerra di successione d'Austria, con appendice di documenti inediti*. Udine: Tipografia arti grafiche friulane, 1949. Pp. 239. 350 fr.

This monograph deals with Sardinian relations with Corsica during the era when the future fate of the island was actually determined: the War of Austrian Succession. Although Corsica was not officially annexed to France until 1769, Louis XVI could boast in 1749 that he was the real master of the island.

The Corsicans had revolted against their Genoese rulers as early as 1729. Throughout the 1730's the unhappy island was rent by dissension and plagued with revolt. Not until 1738, however, when, at the end of the War of Polish Succession, the Kingdom of Sardinia was enlarged and two French dynasties were established in the Apennine peninsula, did Corsica become a prized pawn in Mediterranean politics. Alarmed by Sardinian ambitions to expand to Corsica and down the Ligurian coast, and fearful of increasing British efforts to strengthen their position in the Mediterranean, the Genoese now turned to the French for support in maintaining the territorial integrity of their republic and reducing the Corsicans to obedience. When the War of Austrian Succession broke out in 1740, not only the Genoese, but also the French, Sardinians, and British were intensely interested in Corsican affairs and were all secretly hoping to gain hegemony in the island.

Taking advantage of internal strife in Corsica, Charles Emanuel III, of Sardinia, threw his influence behind the efforts of Count Domenico Rivarola, a Corsican refugee in Tuscany, to obtain mastery of the island. The British and Austrians promised to back the Piedmontese king in this endeavor, while the Genoese received assurances of active help from France, Spain, and Naples to defend their territories against the Austrians and British, who were also their enemies in the European-wide War of Austrian Succession.

In spite of its promise to aid Rivarola, the Sardinian government sent him ineffectual military forces, and the Austrians practically none at all, while the British navy did very little to help the invaders. Rivarola was able to occupy just Bastia and San Fiorenzo, and finally he was bottled up in the latter fortification.

In 1748 an armistice was signed stipulating that the Austro-Sardinians were to remain only in the area around Bastia and San Fiorenzo, whereas the Genoese-French partisans were to occupy the rest of the island. Soon thereafter the French succeeded in inducing the Sardinian government to withdraw its occupation forces from the Bastia-San Fiorenzo area, while permitting French troops to remain in Corsica as "auxiliaries" to the republic. In this way did the Sardinians open the door for the French eventually to take over the whole island.

Raspi's account of the struggle for dominance in Corsica has been based largely on documents in the Turin state archives, many of which are printed verbatim in the appendix. The author has been cautious and judicious in his interpretation of the source material from which he has drawn his conclusions. In his work Raspi not only explains how and why the Genoese lost control of Cor-

sica, but also makes a solid contribution of the study of the War of Austrian Succession in the Mediterranean theater of operations.
University of Texas

R. JOHN RATH

SFORZA, CARLO, *Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi: la politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951*. Rome: Atalante, 1952. Pp. 586. Lire 2,000.

These memoirs relate to the activity of the late Count Sforza during the period between February 1947 and 1951 when he served as Italian Foreign Minister. Upon retiring because of ill health, the venerable republican and anti-Fascist diplomat devoted the remaining months of his life to the compilation of the material presented in this volume. The book contains quite a number of hitherto confidential Foreign Ministry documents, as well as excerpts of speeches and statements by Sforza before Parliament and other bodies. In general, the author lets the documents speak for themselves, presenting little in the way of background information or general narrative. All in all, the book confirms what was generally known about Sforza's policies and presents no sensational revelations. By more ruthless editorial effort the author could easily have eliminated much repetitious material and shortened the book to good advantage.

Throughout the volume Sforza defends his policies against the bitter attacks from Communists and Nenni Socialists on the left and unreconstructed nationalists on the right who repeatedly accused him of sacrificing his country's vital interests. Although he was displeased with the harsh peace treaty of 1947, Sforza acquiesced because there was no alternative. Not to have signed would have meant continued Allied occupation and the possibility that Italy would undergo some of the unhappy experiences Germany faced. Sforza was determined to bring about revision of the treaty, however, and he realized that this could not be done by unilateral action or gambling on war. Only by becoming a respected member of the European community and by being willing to make concessions could Italy ever hope to obtain treaty revision, he insisted.

In a speech to the Constituent Assembly in July 1947 Sforza set forth his long-term objective "to reinstate Italy in the Western European community, of which by tradition and history it is an indissoluble part, transforming at the same time the new links which we steadily have succeeded in forming into a permanent European organization which one day may represent the nucleus of a federated Europe." Such a federated Europe should endeavor to get along with all political systems in the world. Other aims of the Foreign Minister included the achievement of genuine understanding with the Slav world over Trieste, friendly relations with African peoples, and increased Italian emigration to Latin America.

In line with his internationalist outlook, Sforza, loyally supported by Premier DeGasperri, gave vigorous encouragement to the Marshall Plan, Schuman Plan, Strasbourg Council of Europe, and other post-war programs. He also expressed faith in the idea of the United Nations and lamented the Soviet veto of Italian membership. With respect to the proposed Atlantic Pact in 1948, Sforza concedes that his government was at first not overly enthusiastic because it preferred the program of European federation. Later, however, Italy sought to achieve both, assigning NATO first priority.

The various major topics of foreign policy are discussed in a chapter or

two for each. The one on Trieste is the longest, as might be expected. Sforza admits that neither Italy nor Yugoslavia really wanted the Free Territory idea to go into operation, and that at least for the moment Italy hoped that Anglo-American occupation forces would remain in Zone A. Sforza denies Communist allegations that the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, 1948, by the United States, Britain, and France in favor of returning Trieste to Italy was a sudden electoral maneuver by the DeGasperi government. He points out that conversations had been underway with the three powers since early January.

The last chapter, "Leave-taking," written a few days before his death, is an exhortation by the ex-diplomat to his fellow Italians to stop bemoaning the past, look to the future, and remember Mazzini's teachings that nations now must be interdependent. "Italy has everything to gain from now on by being the herald of the European ideal; it need only proclaim itself the Piedmont of such an ideal," he concludes.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

GADOUREK, I., *The Political Control of Czechoslovakia: A Study in Social Control of a Soviet Satellite State*. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese N. V., 1953. Pp. xviii, 285. \$3.75.

Gadourek's study of the political control of Czechoslovakia is sociological. In *Part I* he expounds the thesis that the narrow leadership of the Communist Party is in firm control of all the regions of Czechoslovak society—political, economic, educational, religious, and so on—on all three planes, ideological, material, societal. In *Part II* he describes the methods and impact of control.

Much of what he has to say is extremely interesting, as, for example, his section on "control through face-to-face groups", in which he shows that the small organization is at least as important as the large (pp. 173-76). Much of the book, too, is convincing, despite the fact that Gadourek has had to rely heavily on the reports—unverifiable by outsiders—of refugees and resistance groups. But not everything can be accepted. His account of the Slánský affair is too narrow. He treats it mainly as an example of the control recently exercised by and in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and, to the disadvantage of his book, scarcely touches its wider aspect as part of a long ideological struggle within the communist world (pp. 45-50). This, however, and other mistakes and misunderstandings, seem to be due, in part at least, to the time-lag between completion and publication of the book. Much has happened since 1952.

But another and more important cause is the author's approach. Czechoslovakia is in the midst of a revolution, and a static approach to it invites errors. Yet, till near the end of the book where he talks about the future, Gadourek uses just this approach. Had he, without abandoning his sociological framework, tackled his subject dynamically or historically, he would no doubt have interpreted the Slánský affair more correctly. He would, too, have given more and proper weight in the actual development—and so present pattern—of the Communists' control to such factors as the peculiarly strong position of the presidency (pp. 45-50 and 66-68) and the peculiarly weak position of the Roman Catholic Church (pp. 125-29) in pre-1948 Czechoslovakia.

When the dynamic approach is used in the last forty-odd pages, it suddenly emerges that there is a "space outside control" in Czechoslovak society. This impression readers do not get from the preceding pages. It is announced,

of course, that the "dynamic counterpart" of the book will soon be published. But this seems to be putting the cart before the horse. It may well be found that there is more "space outside control" than presently admitted—that, in fact, the cart does not fit the horse. The same may be true of a proposed treatment of Czechoslovakia's international role.

Dr. Gadourek has made a painstaking study, and it is a pity that it should be somewhat marred by his poor command of English. He really deserves help in the use of such words as "the" or "since" and in avoiding such mistakes as "the occupational Red Army" (p. 9). Here and there, too, more care is called for of him. "Party corporal" is not a translation of *desítkový důvěrník* (p. 27).

This, then, is a useful, if not a first-class book. It is the first only of a series to be published by the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, which claims to be an independent organization of Czechoslovak intellectuals. The first objective of the series is to be "unbiased". It is to be hoped that this will not be lost in pursuit of the third objective, which is to work out a "concrete program" to "restore freedom" in Czechoslovakia.

University of Pittsburgh

WILLIAM V. WALLACE

SHORTER NOTICES

KRYPTON, CONSTANTINE, *The Northern Sea Route: Its Place in Russian Economic History before 1917*. New York: Research Program on the U. S. S. R., 1953. Pp. 194.

The practicability of the northern sea route has long been a subject of investigation and speculation. Climatic and topographical factors have been discussed at considerable length. Mr. Krypton approaches the subject from a less familiar angle—the economic aspects of the problem and their connection with the development of Siberia and Imperial economic policies. As a former director of the economic section of the Northern Research Institute of the U. S. S. R., the author brings to his study wide knowledge and extensive research in the unpublished sources in the Russian archives. The book was written under the auspices of the Research Program on the U. S. S. R., financed by the East European Fund Inc. of the Ford Foundation.

The story Mr. Krypton tells is one of conflict between the desire of Siberian entrepreneurs for more efficient transportation routes to and from European markets and the hesitancy of the central government to risk the competition of foreign industry as well as the danger of encouraging trends toward political and economic independence in the Siberian colonial area. As a matter of fact, these apprehensions on the part of St. Petersburg were strong enough to neutralize in large measure its parallel desire to develop the northern route for other purposes. The result was that what little commercial traffic did exist before 1917 was chiefly in foreign lands.

Mr. Krypton promises a subsequent volume continuing the story under the Soviet régime. It may be anticipated that it will be, like its predecessor, a valuable addition to the literature on this subject.

University of Colorado

ROBERT P. BROWDER

ROEDER, WILLIAM S., ed., *Dictionary of European History*. Introduction by Henry Elmer Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 314. \$6.00.

There is always need for a brief handbook of world history. The present is quite selective and very brief. The selection of rubrics is, one might grant, conventional for such a publication, but one would look in vain for any notable enlightenment in Central European history or even for the bare mention of significant personages and events. What facts are given are generally accurate, but the style, even for an encyclopedia, is unnecessarily hackneyed.

T.

ANDERSONS, EDGARS, ed., *Latvia: Cross Road Country*, Waverly (Iowa): Latvju Grāmata, 1953. Pp. 386.

This attractive compendium, edited and in part written by the Latvian historian and philologist, Edgars Andersons, offers a profusion of excellent photographs and illustrations, eighteen essays by Latvian authors (most of whom may claim distinguished academic backgrounds), appendices and a somewhat haphazard bibliography.

From this enthusiastic and detailed presentation of a mass of information about almost every aspect of private and public life in pre-Soviet Latvia the patient student may winnow much that is significant in the development and survival not only of Latvian, but of Baltic culture. Arveds Svabe's crisp and dynamic historical resumé merits particular attention. The editor's chapter on demography, being both informative and interpretive, presents a valuable insight into national character. The chapters on Latvian arts and letters will be welcomed by those who have hitherto found little material in English on these subjects.

Although much of the information in this volume is of the kind available in the files of information centers, references are made to the serious works of Spekke, Svabe and Bilmanis. Sophisticated critical attitudes are hardly required of patriots in exile writing in tribute to the thirty-fifth anniversary of a democratic Latvia. One could wish that a more professional editing of the copy had added to the dignity of the lyrical and nostalgic passages.

Z.

KRUMWEIDE, HANS-WALTER, *Glaube und Geschichte in der Theologie Luthers*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952. Pp. 119. \$1.75.

This book, if I have correctly understood it, deals less with the philosophy of history as the quest for meaning in the sequence of events, as with the problem of the meaning of man's existence within the framework of space and time. The book opens with an analysis of Troeltsch's contention that the Romantic Movement in Germany destroyed the concept of natural law as everywhere and always valid, and substituted for it the concept of ever new upsurgings of divine creativity. These upsurgings might be in the form of nations not subject to universal rules of morality. The author insists that history, and this means man's existence on earth, cannot be explained simply in terms of isolated upsurges of divine energy, nor even in the form of national manifestations. Then he turns to Luther and finds that he posits, isolated or at any rate unique acts of God within the temporal process (such as the choice of Israel as the chosen nation, the incarnation in Christ and the Cross), but from these special acts one is not to assume that there are no universals. What these acts mean is that God is at work in history. The hidden God of Luther is the God who is operative where only the eye of faith is able to discern him. The hidden God is precisely God in Christ. He is present and can be seen through faith. Faith alone, therefore, can penetrate the meaning of history. This God who is at work in some events, which were isolated in the sense of being once and for all, is the same God throughout, and he had made man his co-worker in various callings. Men are thereby linked with each other, and with that which went before and that which is to come after. Yet no particular meaning in the sequence of events appears to emerge. For Krumwiede the meaning of life is discovered in that God is at work and that man is able to cooperate with him.

Yale University

ROLAND H. BAINTON

SZTACHOVA, JIRINA, ed., *Mid-Europe: A Selective Bibliography*. New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1953. Pp. 197. \$2.00.

After extensive research in the Mid-European Studies Center, Dr. Sztachova has prepared a very useful volume, a bibliography which is a unique and indispensable aid for the student of Eastern Europe. He has limited his selection mainly to books written in English, French and German, but some Italian and Spanish books on Central Eastern Europe have been included. The bibliography contains as many as 1693 entries, chosen carefully for specialists and students in the Anglo-American countries, but it will also be welcomed by serious students in other countries who may not be aware of the wealth and level of scholarly research and writing in the West on Central and Eastern Europe. It is especially gratifying that the scholarship in this area is presented largely by Americans. It is not generally realized that some of the more important research in this field has been done in this country.

The content of the bibliography is divided according to the areas of research: Treaties and Documents; Reference Works; Central and Eastern Europe; Politics;

Geography and Population; Sociology and Economics; International Policy, Law, and Diplomacy; and Culture and Religion. The second part of the bibliography lists the literature of the specific countries of Mid-Europe, and provides a very complete cross-index. A future work of this type which should also include articles published in scholarly journals, would be a most welcome contribution to the fields of research and education.

Brooklyn College of the City of New York,
and New York University

FELIKS GROSS

FREUND, MICHAEL, ed., *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Dokumenten. I, Der Weg zum Kriege 1938-1939*. Freiburg: Herder and Karl Alber (Orbis Academicus), 1953. Pp. 474. DM 28.

Professor Freund of Kiel began in 1936 to publish a series, *Weltgeschichte in Dokumenten*, which was soon suspended by the Nazi régime. The present volume is the first of the revived series. The publication of so many memoirs and diaries by diplomats, in addition to the copious documentation in the various colored "papers" and, in more complete form, the documents of the German Foreign Office, provide a rich mass of diplomatic documentation from which to choose. The present collection of 190 pieces is quite carefully selected from this vast amount of printed material. The number of documents presented is much less than in the State Department edition (*Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D*), but here each document is accompanied by an introductory explanation and is related to the following diary excerpt, speech, or speech direction. The emphasis, if any, is naturally on Germany's dominant position in European diplomacy in these crucial years. It would be possible to cavil at any treatment of European pre-war power politics that begins only with the case of Czechoslovakia in March 1938, or even in the case of Czechoslovakia, does not go back beyond 1938. One might also object to a treatment of "Der Weg zum Krieg" that restricts its documentation to diplomatic papers, to the exclusion of the military arm of German nationalism or the controlled press and propaganda. On the other hand there is no observable reluctance to print documents that show clearly the wide disparity between German official declarations to other governments of peaceful and honorable intentions and the orders to the OKW and German diplomats. More care might have been used in details of names and titles. Chamberlain is uniformly called "Sir Neville." The Czech representative in Munich at the time of the "Accord" is called Hubert Masaryk. His name was Masafík.

T.

Les archives secrètes de la Wilhelmstrasse, V, Livre 1: L'Allemagne et la Pologne. Les petites puissances de l'Europe. (Juin 1937-Mars 1939). Translated by Jean R. Weiland. Paris: Plon, 1954. Pp. 669.

The French edition of the documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office proceeds apace. The present volume covers almost the same ground as the parallel Series D, volume V of the State Department *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1938-1945*. The French edition omits "une série de documents d'importance relativement secondaire." One may compare the total number of documents with the American edition to gain an idea of the differing comprehensiveness of the two versions: the French volume contains 421 documents, the American, for the same areas, 560. In addition it should be noted that the American edition (as the German) has a useful analytical and chronological list of the documents, 4 appendices which are helpful, and documents on the Near East and Latin America which did not appear relevant to the French editors. The reader should be apprized of the fact that the numbers of the documents in the two

collections do not correspond, and that it would be necessary to consult the analytical list of documents in the American edition to find the corresponding document in the French translation.

T.

JANETSCHEK, OTTOKAR, *The Emperor Franz Joseph*. London: Werner Laurie, 1953. Pp. 317. 18 s.

Soon after his assignment to Vienna in 1903, Mr. Wickham Steed, well-known as a foreign correspondent of the London *Times*, requested two prominent native historians and two other knowledgeable Austrians to prepare, each from his own observations, a balanced appraisal of the Emperor Francis Joseph for use by the *Times*. None of them succeeded in the task for the personality of the man was too elusive, too enigmatic. Those searching for fresh insight into the character of the Emperor will close the Janetschek book disappointed. Here are reproduced the generally accepted views of the ruler at various stages in his long career, the mold and interpreter of the Hapsburg Monarchy by his own lights, approving minimum concessions to the spirit of the times, and by the dead-weight of his prestige and influence blocking creative efforts to overhaul the creaking machinery of state.

Truth to tell, this book is hardly a biography at all—not in a conventional sense anyway. We are told on the dust cover that the author "made a great reputation for himself as a writer of fictional biography and his books on Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert were very well received." The work under review belongs in the same genre—a gossip romance, or, better, a string of colorful, verbal snapshots—the stuff which delights the celluloid barons of Hollywood—slices out of the unhappy life of a monarch, who was spared no personal calamity, of his immediate family and the archducal clan, arrogant in its eccentricities, socially irresponsible, decadent.

Much of the book is cast in sprightly dialogue, which reveals considerable familiarity with historical actualities. Interwoven in the narrative is a generous quota of accurate information, though glaring factual mistakes strike the eye now and then, dubious emphases appear, and old-wives fables are dished up. Somewhat abridged from the German edition (Vienna, Amalthea Verlag, 1949), the version in English lacks some of the fine pictures found in the original.

For the specialist, this work can scarcely be anything more than diverting. Must it then be concluded that there is not intellectual justification for hewing down noble trees to manufacture the book? For every reader of the standard biographical study of Francis Joseph by Joseph Redlich, there will be hundreds of readers of this glamorous popularization. Yet, just possibly, an occasional reader, his interest quickened by Janetschek, may turn to the sterner fare of the learned Redlich.

The University of Rochester

ARTHUR J. MAY

LÜDDE-NEURATH, WALTER, *Regierung Dönitz. Die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches*. Göttingen: "Musterschmidt" Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2. Auflage, 1953. Pp. 160. DM 5.50.

Mr. Lüdde-Neurath, who had served the Grossadmiral as adjutant since September 1944, offers his account of *Regierung Dönitz* and of the events of May 1 to 23, 1945. It is, on the whole, a candid and readable account; its value is enhanced by an appendix comprising 30 documents. Unfortunately, the author sheds little light on Dönitz' personality; one gains a hazy impression of honesty, dullness, and a singular lack of political acumen. The larger question of responsibility is handled in the accustomed fashion: since Dönitz knew nothing about the atrocities committed in the concentration camps, he is morally and

politically exonerated—no indication that the issue of National Socialism is somewhat larger than this.

University of Colorado

GERHARD LOOSE

HILDEBRANDT, WALTER, *Der Triest-Konflikt und die italienisch-jugoslawische Frage*. Göttingen und Tübingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1953. Pp. 127. DM 12.

Walter Hildebrandt had probably no other ambition, when working on his treatment of the near-exasperating problem of Trieste, than to find facts and organize them in a chronological order. In his book he does not take sides, nor does he pronounce judgment. He follows, in a rather shortened form, the story of Trieste, the surrounding area and Venezia Giulia to show their complete ethnic development, their changing national allegiance and short-lived decisions, as they affected the fate of the region. He points to the nationality problem and the Central European oriented economic interests as they existed in the period preceding World War I; to the unfortunate deal of the secret treaty of London of May 1915 and its consequences; and to the influx of the Italian element in the inter-war period. He sees in Mussolini's policy the culmination of Italian aspirations to penetrate the Balkan area. He describes the wartime happenings and the struggle between the Allied High Command and Tito's headquarters for the administration of the territory; the peace negotiations, the settlement of the Trieste problem and its failure; the Western powers' policy in favor of returning the Free Territory to Italy; the attempts at bilateral negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia; the process of gradual integration of Zone B with Yugoslavia and of Zone A with Italy; and, finally, the last year's declaration of the United States and Great Britain, not implemented, on handing Zone A to the Italian administration.

To the American reader who is acquainted with a number of detailed studies on the problem of Trieste, Hildebrandt's book will not offer new revelation. He will, however, appreciate its factual nature and well presented survey of the most important events which have led to the melancholy of the Trieste question, piling up new problems upon old ones without solving their crux, which, perhaps, remains intractable.

University of Denver

JOSEF KORBEL

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